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C hap te r  1: INTRODUCTION
“D ie Psychologie des K indes leidet, w ie die der Tiere, häufig an dem Fehler, dass die 
Beobachtungen nicht objektiv interpretiert, sondern durch subjektive Reflexionen ergänzt 
werden. Infolgedessen werden dann [ . . . ]  die frühesten, tatsächlich rein assoziativ  
entstandenen Vorstellungsverbindungen als Akte einer logischen Reflexion gedeutet.” 
(Wilhelm Wundt, 1913, p. 363).
[“C hild-psychology often suffers from  the same mistake that is m ade in anim al psychology: 
namely, that the observations a re n ’t in terpreted  objectively, but are f il le d  out with subjective  
reflections. Thus, the earliest ideational combinations, which are in reality pu rely  
associative, are regarded  as acts o f  log ica l reflection  [ ...] .” (Wundt, 1897/1997)]
Development of action perception: 
Neurocognitive mechanisms underlying 
children’s processing of others’ actions
The present thesis investigates how young children perceive and process others’ actions. It 
reports a series o f studies employing behavioral observation techniques, eye-tracking and 
electrophysiological recordings that were designed to examine developmental changes in 
children’s action perception and the neurocognitive mechanisms that subserve children’s 
processing o f others’ actions. The first chapter o f the thesis will introduce the reader to the 
topic. The first section will provide a general historical background on the topic and will give 
definitions o f the key concepts o f this thesis. The second section will familiarize the reader 
with some main findings o f this research area and will introduce the theories that were 
examined in this thesis. Finally, the third section will give a short overview over the 
remaining chapters o f the thesis.
1. Historical background and Definitions
“0  a v 0 p w n o £  u ú g si noÁmKÓv Zwov” [Human is, by his nature, a social being] (Aristotle, 
Politik 1253 a2). From early on, as exemplified in this quotation from A ristotle’s classical 
work Politika, thinkers have recognized the social nature o f human life. Humans live in very 
different forms of social communities, ranging from small-scale groups to large-scale
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societies with functionally specialized sub-systems (e.g., Luhmann, 1989). Additionally, 
human social life is very flexible. Humans are able to change the manner o f their social 
behavior and adapt it to new environmental circumstances or novel ideas as evidenced in the 
many transformations human societies have experienced in the past two thousand years (e.g., 
Rietbergen, 1998; Weber, 2000). Humans are furthermore unique in their ability to culturally 
transmit knowledge and skills from one generation to the next (Habermas, 1981; Tomasello, 
Kruger, & Ratner, 1993). Based on the acknowledgement o f these facts, it has been 
concluded that humans are social beings at core and develop their competencies and 
characteristics in interaction with other humans (e.g., Brandom, 1994; Buber, 1923; Mead, 
1934; Habermas, 1981; Tugendhat, 1979). I f  other humans and their actions are so vital for 
human development, then the more concrete questions arises o f how human children perceive 
other people’s actions, how they process action-related information and how they are able to 
learn through the observation o f other people’s actions.
Even though questions on the nature o f intentionality and intentional action control 
have been a major topic o f interest in empirical psychology since its origins (James, 1890; 
Lotze, 1852), the early psychologists widely neglected questions o f how people -  and 
especially children -  process the actions o f others. In the tradition o f British Empiricism and 
Kantian philosophy, they were mostly interested in questions regarding the nature o f sensory- 
specific stimulus perception, consciousness, and spatial as well as temporal representations. 
This is exemplified in W undt’s (1913) search for the basic elements o f consciousness and the 
apperceptive integration o f these basic elements into higher order mental representations. 
Following this tradition, research on action mainly concentrated on questions o f intentional 
action control, for example, the relation between consciousness and action control (James, 
1890). This changed, however, in the first half o f the 20th century.
1.1 Three approaches to action perception in the early 20th century
At least three major psychological movements generated systematic investigations of 
children’s and adults’ perception o f other people’s actions: Behaviorism, Psychoanalysis, and 
Genetic Epistemology. W ith the rise o f Behaviorism and its critics o f a speculative form of 
psychology that was often based on introspection, psychological research started to 
concentrate on studying the impact of environmental factors on human behavior. As indicated 
by its name, behavior became the central category, in contrast to, for example, consciousness 
or phenomenological reports of subjective experiences. Human behavior was studied as a
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function o f learning processes and internal drives (e.g., Hull, 1943). Even though, within 
developmental psychology, the main focus o f behaviorist research was on the application of 
animal findings to young children (e.g., Bijou, 1955), the impact o f other people’s actions on 
the behavior o f the individual also became a topic o f interest for the behaviorist movement 
(e.g., Skinner, 1948). W ithin this approach, other people’s actions were mainly conceived of 
as being conditioned stimuli or rewards that affect an individual’s behavior. Children’s 
development was seen as a sequence o f learning processes governed by associative and 
instrumental learning. This approach was further fruitful as it led to a theory o f imitation and 
subsequent experiments that showed how participants could acquire a tendency to imitate by 
means o f reward-learning (Miller & Dollard, 1941)1. However, neither o f these studies 
controlled for the impact o f emulation learning, local enhancement or stimulus enhancement 
(see Tomasello, 1999). Furthermore, even if  it were to be assumed that the participants 
learned to copy specific actions, by focusing on the behavioral outcomes the cognitive 
mechanisms that enabled the translation o f observed behavior into one’s own actions were 
neglected (cf. Brass & Heyes, 2005).
A wealthier concept o f human action perception and processing was pursued within 
psychoanalytic approaches to the human mind (e.g., Freud, 1917; Fromm, 1932). Freud 
(1917), for example, suggested that in the course o f human development from the oral to the 
genital phase, children introject or internalize (i.e. build an internal representation of) their 
primary caregivers’ attitude towards certain kinds o f behaviors. In other words, he suggested 
that children become able to anticipate how their caregivers (representing the norms o f their 
society) will react to certain o f their behaviors, which the children felt inclined to do, by 
internally re-enacting or simulating the caregivers’ actions. Children are thus able to predict 
the reactions o f others to their actions and this simulation-based prediction allowed them to 
adapt to the requirements o f their society. Though it remained unclear how the proposed 
mechanism o f introjection actually worked, and though these notions were exclusively 
applied to explain the normalization o f behavior in the course o f human development, it 
should be noted that these considerations resembled to some extent the discussions on 
interpersonal action simulation that take place in contemporary cognitive science (cf. 
Goldman, 2005). In general, however, psychoanalytic theory formation had no great impact
1 Interestingly, the seminal studies by Thorndike (1911) indicated that cats and other animals were not 
able to learn by observation. If a cat was put into a cage, which she could only leave through a door, 
she was not able to learn how to open this door by observing another cat.
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on contemporary cognitive science as it suffered from mythological impact and highly 
speculative concepts (e.g., Grossmann, 1989) and has therefore been criticized as being a 
pseudo-science (Popper, 1994).
The third theoretical approach that contributed to the question o f how young children 
process perceived actions is linked to the name o f Jean Piaget. Primarily, P iaget’s motivation 
was the foundation o f a Genetic Epistemology with which he wanted to reconstruct the socio- 
and psychogenesis o f an individual’s ability for scientific reasoning. In particular, he wanted 
to historize -  by taking recourse to ideas o f Hegel (1997) -  the by Kant (1787/1998) as 
apriori assumed categorical structure o f human thinking (see for an overview Fetz, 1988). For 
Piaget, the fundament o f all cognitive operations lied in the sensomotoric processes o f the 
first two years o f life. In his analysis o f early cognitive development, Piaget (1962) developed 
a theory o f action perception and imitation. The basic processes that govern the development 
o f imitation over the six stages o f sensorimotor development were assimilation (i.e. the 
integration o f a percept into an existing scheme) and accommodation (i.e. the adaptation o f an 
existing scheme to novel information). In the first stage o f sensorimotor development, the 
newborn is endowed only with inborn reflexes. These reflexes become released by 
increasingly different stimuli. In other words, infants progressively assimilate different 
objects into their mental representations (i.e. schemata; cf. Piaget, 1952). Over the next two 
stages, the reflex schemata become first primary circular reactions through the assimilation of 
external elements. Insofar as a m odel’s actions resemble infants’ own actions, they can be 
assimilated to a circular reaction and repeated (i.e. imitated). Subsequently, the existence of 
secondary circular reactions describes the repetition o f actions, whose consequences can be 
visually perceived. Insofar as the visually perceived movements o f other people resemble 
infants’ own movements, they can be assimilated and reproduced. In stages 4 and 5, infants 
become able to assimilate actions o f others even though they cannot observe these actions 
when they perform them themselves. The existence o f tertiary circular reactions describes the 
observation that children systematically try to imitate novel actions, even though they are not 
yet within their action repertoire. According to Piaget (1962), this ability is not based on a 
learned association between visual percepts and the kinesthetic perception o f one’s own body 
parts as suggested by Guillaume (1925). It is acquired through the coordination and 
reciprocal assimilation o f different schemata, so that the visual percepts serve as indices for 
the movement. From these stages onwards, imitation is established as an independent 
function as it differs from a reproductive assimilation. In the sixth stage, infants are able to
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interiorize the accommodative process and to build inner representations o f the outer world. 
This enables them to internally accommodate their schemata before they actually perform 
them and to defer their imitation o f actions. In sum, according to Piaget (1962) the ability to 
imitate is the result o f a developmental process that develops over several stages.
Importantly, one should note that Piaget uses the word “imitation” in a much broader 
sense than the layperson does. For Piaget, “imitation” refers not only to the copying of 
another person’s action, but also to the tracing (i.e. reproduction) o f objects or physical 
events by means o f body movements and the inner image o f an object. Furthermore, he 
suggests that a “function o f imitation ... [is that it makes] new reconstitutions and 
anticipations possible” (Piaget, 1952, p. 84). In particular, by means o f reproductive 
assimilation o f information into an existing scheme, the information is understood (though 
not on a representational level) and running through this scheme (i.e. “imitation”) enables 
anticipation o f future events. Taken together, according to Piaget domain-general 
mechanisms such as the accommodative differentiation o f schemas and the assimilation of 
outer events (comprising human actions) into existing schemata subserve infants’ imitation 
and prediction o f other people’s actions.
Although Piaget’s theory stands out in its systematicity (as evidenced in his detailed 
account on the development o f imitation), one has to take into account that his considerations 
were based on occasional (though systematic) observations o f very few subjects. 
Furthermore, even though his general approach to infant development in terms o f 
sensorimotor processes has inspired many researchers (e.g., Carpendale & Lewis, 2004; 
Pfeifer & Scheier, 1999; Smith & Sheya, 2010), his entire theoretical framework has been 
criticized as being on the one hand too speculative and abstract and on the other hand as 
being descriptive rather than explanatory, i.e. not elucidating the cognitive mechanisms that 
underlie developmental changes (see for an overview Montada, 2002).
1.2 Definitions
This thesis reports a series o f studies that were designed to investigate children’s developing 
action perception. More precisely, it examines the social-cognitive and neuro-cognitive 
mechanisms that subserve humans’ developing processing o f others’ actions. To this end, this 
thesis focuses on two interrelated aspects: the first part addresses the mechanisms and 
developmental changes in children’s action perception as evidenced in their action prediction 
or their neural responses to perceived actions. For example, how infants anticipate others’
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actions is indicative of infants’ representation of this action, and is thus informative with 
respect to the mechanisms underlying o f infants’ processing o f others’ actions. The studies in 
the second part of this thesis focus on a specific topic of action perception, namely 
observational or imitative learning. A central question in this research field is, which neuro­
cognitive mechanism is used to translate perceived actions into one’s own actions (cf. Brass 
& Heyes, 2005). Furthermore, children’s imitation o f action also indirectly informs us about 
how others’ actions are processed (cf. Elsner, 2005).
The focus o f the first part o f this thesis will thus be on children’s action percep tion ,
i.e. the mechanisms involved in children’s processing o f perceived actions. Although in the 
literature the concept of action understanding is often employed for research on this topic 
(e.g., Behne, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2005; Phillips & Wellman, 2005; W oodward & 
Guajardo, 2002), action perception  will be used as the central concept o f this thesis. This 
decision is motivated by the following considerations. There is to date no clear definition of 
(action) understanding . In fact, especially in the 20th century, philosophers have continued to 
argue about the concept o f understanding  and its underlying mechanisms (e.g., Gadamer, 
1960; Heidegger, 1927; Tugendhat, 2007; Brandom, 1994; von Wright, 1971; see also Uithol, 
van Rooij, Bekkering, & Haselager, in press). In its strongest form, understanding an action 
relies on explicit knowledge about the purpose of and the reason for an action, and thus 
equals an explanation o f an action (cf. von Wright, 1974; see also Bransen, 1999). Even 
though developmental research has suggested that infants process human actions differently 
than other events (cf. Spelke et al., 1995; Woodward, 1998), it is questionable whether young 
children are able to understand actions according to the definition outlined above (e.g., 
Perner, 2010; Sirois & Jackson, 2006). For that reason, the more parsimonious concept of 
action perception  shall be employed in this thesis.
W ith regard to the translation o f observed actions into one’s own actions, the concept 
o f imitative learning or imitation  shall be used to describe children’s reproduction (or 
facilitation o f the execution) o f an observed behavior. Various definitions have been put 
forward to differentiate imitation from other concepts such as goal emulation or local 
enhancement. It has been suggested that imitation should refer only to the acquisition of 
entirely novel behaviors (Byrne & Russon, 1998). Others have proposed that behaviors 
should only be called imitative if the reproduction of the observed behavior was based on an 
understanding o f the other’s intention (Tomasello, 1999) or if  the action was performed with 
the conscious intention o f imitating the other person (Tissaw, 2007). However, all these
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definitions are controversial. With regard to Byrne and Russon’s (1998) definition one could 
object that it is hardly possible to determine if  an action is novel (i.e. has never been 
performed before) for an infant. The other two suggestions connect imitation to a particular 
mechanism (Tomasello, 1999) or even to a very specific intention (Tissaw, 2007). This is 
problematic as it is, for example, controversial whether infants possess the necessary 
cognitive abilities (see Paulus, in press-b). Therefore, in the context of this thesis imitation  
shall be used to describe the relation between a perceived and a performed behavior whereby 
the performed behavior is sufficiently similar to and also the consequence o f (i.e. causally 
connected to) this similar action (Paulus in press-b).
2. Current approaches
The following section will first briefly present studies on young children’s action perception 
carried out over the past few years. Subsequently, the main theories o f this research field, 
which are o f central importance to this thesis, will be introduced.
2.1 Actual findings
In a seminal habituation study, W oodward (1998) presented 5- to 9-month-old infants with an 
actor grasping one o f two toys. After habituation, the position o f both toys was switched and 
the actor grasped either the same toy or took the same movement path and grasped the other 
toy. Infants showed longer looking times when the actor kept the same movement path and 
grasped the new toy than when the actor changed the movement path and grasped the old toy. 
This was not the case when the infants observed a mechanical claw performing the grasping 
movement (Woodward, 1998) or a hand-dropping instead of a grasping action (Woodward,
1999). These and similar results have been interpreted as evidence for the notion that very 
young infants are already sensitive to the goal-directed nature o f human action (e.g., 
Woodward, Sommerville, & Guajardo, 2004). Interestingly, when it was clear that the claw 
was operated by a human agent, 9-month-old infants also dishabituated to a change in the 
action target (Hofer, Hauf, & Aschersleben, 2005). Reid and colleagues (Reid, Csibra, 
Belsky, & Johnson, 2007) provided further support for infants’ sensitivity to others’ action 
goals. In their study, 8-month-old infants observed complete and incomplete goal-directed 
actions while their brain responses to these two types of actions were assessed by means of 
electroencephalography (EEG). The results showed increased gamma-band activity for
18
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incomplete actions compared to complete actions over the left frontal cortex, indicating a 
possible neural correlate for infants’ processing o f goal-directed actions.
However, infants not only perceive the goal-directed nature o f others’ actions, but are 
also sensitive towards other components o f human action, as evidenced by a study o f Behne 
and colleagues (Behne, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2005). Infants were handed toys by an 
experimenter. Occasionally these actions failed because the experimenter was unable or 
unwilling to finish the handling action. Infants from 9 months onwards discriminated 
between these two actions, as evidenced by their more impatient reactions in the “unwilling” 
condition. Furthermore, Daum and colleagues (Daum, Vuori, Prinz, & Aschersleben, 2009) 
showed that infants are able to use information about another’s grasp to infer the size o f his 
target object. In their study they employed a habituation paradigm and showed that 6- and 9- 
month-old infants looked longer when the initiation o f a grasping action (i.e. the aperture size 
o f the grasp) did not fit in with a picture o f the actor’s grasp o f a cup (i.e. full or precision 
grip at the handle). Even though research has provided evidence that infants and children pay 
special attention to the goal o f an action and prefer to imitate another person’s goal over his 
means (Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Gattis, 2000; Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2005), these 
findings indicate that infants also encode the specific way, in which an action was performed.
Children’s developing action knowledge is not restricted to simple grasping 
movements, but also extends to tool-use actions. In two eye-tracking studies, for example, 
Kochukhova and Gredebäck (2010) and Hunnius and Bekkering (2010) were able to show 
that infants from 6 months o f age onwards are able to anticipate the correct end location of 
ongoing tool-use actions, which involve tools such as spoons, cups or mobile phones. Further 
evidence for infants’ developing sensitivity to other people’s tool use actions comes from 
studies showing that infants around 1 year o f age are able to differentiate between possible 
and impossible tool-use actions (Schlesinger & Langer, 1999) and that their own tool use 
benefits from the observation o f other’s tool-use actions (Elsner & Pauen, 2007).
Whereas the studies mentioned above provide converging evidence for and insight 
into infants’ developing action perception, the social-cognitive and neuro-cognitive 
mechanisms that underlie children’s processing o f others’ actions have been subject to 
intense theoretical discussion. Importantly, these theories acted on different anthropological 
and epistemological assumptions, evolved from various scientific traditions, and thus 
provided partially contrasting explanations. For the sake of clarity, these theories can be
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differentiated along a number of dimensions. For example, whereas some theories highlight 
the sensorimotor nature o f the processes involved in children’s processing o f other people’s 
actions (see Daum, Sommerville, & Prinz, 2009), others have argued that action perception is 
guided by a cognitive architecture that consists of domain-specific core principles that 
support human infants’ reasoning about others’ actions (e.g., Carey & Spelke, 1994; 
Premack, 1990). Another issue concerns whether individual processes as the basic 
mechanisms o f early action perception are stressed (e.g., Gergely & Csibra, 2003) or whether 
the sociocultural mechanisms that contribute to the developing social understanding are 
emphasized (e.g., Carpendale & Lewis, 2006). A third question is whether one assumes 
relative developmental continuity in the mechanisms subserving action perception (e.g., Luo 
& Baillargeon, in press) or whether one stresses developmental discontinuity in the 
processing o f others’ actions (e.g., Barresi & Moore, 1996; Moore, 2006). In the following 
sections, some of the currently most important theories and mechanisms shall be briefly 
introduced.
2.2 Motor resonance
The first mechanism, motor resonance, suggests that persons use their own motor system to 
(i.e. their own action experiences) to process other people’s actions. Falck-Ytter, Gredeback, 
and von Hofsten (2006) investigated 6- and 12-month-old infants’ and adults’ proactive eye- 
movements when they observed goal-directed actions. In particular, participants observed 
how an adult person moved objects into a bucket. The 12-month-old infants and adults, but 
not 6-month-old infants showed anticipatory eye-movements to the bucket during the 
transport action, indicating that they predicted the goal o f the ongoing action. Furthermore, 
the 12-month-old infants did not display anticipatory eye-movements when the balls flew into 
the bucket in a self-propelled manner. As children’s ability to perform grasping and transport 
actions develops over the second half o f the first year o f life (cf. Bruner, 1970), the authors 
interpreted their results as evidence for the claim that 12-month-olds’ action experiences 
underlie their ability to anticipate the target o f the ongoing action. To directly investigate the 
relation between action experiences and action perception, Sommerville, Woodward, and 
Needham (2005) extended the work o f W oodward (1998) with a training study. They 
provided 3-month-old infants with grasping experience by letting them wear a pair o f “sticky 
mittens” that facilitated infants’ picking-up o f objects (cf. Needham, Barrett, & Peterman, 
2002). Only infants who received this training prior to the test trials showed longer looking
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times when the actor grasped the new toy than when the actor grasped the old toy, suggesting 
that active action experience has an impact on the processing o f other people’s actions (motor 
resonance).
These and other studies (e.g., Daum, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2011; Hauf, 
Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2007; Kochukhova & Gredeback, in press; van Elk, van Schie, 
Hunnius, Vesper, & Bekkering, 2008; Southgate, Johnson, El Karoui, & Csibra, 2010; cf. 
Hauf, 2007) provide converging evidence for the claim that the processing o f one’s own and 
others’ actions shares a common representation format (e.g., Longo & Berthental, 2006; 
Meltzoff, 2007; Prinz, 1997). On a neural level, it has been suggested that a human mirror 
neuron system (MNS) might either underlie (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004) or represent 
(Jacob, 2009) the mapping o f perceived actions onto one’s own motor repertoire. 
Functionally, it has been claimed that such a mapping process underlies the human ability to 
predict the course o f others’ ongoing actions. In particular, it has been proposed that by 
means o f feeding the perceived action into an internal forward model o f the same action, 
either others’ goals or the upcoming course o f their action can be recognized and anticipated 
(Csibra, 2007; Decety & Sommerville, 2003; Kilner et al., 2007; Knoblich, 2008). 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that motor resonance plays a role in human imitation by 
activating the same motor program in the observer as in the actor (cf. Heyes & Bird, 2007; 
see also M eltzoff & Moore, 1997).
2.3 Perceptual learning
Hunnius and Bekkering (2010) showed that 6-month-old infants are able to anticipate the 
correct goal o f an ongoing tool-use action. As infants o f this age are not able to perform this 
action themselves, the authors suggested that infants’ anticipations might in this case be 
subserved by learned visual associations. In other words, through repeated co-occurrence 
visual inputs become associated with each other and such associations might help infants to 
predict future events. This interpretation is supported by accumulated evidence o f powerful 
statistical learning abilities even in very young infants (e.g., Altmann, 2002; Kirkham, 
Slemmer, & Johnson, 2002; Lany & Gomez, 2008; Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996; Smith 
& Yu, 2008). Further evidence for the impact o f visual experience on event prediction is 
provided by Kochukhova and Gredeback (2007) who showed that 6-month-old infants use 
experiences with objects’ motion trajectories to predict an their movement paths. As it has 
been argued that human action forms a special category o f physical events (cf. Davidson,
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1980), such findings indirectly support the claim that perceptual associations might be an 
important factor in infants’ developing action perception and processing. In line with this, it 
has been suggested that a number o f findings on infants’ action perception and prediction can 
be explained in terms o f perceptual learning processes (e.g., Kiraly, Jovanovic, Prinz, 
Aschersleben, & Gergely, 2003; Moore, 2006; M oore & Povinelli, 2007; Paulus, in press-a; 
Perner & Ruffman, 2005).
Beyond associations between events, perceptual learning processes are also of 
relevance when processing information about other’s potential actions and their action 
capabilities. Judging others’ action capabilities is especially difficult, when they differ from 
one’s own abilities. Under such circumstances, an action simulation that is based on the 
observer’s own action repertoire would interfere with an adequate evaluation o f what others 
can or cannot do (cf. Ramenzoni, Riley, Shockley, & Davis, 2008). However, humans seem 
to be surprisingly accurate in adequately judging others’ action capabilities. To account for 
this it has been suggested, with reference to Gibson’s (1979) notion o f affordances, that the 
observer is able to use perceptual information in the evaluation o f others’ actions. More 
specifically, it has been proposed that observers directly perceive the action-relevant 
properties o f agents in relation to their physical environment (Ramenzoni et al., 2008; 
Stoffregen et al., 1999). Experiences with the characteristics o f the environment and others’ 
actions in the environment allow us therefore to perceive others’ action affordances. From a 
developmental perspective, it has been suggested that this mechanism is involved in 
children’s developing action perception (Rochat, 1995).
2.4 Action-effect binding
Related to ideas about perceptual learning and partially overlapping with the notion o f motor 
resonance is the idea that humans employ learned action-effect associations to process other 
people’s actions. In particular, it has been suggested by proponents o f an ideomotor approach 
to action control that through the repeated co-occurrence o f an action and its effects, the 
cognitive representation o f the effect becomes associated with the activated motor code (i.e. 
bidirectional action-effect associations). W hen the agent subsequently wants to obtain the 
same effect, the associated motor program will be activated and the appropriate action will be 
executed (Elsner & Hommel, 2001; Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001). 
Developmental research has provided evidence that infants’ actions are indeed affected by the 
salient action outcomes (e.g., Bahrick & Watson, 1985; Gergely, 2002; Mast, Fagen, Rovee-
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Collier, & Sullivan, 1980) and it has thus been suggested that infants also employ action­
effect associations to control their own actions (Aschersleben, 2006). Extending this 
approach to action perception, it has been proposed that when infants observe another person 
performing the same action, they can employ acquired action-effect associations to process 
this action and predict its outcome (Jovanovic, Kiraly, Elsner, Gergely, Prinz, & 
Aschersleben, 2007; Jovanovic & Schwarzer, 2007; Kiraly et al., 2003).
In the same vein, it has also been suggested that action effects play an important role 
in infants’ imitation. In line with the ideomotor approach, it has been suggested that infants 
detect the regularities between observed actions and their effects and use the knowledge 
about these regularities to activate the correct motor program when they subsequently want to 
attain this effect themselves (Elsner & Aschersleben, 2003). This hypothesis is supported by 
findings that showed that infants particularly tend to imitate actions that were followed by a 
salient action effect (Hauf, Elsner, & Aschersleben, 2004; H auf & Aschersleben, 2008; for a 
review see Elsner, 2007).
2.5 Teleological reasoning
The teleological stance theory (Gergely & Csibra, 2003) is rooted in domain-specificity 
approaches o f cognitive development. This family o f theories proposes that from early on in 
development, children differentiate between several domains o f knowledge. For example, it 
has been suggested that young infants already possess a naïve psychology and naïve physics 
and that they thus reason differently about other humans than about physical objects (cf. 
Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994). Furthermore, it has been proposed that their reasoning within 
each o f these domains is governed by a number o f (possibly innate) core principles (e.g., 
Carey & Spelke, 1994; Leslie, 1994). In this tradition, the Teleological stance theory has 
suggested that infants reason about others’ actions by applying a principle o f  rational action  
(Gergely & Csibra, 2003). This principle holds that already infants assume that others’ 
actions are efficient. It is said to be a core principle that forms “the initial state o f infant’s 
naïve psychological theory [...] that is as yet ‘uncontaminated’ by the associations 
established later in development” (Csibra, Gergely, Biro, Koos, & Brockbank, 1999, p. 262). 
Applying this principle infants come to understand and predict others’ action goals by 
observing the actions and taking the situational constraints into account. Additionally, given 
knowledge about an agent’s goal, the principle enables an evaluation o f the rationality o f the 
means that were chosen to perform the action (Csibra & Gergely, 2007; Gredeback &
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Melinder, 2010). Support for this theory has been provided mainly in experiments employing 
visual habituation paradigms (e.g., Bíró, Csibra, & Gergely, 2007; Csibra, 2008; Csibra et al., 
1999; Sodian, Schoeppner, & Metz, 2004). Furthermore, based on a seminal study by 
Gergely, Bekkering and Kiraly (2002), it has been suggested that infants’ imitation is also 
based on an evaluation o f the action’s efficiency (e.g., Buttelmann et al., 2007; Schwier, van 
Maanen, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2006; Zmyj, Daum, & Aschersleben, 2009).
Taken together, recent theoretical and empirical work has identified several possible 
mechanisms that might underlie young children’s processing o f others’ actions. The present 
thesis investigates the impact o f these mechanisms on infants’ and children’s action 
perception, as evidenced, for example, in their action anticipation and imitation.
3. Outline of the thesis
The next four chapters report investigations o f infants’ and children’s action perception. 
Chapter 2 confronts a perceptual learning view with the Teleological stance theory. It 
investigates the relative impact o f statistical learning and teleological reasoning on 9-month- 
old infants’ and adults’ action prediction by means o f an eye-tracking study. Chapter 3 
describes an EEG-study on how active experience with an action and its typical sound effect 
affects 8-month-old infants’ subsequent perception o f this sound (i.e. acquisition of 
bidirectional action-effect associations). Chapter 4 describes a study on 14- and 20-month-old 
children’s ability to learn to predict the target o f a novel tool-use action on the basis of 
posture information. Chapter 5 investigates 2.5- to 5-year-old children’s ability to evaluate 
others’ action capabilities in a situation, in which an actor needs support from another person.
The next five chapters describe studies on the neuro-cognitive mechanisms subserving 
imitative learning. Chapter 6 and 7 concern two studies that confront the impact o f motor 
resonance and teleological reasoning on 14-month-old infants’ imitation. Chapter 8 puts 
forward a model o f imitation in infancy that integrates the notions o f motor resonance and 
action-effect binding and provides empirical support for it in a study with 14-month-old 
infants. Chapter 9 extends this idea to a study with human adults. Chapter 10 describes an 
EEG-study on the neurocognitive basis o f imitative learning in infancy. Finally, Chapter 11 -  
the Epilogue -  o f this thesis summarizes the most important theoretical insights derived from 
the experimental investigations and describes possible directions for further research.
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Chapter 2
The role of frequency information and teleological reasoning in 
infants’ and adults’ action prediction
Based on:
Paulus, M., Hunnius, S., van Wijngaarden, C., Vrins, S., van Rooij, I., & Bekkering, H. (in 
press). The role o f frequency information and teleological reasoning in infants’ and adults’ 
action prediction. D evelopm ental Psychology.
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Abstract
This study investigates the contribution o f frequency learning and teleological reasoning to 
action prediction in nine-month-old infants and adults. Participants observed how an agent 
repeatedly walked to a goal while taking the longer o f two possible paths, as the shorter and 
more efficient path was impassable. In the subsequent test phase, both paths were passable. In 
the first test trial, infants and adults anticipated the agent to take the longer path. Unlike 
adults, infants kept anticipating movements to the longer path even after observing that the 
agent now took the more efficient path, indicating that the frequency o f previous observations 
dominates action prediction. These results provide evidence, contrary to existing claims in the 
developmental literature, that frequency learning underlies action prediction in infancy, 
whereas teleological reasoning might gain importance later on in life.
26
C hap te r  2: FREQUENCY INFORMATION AND TELEOLOGICAL REASONING
1. Introduction
The ability to predict others’ actions is an important human capacity. It allows for timely 
planning o f one's own reactions to others' actions and is a significant component o f proper 
functioning in a dynamic social environment. Central to the investigation o f this ability are 
the mechanisms humans o f different ages rely on to predict others’ actions. Moreover, 
findings about the mechanisms, which subserve action prediction, inform us about how 
humans perceive others’ actions and offer insight into the development o f social 
understanding (cf. Carpendale & Lewis, 2006; Hauf, 2007; Moore, 2006).
One o f the prominent cognitive mechanisms o f infants’ social understanding proposed 
in the literature is that o f teleological reasoning. The teleological stance theory postulates that 
humans normatively evaluate actions by applying the principle o f  rational action  (Gergely & 
Csibra, 2003). According to this principle, humans tend to expect actions that they infer to be 
most efficient for achieving one’s aims based on the situational constraints (Csibra & 
Gergely, 1998). It has been suggested that this principle is a core principle that forms “the 
initial state o f infant’s naïve psychological theory [...] that is as yet ‘uncontaminated’ by the 
associations established later in development” (Csibra, Gergely, Biró, Koós, & Brockbank, 
1999, p. 262). Support for this view comes from experimental studies with both adults (e.g., 
de Lange, Spronk, Willems, Toni, & Bekkering, 2008; Brass, Schmitt, Spengler, & Gergely, 
2007) and infants (e.g., Biró, Csibra, & Gergely, 2007; Csibra, 2008; Csibra et al., 1999; 
Csibra, Biró, Koós, & Gergely, 2003; Gergely, Bekkering, & Kiraly, 2002; Gergely, 
Nadasdy, Csibra, & Biró, 1995; Kamewari, Kato, Kanda, Ishiguro, & Hiraki, 2005; Sodian, 
Schoeppner, & Metz, 2004). Furthermore, computational models o f action prediction based 
on the ‘rationality principle’ have been shown to fit human predictions for adults in several 
tasks (e.g., Baker, Tenenbaum, & Saxe, 2006; Baker, Saxe, & Tenenbaum, 2009).
Importantly, most evidence for infants’ reliance on the principle o f  rational action  to 
understand and predict others’ actions comes from studies, in which infants are habituated to 
an animated agent (e.g., a ball) or a human, which is passing an obstacle (e.g., jum ping over a 
barrier) to reach its goal (e.g., Biró et al., 2007; Csibra, 2008; Csibra et al., 1999, 2003; 
Gergely et al., 1995; Kamewari et al., 2005; Sodian et al., 2004). In a subsequent test phase, 
two possible test trials without the obstacle are presented to the infants. In the one test trial 
(the o ld  event) the agent continues to perform the jum ping movement, although not justified 
by the situational constraints as the obstacle has been removed. In the other test trial (the new
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event) the agent takes the direct route to its goal. Infants tended to look longer in the o ld  event 
test trial compared to the new event test trial, and it has been suggested that infants show 
surprise about the agent’s inefficient action as it would have been more efficient, and hence 
by the principle o f  rational action  also more likely, to take a direct route (cf. Gergely & 
Csibra, 2003).
Notwithstanding the appeal o f this original explanation, it is important to note that the 
finding can also be explained differently. M ore specifically, the finding may be the result of 
long-term frequency learning by infants based on the actions and events they observe in their 
social and physical environments. In daily life infants observe that humans and other agents 
very rarely perform sudden jum ps during their movements. Similarly, when infants observe 
objects that move over surfaces (e.g., a ball), these objects usually move linearly along the 
surface in a straight path without making sudden jum ps or swerves. Importantly, this 
explanation is in line with findings that statistical learning plays a central role in infants’ 
(e.g., Kirkham, Slemmer, & Johnson, 2002; Lany & Gomez, 2008; Saffran, Aslin, & 
Newport, 1996; Smith & Yu, 2008) as well as adults’ information processing (e.g., Hasher & 
Zacks, 1984). In particular, it has been suggested that from early on in life humans use 
frequency information to process perceptual events and actions (e.g., Haith, 1993; Hunnius & 
Bekkering, 2010; Kochukhova & Gredeback, 2007; von Hofsten, Feng, & Spelke, 2000). 
Infants come into an experimental session with some expectations about the movements of 
agents and objects, which they have acquired through observation in their daily life. It is thus 
possible that infants might have looked longer at the o ld  event trials o f the above-cited studies 
as they infrequently observe agents who perform suddenly jum ping movements or moving 
objects that do not follow linear routes on surfaces (cf. Luo, Kaufman, & Baillargeon, 2009). 
In other words, the inefficient action (o ld  event) happens to be an action which is very 
infrequent in our world and the infants’ reaction to these stimuli might thus be a novelty 
response to an event they rarely observe. As the inefficient action presented in the o ld  event 
trials is also the more infrequent action, the impact o f statistical learning and teleological 
reasoning on infants’ action prediction cannot be disentangled in these studies.
The present study was designed to disentangle the contributions o f frequency learning 
and teleological reasoning to infants’ and adults’ action anticipation. To this end, we 
constructed stimulus material in which an animated agent moved from one side o f a computer 
screen to the other to get to another agent. In a learning phase, the agent repeatedly took the 
longer o f two paths, as the shorter (and hence more efficient) path was impassable. In a
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subsequent test phase, both paths were open and could be used. I f  infants and adults rely on 
frequency information in their action prediction, they should anticipate the agent to continue 
using the longer path. I f  they, however, rely on the principle o f rational action to predict the 
agent’s actions, they should anticipate that the agent would use the shorter path as soon as it 
is passable again, as taking this path would be the most efficient way to get to the other side. 
To examine participants’ action anticipations, we measured their overall looking times 
(Csibra et al., 1999) as well as their proactive eye movements (Eshuis, Coventry, & 
Vulchanova, 2009; Falck-Ytter, Gredeback, & von Hofsten, 2006; Hunnius & Bekkering, 
2010; cf. Aslin, 2007).
2. Method
2.1 Participants
Participants were 20 9-month-old infants (M  = 9 months, 25 days; range 9;16 to 10;02) and 
14 adults (range 19-32 years). An additional 19 infants did not complete the experiment due 
to fussiness (n = 9), interference o f the parent (n = 1), procedural or technical errors (n = 4), 
or insufficient data in the test trials or not reaching the habituation criterion (n = 5)2. The 
infants were recruited from birth records. Parents gave informed consent for participation and 
were given a book or monetary compensation for their visit. The adults participated in the 
experiment in return o f 5 Euros or course credit.
2.2 Stimuli
The stimulus materials consisted o f introductory movies, learning movies, and test movies. 
All movies had a size o f 1200 by 1024 pixels and were created using Adobe Image Ready 
7.0. Three different introductory movies were made and showed a horizontal path on a green 
background which led from the right side o f the computer screen to its middle. In each movie, 
a cow walked along the path from the right side to the middle, where the path ended, and 
back. One introductory movie showed how the cow walked along the path, another one 
showed exactly the same movement o f the cow with a transparent oval occluder in the middle 
o f the path, and a third one showed the movement with an opaque occluder (see Figure 1A). 
The movies were designed for two purposes: First, they enabled the participants to get
2 Although this drop-out rate seems to be high, it is comparable to other habituation-based studies 
with similar designs (cf. Csibra et al., 1999)
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acquainted with the occluder and to learn that the cow continued its path behind the occluder 
and reappeared from behind it. Second, participants learned that the cow always moved on 
the yellow paths and not over the green surface, as in every movie she walked until the end of 
the path and subsequently returned to her initial position.
The learning movies showed two paths leading from the left to the right side o f the 
screen. At both ends, the paths converged into a single path (see Figure 1B). One o f the paths 
was obviously longer as it was U-shaped. Importantly, the shorter path did not lead to the 
other side as it was interrupted by a gap in the middle. The same transparent occluder as in 
the introductory movies overlaid the crossroad between both pathways on the left side. We 
introduced an occluder to elicit anticipatory eye-movements (cf. von Hofsten, Kochukhova, 
& Rosander, 2007) to one o f the paths rather than fixations on the moving agent. In other 
words, as, due to the occluder, participants could not perceive, which path the cow was going 
to take, their predictive eye-movements to one o f the two paths would tell us about their 
action anticipation. On the left side o f the screen a cow was standing on the path, on the right 
side o f the screen there was a sheep. After a short period the sheep wiggled, waited shortly, 
and moved away to the right until it was off screen. Subsequently, the cow wiggled as a 
response to the sheep’s wiggling. After this interaction between the characters, the 
transparent occluder gradually turned opaque. The cow started walking along the path and 
disappeared under the occluder that overlaid the crossroad. After 1.5s the cow appeared 
again, walked along the long pathway to the other side, and went off the screen after the 
sheep. The movie ended with a black screen and took altogether 12s. Two versions o f this 
learning movie were made as the path location was counterbalanced, such that the short path 
appeared on the upper part and the lower part o f the screen in an equal number o f times.
The test movies differed from the learning movies insofar as there was no gap in the 
short pathway, so that both pathways were now passable and connected the left and right 
side. The o ld  action  movie (see Figure 1C) resembled the learning movie as the cow took the 
long pathway to get to the sheep. In the new action  movie, however, the cow took the short 
pathway. Four o ld  action  movies were combined to form the o ld  action test block, four new 
action  movies were combined to form the new action test block. Two versions o f both test 
blocks were made to counterbalance path location.
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A)
Figure 1. Part A shows examples of the three introductory movies. Part B gives two key frames from 
the learning movies. The arrows indicate the movement direction. Part C gives in the first picture a 
projection of infants’ first anticipation in the first test trial. The second and third picture show one 
frame from the old action movie and one frame from the new action movie. The rectangles in the first 
picture illustrate the approximate position and size of the regions of interest.
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2.3 Experimental setup and procedure
The adults were seated on a chair in front o f a monitor. The infants were seated in an infant 
seat on the lap o f their parent who was sitting on a chair in front o f the monitor. All 
participants were tested at a viewing distance o f approximately 60cm from the monitor. Light 
conditions were kept low to minimize visual distraction. During the experiment, the gaze of 
both eyes was recorded using a corneal reflection eye-tracker (Tobii 1750, Tobii Technology, 
Sweden). The eye-tracking system was integrated in a 17” TFT flat-screen monitor on which 
the stimuli were shown. The apparatus recorded gaze data at 50Hz with an average accuracy 
o f 0.5° visual angle. The gaze o f each participant was calibrated using a 9-point calibration 
procedure. If  seven or less points were calibrated, the calibration was repeated; otherwise the 
experiment was started.
Infant procedure. Infants participated in a habituation-based experimental procedure 
which was programmed using Presentation (Neurobehavioral Systems, USA). Once started 
by the experimenter, the program ran the experiment automatically. It registered the 
participant’s eye movements, calculated looking times, and controlled the stimulus 
presentation on the basis o f the participant’s looking behavior.
The experiment started with the presentation o f the introductory stimuli. The 
familiarization stimulus without any occluder was shown once; the stimulus with the 
transparent occluder and the stimulus with the opaque occluder were both shown twice. 
Thereupon, an unrelated movie was presented for 10s to attract the infant’s attention 
(attention getter), and the habituation phase was started with the presentation o f the first 
learning movie. The learning movie was presented repeatedly (learning trial) and was 
stopped when the infant looked away for more than two seconds or when the trial reached its 
maximum duration o f 1min. Then, again an attention getter was presented. W hen the infant 
looked at the screen, the next trial was started.
The program computed the average looking times o f the first three trials and 
compared this value on-line with the last three looking times. The habituation criterion was 
reached when the average looking time o f the last three trials was less than 50% of the 
average looking time o f the first three trials and this criterion had to be met twice in a row (cf. 
Csibra et al., 1999). Accordingly, the minimal number o f habituation trials was seven. The 
maximal trial number was set to 15.
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W hen the habituation criterion was reached, a 30s break was introduced during which 
a short, unrelated movie was presented. Then, the test phase was started which consisted of 
the presentation o f the new action test block  and the o ld  action test block . Both movies had a 
fixed length o f 44s. The order o f presentation was balanced between infants. Note that the 
first 6.5s o f both the o ld  action  block and the new action  block were identical, as the cow 
started walking and disappeared under the occluder. To ensure that the looking times towards 
the test movies reflected infants’ response to the nature of the stimulus, we included only 
participants who watched the stimulus long enough to be able to see which o f the two paths 
the cow actually took. Therefore, all participants were excluded who stopped watching the 
test trials within the first 6.5s.
A dult procedure. The adults’ experiment was run using Clearview (Tobii Technology, 
Sweden). The familiarization stimulus with the opaque occluder (see Figure 1A) was shown 
once. Then, the learning movie (see Figure 1B) was presented 8 times in a row as for adults 
usually no habituation-based procedure is used. Subsequently, the new action test block  was 
presented (see Figure 1C).
2.4 Measures
Looking times: To analyze infants’ dishabituation responses to both test events, their 
looking times in the new action test block  and the o ld  action test block  were summarized.
Anticipations: Two same-sized regions o f interest were defined around the areas 
where the paths reappeared from behind the occluder (see Figure 1C). A visual anticipation 
was defined as the first eye movement directed onto one o f the two regions o f interest during 
the time the cow was hidden behind the occluder. To analyze anticipations statistically a 
difference score (DS; for a similar procedure see Corkum & Moore, 1998; Moore & Corkum,
1998) was calculated. To this end, an anticipation to the long pathway was given the value 1, 
an anticipation to the short pathway was given the value -1 , and if  no anticipation occurred, 
the movie was coded with the value 0 (e.g., when participants kept fixating on the occluder or 
directed their gaze elsewhere on the screen). Data were processed using Matlab and 
Clearview.
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3. RESULTS
Infants: Looking times. Infants completed on average 10.7 habituation trials (SD = 
3.0). The looking times during the test phase were analyzed by a repeated measures analysis 
o f variance (ANOVA) with the within-subjects factor Test Block (old action, new action) and 
the between-subjects factor Order o f Presentation (i.e., counterbalancing o f the o ld  action  and 
the new action  test block). This analysis resulted in no significant effect (all p s  > 0.31), 
suggesting that infants did not spend more time looking to the new action test block (M  = 23.5 
s, SD  = 7.3) or the o ld  action test block (M  = 24.5 s, SD  = 9.2).
Infants: Anticipations. W e were interested to which path infants would anticipate in 
the first movie o f the first test trial, as this was the first incidence that both paths could be 
used. Note that while the cow was under the occluder, there were no perceptual cues about 
whether the cow actually would take the long path (o ld  action) or the short path (novel 
action). O f all infants, 65% showed an anticipatory look in the first test movie, and 92% of 
them anticipated to the long pathway. A one-sample t-test with DS as dependent variable 
showed that the average value o f 0.55 was significantly different from zero (t(19) = 4.067, p  
= 0.001).
For further analyses, the group o f infants who first watched the novel action (i.e. the 
block in which the cow takes the short pathway) was selected, as infants in the other group 
first watched an action which was incorrect with respect to the predictions o f the teleological 
stance theory. The DS for each o f the four movies was separately calculated (see Figure 2A). 
A repeated-measures ANOVA with DS as the dependent variable and the within-subjects 
factor Movie (movie 1, movie 2, movie 3, movie 4) revealed no effect o f movie (F<1), 
indicating that infants’ anticipation behavior did not change over the four test movies. 
Accordingly, we averaged the DS over all movies. A one-sample t-test showed that the 
average DS o f 0.25 was significantly different from zero (t(9) = 3.000 , p  < 0.05), and infants 
thus tended to anticipate to the long path over all test trials.
To further examine if infants’ tendency to anticipate to the long path could be due to a 
failure to perceive the gap in the habituation phase or to perceive the lack o f the gap during 
the test phase, the relation between the time infants spent looking to the location of the gap 
and their test performance was analyzed. To this end a region o f interest was defined around 
the position o f the gap and infants’ looking times at this region were calculated. On average,
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infants spent 12.3 s (SD = 9.7) during the habituation phase looking at the gap. A 
correlational analysis between the time infants spent looking at the gap and their anticipation 
behavior in the first test trial (M = 0.45, SD = 0.60) as well as their performance over all four 
test trials (M = 0.25, SD = 0.26) revealed no significant relation, r  = .15, p  = .54, and, r  = .18, 
p  = .63, respectively. During the test phase, infants spent on average 436 ms (SD = 589) 
looking at the location where previously had been the gap (though no fixation was found in 
the seconds directly prior to the occlusion event o f the first test trial). There was no 
significant correlation between infants’ looking to the previous location of the gap and their 
performances in the first test trial or their performances over all four test trials, r  = .21, p  = 
.56, and, r  = -.12, p  = .75, respectively.
Adults. O f all adults, 71% displayed an anticipatory look in the first test movie and 
100% of them anticipated to the long pathway. A one-sample t-test showed that the DS o f 
0.79 was significantly different from zero (t(13) = 6.904, p  < 0.001). W e further calculated 
the DS for each o f the four movies (see Figure 2B). A repeated-measures ANOVA with DS 
as the dependent variable and the within-subjects factor Movie revealed a significant effect of 
movie (F(3,10) = 30.028, p  <  0.001, t |p2=0.891). Post-hoc i-tests indicated that the frequency 
o f anticipations differed between the first movie and the following movies (all p s  < 0.001), 
which were not significantly different from each other (all p s  > 0.38). We subsequently 
averaged the DS over the last three movies. A one-sample t-test showed that the average DS 
o f -0.59 was significantly different from zero (t(13) = -6.853, p  < 0.001), indicating that the 
adults tended to anticipate to the short path during the last three movies3.
3 To examine whether the effect was mainly driven by trials in which no anticipations occurred, 
we disregarded all the trials w ithout anticipations and conducted additional analyses. 10 out of
11 infants showed an anticipation to the long path. A binomial test revealed that this pattern was 
significantly different from chance, p  = .01. Likewise, 11 out of 11 adult participants displayed an 
anticipation to the long path, p  < .001. Next, we analyzed differences between trials. As this data 
structure does not fulfill the requirements for a Chi-Square analysis (e.g., not every participant 
contributed data in each trial), we implemented a permutation method to test the significance of 
differences between groups (cf. Good, 1999). For the infants, the permutation test yielded no 
significant differences between trials, all p s > .23. For the adults, the analysis showed that the first test 
trial differed from the others (all ps < .001), which differed not significantly from each other (all ps > 
.21).
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Figure 2. Average difference scores of the anticipations in each movie of the new action test block. 
Positive scores indicate anticipations to the longer path, negative scores to the shorter path, 
respectively. Error bars indicate standard error. Part A shows the results of the infant participants. Part 
B shows the results of the adult participants.
4. DISCUSSION
This study examined the mechanisms on which infants and adults tend to base their 
predictions o f others’ actions. In particular, the impact o f frequency learning and teleological 
reasoning on action prediction was investigated. To this end, 9-month-old infants and adults 
observed an agent repeatedly taking the longer o f two paths to get to its goal, as the shorter 
path was impassable. In a subsequent test phase, the shorter path was passable, and a more 
efficient action was possible. In the first test trial, participants still expected the agent to take 
the longer path, which shows that infants and adults relied on frequency information (i.e., on
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previously observed actions) to predict an upcoming action. After having watched the agent 
taking the shorter, more efficient path, adults quickly adjusted their expectations. The infants, 
however, kept anticipating to the long path which suggests that statistical learning is the 
dominant mechanism o f action prediction in infancy rather than the application o f the 
principle o f  rational action  (Gergely & Csibra, 2003). Adults, on the other hand, quickly 
adjusted their predictions when their predictions based on frequency failed.
Interestingly, even adults relied on frequency information in the first test trial. This 
result is consistent with empirical findings (cf. Hasher & Zacks, 1984) as well as 
longstanding theoretical approaches (e.g., Hume, 1748) stressing the fact that humans tend to 
form expectancies on the basis o f frequency information and use these expectancies as a 
default mode o f prediction without necessarily reflecting on them. It remains subject to 
further investigation whether adults relied on the frequency information (i.e., expected the 
agent to act as before) despite being aware o f the changes or because they overlooked (the 
relevance of) those changes. Importantly, after having observed that the agent changed its 
behavior when a more efficient action had become possible, adults rapidly considered the 
novel circumstances and adjusted their expectations. This suggests that adults can overcome 
this default mode after experiencing a failure to predict actions on the basis o f frequency 
information. Further research is needed to examine whether adults’ action anticipations in 
such novel circumstances are based on their application o f the princip le o f  rational action  
(Gergely & Csibra, 2003) or on other mechanisms.
One might argue that infants’ repeated anticipations to the long path during the test 
phase might also be interpreted as resulting from an A-not-B error (cf. M arcovitch & Zelazo,
1999). However, it is very unlikely that our findings can be sufficiently explained by that. 
First, studies have suggested that the A-not-B error is predominantly found in young 
children’s reaching movements, but not their looking behavior (e.g., Diamond, 1991; 
Hofstadter & Reznick, 1996). Second, and more important, these kinds o f errors have been 
reported to occur only when A-trials are directly followed by B-trials, which is not the case in 
our study as we introduced a 30 second break between the learning and the testing phase. 
Therefore it is unlikely that our task shows the characteristics that are typical for A-not-B 
errors. The break is furthermore important, as it has been suggested that the “motor memory” 
o f the preceding actions plays a critical role in this task (Diedrich, Thelen, Smith, & Corbetta,
2000). As the infants watched and visually scanned an unrelated, though interesting, movie 
during the break, we can conclude that the motor memory o f the crucial effector (in our case
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the eyes) was interrupted in this break by the visual fixations and eye movements on the 
unrelated display. Thus, it is unlikely that the visual anticipations in the test trials were driven 
by a simple repetition o f a previously executed motor program, but rather they were the result 
o f a learned association between the cow and the path she had been taking.
Importantly, a closer analysis o f infants’ visual behavior shows that they looked at the 
location o f the gap during the habituation trials and the test trials. This suggests that the 
infants perceived the presence o f the gap during the learning phase as well as its absence 
during the test phase o f the experiment. Furthermore, to exclude the possibility that infants 
did not look long enough to process the information about the presence the gap in the 
learning trials or the absence o f the gap in the test trials, we performed additional 
correlational analyses and found no relation between the time infants spent looking at the gap 
location and their anticipation performance in the test trials. This finding is especially 
relevant, as one could argue that infants’ failure to anticipate to the short path during the test 
phase could be due to the possibility that they did not see that the short path was initially 
blocked and therefore assumed that the cow had a preference to take the long path. 
Additionally, one could argue that infants did not anticipate to the short path because they -  
even though noticing that there was a gap during the learning trials -  did not perceive that the 
short path was passable in the test trials. However, if  these alternative explanations were true, 
one would expect that the infants who looked longer at the location o f the gap (i.e. long 
enough to process the information) should anticipate to the short path or at least should not 
show anticipations to the long path anymore. Likewise, the infants who did not look long 
enough should show continued anticipations to the long path. Therefore, if  this interpretation 
would be true, a correlation between infants’ looking times and their test performance should 
be expected. However, we found no correlation between the time infants spent looking at the 
location o f the gap and their test performance. Yet, most important is the fact that the 
participants observed from the first test trial on that the cow was now taking the short path. In 
particular, that the cow was moving on the short path from one side o f the screen to the other 
side provides compelling evidence that the short path was passable. Taken together, the facts 
that infants looked at the location o f the gap during the test trials, that there was no 
correlation between the time they spent looking at the location o f the gap and their test 
performance, and that they observed during the four test trials how the cow was moving on 
the short path renders it very unlikely that infants’ anticipation behavior could be explained 
by the assumption that they did not discover that the short path was now available.
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Infants’ dishabituation responses revealed no significant difference in their looking 
times between blocks. This finding may at first sight seem to contradict existing findings in 
habitation experiments which have suggested that infants rely on teleological reasoning in 
their action prediction. W ithin the context o f our experimental design, the absence of 
dishabituation effects can be explained by noting that the two measures (i.e., dishabituation 
times, anticipations) represent two different kinds o f underlying processes. Whereas 
anticipatory eye-movements reveal infants’ ability to predict an action, dishabituation times 
represent infants’ “surprise reaction” on basis of a retrospective evaluation of the deviation of 
the observed behavior from what one would expect (cf. Gredeback & Melinder, in press). 
Whereas one can assume that humans quickly acquire an expectation about others’ actions, it 
takes more to be really surprised about an action. For example, knowing that a colleague 
usually drinks coffee allows one to anticipate what she will drink during her break. 
Nonetheless one would not be surprised if  one day she takes a glass o f water, even if  not 
having anticipated that. However, if  she would opt for a glass o f vinegar, one would be 
surprised as this action is totally unexpected given one’s experiences about what humans 
normally drink. In the same vein, it has been shown that infants display “surprise reactions” 
for events that are not only not anticipated, but that violate physical laws (e.g., Baillargeon, 
2004; Luo et al., 2009; see also Kuchokhova & Gredeback, 2007). As our experimental 
stimuli were specifically designed so as to exclude such non-natural actions, we might thus 
not find clear “surprise effects” in the infants’ dishabituation times. Importantly, though, we 
do find that infants’ predictive looking behavior revealed infants’ action anticipations based 
on statistical regularities that were build up during the course o f the experiment.
The essential finding o f our study is that the 9-month-old infants kept anticipating to 
the longer, inefficient path, even though it would have been more efficient for the cow to take 
the shorter path and negative evidence had been provided on preceding trials. Accordingly, 
our results provide evidence that infants do not yet predict actions o f others based on the 
principle o f  rational action  but rather rely on frequency information in forming action 
predictions. This finding contradicts the interpretation o f previous studies (cf. Biro et al., 
2007; Csibra, 2008; Csibra et al., 1999, 2003; Gergely et al., 1995), but is rather in line with 
the view that statistical and associative learning forms an important mechanism in infants’ 
early cognitive and social-cognitive development (e.g., Saffran, Pollak, Seibel, & Shkolnik, 
2007; see also Barresi & Moore, 1996) and corroborates recent studies on infants’ imitation 
which show limits o f infants’ ability to rationally assess the actions o f others (Paulus,
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Hunnius, Vissers, & Bekkering, in press-c). This leaves us with the question o f how the 
ability to evaluate others’ actions in terms o f efficiency develops. Further research is needed 
to investigate this in more detail.
Comprehending the mechanisms underlying our ability to predict others’ actions is 
central to explaining the social basis o f human cognition and behavior. Key mechanisms are 
our ability to predict future actions based on past observations, based on our own experiences 
with these actions, and based on their efficiency (Csibra & Gergely, 2007). Whereas the 
action prediction and understanding literature has mainly focused on motor and cognitive 
processes and their relative importance (e.g., Brass et al., 2007; Csibra, 2007; de Lange et al., 
2008; Eshuis et al., 2009; Gredeback & Melinder, in press; Paulus et al., in press-c; Paulus, 
Hunnius, Vissers, & Bekkering, in press-b; Sommerville & Woodward, 2005), our results 
make clear that more attention needs to be given to the role o f perceptual processes and 
frequency learning in human action perception and prediction.
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Chapter 3
How learning to shake a rattle affects 8-month-old infants’ perception 
of the rattle’s sound: Electrophysiological evidence for action-effect
binding in infancy
Based on:
Paulus, M., Hunnius, S., van Elk, M., & Bekkering, H. (submitted). H ow learning to shake a  
rattle affects 8-m onth-old in fan ts’ perception  o f  the r a tt le ’s sound: E lectrophysiological 
evidence fo r  action-effect binding in infancy. M anuscript submitted for publication.
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Abstract
Bidirectional action-effect associations play a fundamental role in intentional action control 
and the development o f the mirror neuron system. However, it has been questioned if  infants 
are able to acquire bidirectional action-effect associations (i.e. are able to intentionally 
control their actions). To investigate this, we trained 8-month-old infants for one week to use 
a novel rattle that produced a specific sound when shaken. Infants were also presented with 
another sound, which was not related to an action. Thereafter, infants’ EEG responses to 
these two sounds and an additional, unfamiliar sound were recorded. Infants displayed a 
stronger mu-desynchronization above cortical motor sites (i.e. motor resonance) when 
listening to the action-related sound than when hearing other sounds. Our results provide 
therefore electrophysiological evidence that infants as young as 8 months are able to acquire 
bidirectional action-effect associations and parallel findings o f audiovisual mirror neurons in 
the monkey brain.
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1. Introduction
As adults we quickly learn that an action we perform such as, for instance, hitting a drum, 
produces a specific effect, in our example a characteristic sound pattern. W hen we encounter 
the same sound at a later occasion, we can infer that it probably has been the consequence of 
this specific action. Theories have proposed that such associations between actions and their 
distal effects (i.e., bidirectional action-effect associations) play an important role in action 
control (Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001) and the processing o f others’ 
actions (Kohler et al., 2002).
In the nineteenth century, Lotze (1852) and James (1890) already suggested that 
actions are controlled through bidirectional action-effect associations (see also Prinz, 1997). 
According to this ideomotor theory o f action control, action knowledge is acquired through 
the repeated co-occurrences o f actions and their sensory effects and represented in terms of 
these action effects (Elsner & Hommel, 2001; Hommel et al., 2001; Kunde, Hoffmann, & 
Zellmann, 2002; Paulus, Hunnius, Vissers, & Bekkering, in press-b; Topolinski, in press; for 
a recent review see also Nattkemper, Ziessler, & Frensch, 2010). As the intention to elicit a 
particular sensory effect is assumed to directly activate the motor program that is associated 
with this effect, acquired action-effect associations underlie the voluntary control o f actions 
(Elsner & Hommel, 2001; Hommel, 2009).
In a similar vein, the discovery o f audiovisual mirror neurons in the monkey brain 
suggests a close link between an action’s typical effect and the associated motor program 
(Kohler et al., 2002). In particular, it was observed that neurons in the m onkey’s premotor 
cortex show an increased rate o f activation not only when the monkey performs an action 
himself, but also when he perceives the typical auditory effect o f this action. To explain the 
acquisition and development o f mirror neurons, Heyes and colleagues (Catmur Walsh, & 
Heyes, 2007, 2009; Heyes 2001, 2010; Heyes & Ray, 2000) as well as Keysers and 
colleagues (Del Giudice, Manera, & Keysers, 2008; Keysers & Perrett, 2004) proposed that 
mirror neurons might be the product o f an acquired association between sensory and motor 
codes, that is, based on sensorimotor learning.
Even though the acquisition o f bidirectional action-effect associations is thought to 
play an important role in human action control (e.g., Hommel et al., 2001) and the 
development o f mirror neurons (e.g., Del Giudice et al., 2008; Heyes, 2010), little is known
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about infants’ ability to acquire bidirectional action-effect associations. Research has shown 
that from early on infants are sensitive to the contingencies betw een their actions and the 
effects o f these actions in the environm ent (e.g., Bahrick & W atson, 1985; M ast, Fagen, 
Rovee-Collier, & Sullivan, 1980; for a review  see M oore, 2006). Furtherm ore, it has been 
suggested that infants use these contingencies to guide and intentionally control their actions 
(e.g., E lsner & Aschersleben, 2003; Hauf, Elsner, & Aschersleben, 2004; H auf & 
Aschersleben, 2008; Verschoor, W eidema, Biro, & Hommel, 2010). However, it has been 
argued that some o f these results could also be explained by instrumental learning, as infants 
ju st repeated the actions that had been rewarded with an interesting effect (instead o f having 
an expectation that the action leads to a particular effect). In other words, it has been 
suggested that infants’ action control is merely based on stim ulus-response (S-R) learning 
and operant conditioning rather than on acquired action-outcom e associations (Kenward, 
Folke, Holm berg, Johansson, & Gredeback, 2009; Klossek, Russell, & Dickinson, 2008). 
Accordingly, more research is needed to investigate i f  infants can acquire bidirectional 
action-effect associations that can later be employed to intentionally control actions (e.g., 
Hommel et al., 2001) or to process other people’s actions (e.g., K ohler et al., 2002).
To address the question w hether infants are able to acquire bidirectional action-effect 
associations and w hether they indeed “m irror” others’ actions (i.e. activate the corresponding 
m otor program  w hen they perceive another person’s action) w ithin their own m otor repertoire 
w hen they perceive the effects o f these actions, we examined infants’ brain responses to the 
perception o f distal action effects w ith electroencephalography (EEG). Research w ith adults 
has repeatedly shown that spectral power decreases in the m u-frequency band above cortical 
m otor sites provide a direct way o f assessing activation in the m otor system (e.g., Caetano, 
Jousmaki, & Hari, 2007). Frequency band analysis has thus becom e a reliable m ethod to 
investigate cortical m otor activation also in infants (M arshall, Young, & M eltzoff, in press; 
N yström , Ljungham m ar, Rosander, & von Hofsten, in press; Reid, Striano, & Iacoboni, 2011; 
Stapel, Hunnius, van Elk, & Bekkering, 2010; van Elk, van Schie, Hunnius, Vesper, & 
Bekkering, 2008; for a review  see M arshall & M eltzoff, 2011). To investigate infants’ 
acquisition o f bidirectional action-effect associations, we trained 8-m onth-old infants for one 
w eek w ith a novel rattle that produced a specific sound effect w hen shaken. After the training 
period, infants’ electrophysiological responses to the sound were measured. Our m ain interest 
was to identify power-changes related to the presentation o f the rattle’s sound. Typically, 
power-changes are expressed with respect to a pre-stim ulus baseline period or as the
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difference betw een conditions. In the present study we used tw o other conditions to 
determ ine power-changes in the mu-frequency band: Infants’ brain responses to a likewise 
familiar, but non-action related sound (presented through a voice recorder during the training 
period) and an unfam iliar auditory stimulus were recorded. I f  infants built bidirectional 
action-effect associations during their rattle training, perceiving the auditory stimulus that had 
been the effect o f the infants’ own actions should activate the associated m otor program. This 
should be reflected in a stronger desynchronization o f power in the infants’ m u-frequency 
band above cortical m otor areas for the action-related sound com pared to the tw o other 
sounds that w ere not action-related.
2. Method
2.1 Participants
The final sample consisted o f 15 infants (range: 7 months, 8 days to 8 months, 30 days; 
average: 250 days; 6 boys). Four infants were tested but not included in the final sample 
because o f equipm ent failure (n=1) or fussiness (n=3). The participants were recruited from 
public birth records and were healthy, full-term  infants w ithout any pre- or perinatal 
complications. Inform ed consent for participation was given by the infants’ parents. The 
fam ilies received a baby book or monetary com pensation for their visit.
2.2 Stimuli
The stimulus material o f the training phase consisted o f three identical cylindric objects (d=
4.5 cm; h= 6 cm; see Figure 1) made out o f red plastic, as well as voice recorders 
(Voicetracer 600, Philips, Germany). W hen shaken, the objects produced three different 
sounds (due to their content w hich could be a bell, a couple o f metal disks or screws) and 
could thus be used as rattles. Additionally, the same three sounds were recorded and put on a 
voice recorder, so that they could be played to the infants. Im portantly, each o f the voice 
recorders contained recordings from only one o f the three sounds. Cylindrical plastic boxes, 
in w hich the voice recorders could be inserted, served as container so that the voice recorders 
could be put on the table in a stable position.
The stimulus material o f the test phase consisted o f recordings o f the same three 
sounds, w hich lasted for 2000 ms each. Stimuli were recorded digitally using an AKG-3000 
condenser microphone and a M O TU  828ml2 audio interface on a M acPro com puter in an
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acoustically isolated room at 16-bit, 44,100 KHz quality and were controlled for pitch and 
loudness. Additionally, we used geom etric shapes as background pictures on a com puter 
screen while the sounds were presented in the test phase to m aintain the child’s attention and 
to avoid head movements.
Figure 1. Figure 1 shows the objects used in the training phase of the experiment. One the left side is 
the rattle and on the right side the container, in which the voice recorder was inserted.
2.3 Procedure and Design
Training Phase. For the first appointm ent, infants and parents were visited at home by the 
experimenter. The experim enter handed over one o f  the rattles and one voice recorder to the 
parents. Parents were instructed verbally about the training procedure. They also received a 
written training schedule, w hich indicated that they had to train w ith their infant every day for 
about one week (the num ber o f  training days varied between 6 and 8). Parents were asked to 
give their infants 5 m inutes o f  training w ith the rattle and let the infant listen to the voice 
recorder for 5 m inutes each day. In particular, they were asked to offer the rattle to the infant 
and let him  play w ith the rattle for this time period. Additionally, a  Velcro was provided with 
the rattle. In case infants had difficulties grasping and holding the rattle, parents were asked 
to attach the rattle to the infants’ wrist. For the training period w ith the voice recorder, the 
parents were instructed to activate the replay function o f  the recorder and then insert it into 
the container and place it in front o f  the infant approxim ately 1.5 m eters away (i.e. out o f  
reach). During the training w ith the rattle and the voice recorder, parents were instructed to 
remove any other toys and to avoid any other sounds in the background (e.g., radio).
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It was counterbalanced between days w ith w hich object parents were supposed to start 
the training (i.e. rattle or voice recorder). To ensure compliance w ith the instructions, parents 
were asked to w rite down the exact training times every day on the training schedule and 
provide information, how their infant reacted to the stimuli. It was balanced between 
participants which o f the three sounds was the action-related sound (AS; caused by shaking 
the rattle), the non-action related sound (NAS; played automatically from the voice recorder), 
and control sound (CS; not experienced during the training phase).
Test Phase. The test session was scheduled one day after the last training session in the infant 
EEG  lab o f the Donders Institute, Radboud U niversity Nijm egen. D uring the experiment, the 
infant was seated in an infant seat in front o f a com puter monitor. The child’s parent was 
sitting out o f view  behind the infant. A  loudspeaker was located behind the screen. The 
software Presentation 11.07 (Neurobehavioral Systems, USA) was used to present the three 
auditory stimuli (i.e., AS, NAS, CS) in a pseudo-random ized order so that the same stimulus 
was never presented m ore than tw o tim es in a row. A t the same time, pictures o f geom etrical 
figures w ere displayed on the screen in a random order that was unrelated to the sound 
presented. The experim ent was conducted until the child lost interest in the sound stimuli, as 
evidenced by yawning, crying, or falling asleep. The study was set up as a within-subjects 
design, as the participants were presented w ith all three auditory stimuli.
2.4 EEG recording and analysis
The EEG  data was segmented into 2200 ms tim e frames per trial, including a 200 ms 
baseline before stimulus onset and the 2000 ms, during which the stimuli w ere presented. By 
means o f a filter, frequencies below  0.0159 Hz and above 120 Hz w ere cut off. A  baseline 
correction was perform ed employing the 200 ms time fram e before stimulus onset. Trials 
w ith artifacts were rejected by means o f the automatic artifact rejection function o f Brain 
V ision Analyzer, em ploying the individual channel rejection mode (maximum difference o f 
values in a segm ent 250 microvolt). On average, 24.8% o f all trials w ere excluded from 
further analysis, leaving on average 27 trials per infant and per condition. Per infant, on 
average 27.3 trials for condition AS (range: 10-49), 27.2 trials for condition NAS (range: 9­
46), and 26.7 trials for condition CS (range: 9-47) w ere used the analysis. A  two-way 
repeated measures analysis o f variance (ANOVA) w ith the w ithin-subject factors Hem isphere 
(C3, C4) and Sound Condition (AS, NAS, CS) and num ber o f included trials as dependent 
variable revealed no significant differences (all p s  > .44).
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For each trial, fast Fourier transform ations (FFTs) were conducted over the 2000 ms 
time period beginning w ith stimulus onset and grand averages o f the FFTs w ere calculated 
for all three conditions. To investigate m otor activation during infants’ perception o f the three 
different sounds, we focused on the C3 and C4 electrodes, as they are located above the left 
and right hemispherical cortical m otor regions where w e expected an effect (cf. Babiloni et 
al., 2002; Reid et al., 2011). To analyze the average strength o f m u-desynchronization for the 
three sounds, m u-frequency pow er w as averaged over the 6-8 Hz frequency band (cf. Stapel 
et al., 2010). D ata w ere entered into a two-w ay repeated m easures analysis o f variance 
(ANOVA) w ith the w ithin-subject factors H em isphere (C3, C4) and Sound Condition (AS, 
NAS, CS).
3. Results
It was the aim o f the study to investigate w hether the power o f the EEG  signal in the mu- 
frequency range was m ore strongly suppressed during the perception o f the action-related 
sound (AS) com pared to a similarly familiar, but not action-related sound (NAS) or an 
unfam iliar sound (CS). An ANOVA revealed a significant main effect o f Sound Condition, 
F(2,28)=3.719, p< 0 .05 , i)p2= .2 \  (see Figure 2). N o significant effect o f H em isphere and no 
interaction effect were found (all ps>.11). So, to further analyze the effect o f Sound 
Condition, we averaged the data across hemispheres. Post-hoc t-tests revealed that the 
am ount o f m u-desynchronization in condition AS differed significantly from condition NAS 
and CS, t(14)=2.240, p< .05 and t(14)=2.364, p< .05, respectively, whereas no significant 
difference was found betw een the latter tw o conditions, t(14)=1.089, p= .30.
To further analyze w hether the strength o f m u-desynchronization was related to the 
duration o f training, we calculated the correlation between m u-desynchronization and the 
num ber o f training days. To this end, we computed for each participant a learning score 
defined as average difference in m u-desynchronization between AS and NAS (AS-NAS- 
score) as well as AS and CS (AS-CS-score). The analysis revealed a significant correlation 
betw een the num ber o f training days (M  = 6.9 days, SD = 0.64) and the AS-CS-score (r=-.69, 
p< .05), suggesting that infants showed more m otor activation for AS the more they trained 
w ith the novel objects. The negative correlation for the AS-NAS-score did not reach 
significance (r=-.34, p=.21).
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B
Figure 2. Figure A shows the powerspectra of the three conditions AS (dark line), NAS (light grey 
line) and CS (intermediate grey line) averaged over infants and over C3 and C4. Figure B displays the 
grand averaged EEG power for the three auditory stimuli AS (dark bars on the left), NAS (light grey 
bars in the middle), and CS (intermediate grey bars on the right) at different electrode sites.
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Finally, to ensure that the effect o f m u desynchronization was restricted to central 
areas and not w idely distributed (i.e. spreading from central over frontal and parietal sites), 
we perform ed an additional analysis. To this end, we selected for each hem isphere an 
additional frontal (Fp1, Fp2) and parietal electrode (P3, P4) and investigated differences 
betw een conditions for these electrodes. D ata were entered into a three-w ay repeated 
measures ANOVA w ith the w ithin-subject factors H em isphere (left, right), Side (frontal, 
parietal) and Sound Condition (AS, NAS, CS). The analysis revealed only a m ain effect o f 
Side, F( 1,14)= 18.501, p=.001, r]p2=.51  (all other p s  >  .19), which shows that power was 
greater over parietal sites (M =5.94, SE=.57) than over frontal sites (M =11.62, SE=1.69). 
Importantly, no effect o f Sound Condition, F<1, no interaction effect o f Sound Condition 
w ith Side, F<1, or Hem isphere, F=1, and no threeway interaction betw een the factors was 
found, F<1, suggesting that the effect o f Sound Condition on the infant mu frequency band 
was restricted to central sites.
4. Discussion
This study investigates the acquisition o f bidirectional action-effect associations in infancy. 
To this end, infants were trained for one w eek to use a novel rattle that produced a specific 
sound w hen shaken. A t the same time, infants were fam iliarized w ith another, not action- 
related sound. A fter this training phase, infants’ EEG  responses to these tw o sounds and an 
additional, unfam iliar sound were recorded. Our results show that infants displayed stronger 
m u-desynchronization w hen listening to the action-related sound than w hen hearing the other 
tw o sounds. Interestingly, the strength o f this effect was related to the duration o f training. 
Our results provide therefore electrophysiological evidence that infants as young as 8 months 
o f age can acquire bidirectional action-effect associations.
Following the ideom otor theory, we interpret these findings as evidence that through 
the repeated co-occurrence o f an action and its auditory effect the m otor code and the 
perceptual code (i.e., o f the perceived effect) becam e related to each other, and thus, infants 
acquired an action-effect association. W hen infants subsequently perceived the auditory 
stimulus, the perception o f this sound led to an activation o f the perceptual code and the 
associated m otor code (cf. Del Giudice et al., 2008; Elsner & Hommel, 2001; Heyes, 2010). 
Accordingly, the perception o f the auditory effect resulted in an activation o f cortical m otor 
areas (cf. E lsner et al., 2002) and thus a desynchronization in the mu-frequency band.
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It is im portant to emphasize that our results cannot be explained by differences 
betw een the three auditory stimuli. First, the stimuli w ere carefully recorded and were 
controlled for pitch and loudness. Second, the use o f the stimuli as action-related sound, non 
action-related sound and control sound was counterbalanced betw een participants, rendering 
it unlikely that our effects w ere merely due to specific stimulus characteristics. Furtherm ore, 
the fact that the desynchronization was significantly stronger for the action-related sound 
com pared to another fam iliar and an unfam iliar sound, whereas no difference w as found 
betw een the familiar, but not action-related sound and the unfam iliar sound excludes the 
possibility that the desynchronization was merely due to a fam iliarity or a novelty effect.
Interestingly, our analysis did not reveal any difference betw een the hemispheres, 
suggesting that the effects w ere comparably pronounced for both the left and right cortical 
m otor areas. A ssum ing that the infants did always train w ith one hand, this finding could 
suggest that the infants associated a rather abstract m otor code (i.e. o f hand action in general 
instead o f a, for example, right hand action) with the rattle’s sound effect. Therefore motor 
areas o f both hem ispheres becom e activated upon hearing the rattle’s typical sound. 
A lternatively, it m ight be the case that the infants did not have a strong hand preferences 
during the training phase, but trained sometimes w ith their left and sometimes w ith their right 
hand. This explanation is supported by research on infants’ handedness, w hich provided 
evidence for lateral fluctuations in infants’ hand preferences (e.g., Corbetta & Thelen, 1999,
2002). As a consequence, infants’ m ight have associated left- and right-hand actions w ith the 
sound effect and, w hen perceiving this sound again, showed an activation in cortical m otor 
areas o f both hemispheres. Further research, carefully controlling for infants’ left- and right- 
hand use, is necessary to investigate this issue in m ore detail.
Previous research has suggested that infants are sensitive to the effects o f their own 
actions from early on and use these effects to guide their actions (e.g., H auf et al., 2004; M ast 
et al., 1980; for a review see Elsner, 2007). H auf and A schersleben (2008), for example, 
dem onstrated to 7- and 9-m onth-old infants that pressing one o f tw o buttons led to a salient 
action effect. Subsequently, infants could play w ith the buttons. In their experiment, the 
infants tended to press the button first and longer that led to the salient action effect in the 
dem onstration phase. A lthough these findings provide evidence for an im pact o f action 
effects on infants’ subsequent action execution, it was unclear if  the effects w ere due to an 
acquisition o f bidirectional action-effect contingencies. Alternatively, m erely reinforcem ent 
learning o f habitual responses can also explain the results (e.g., K lossek et al., 2008;
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K enward et al., 2009). O ur study, however, provides direct evidence that already 8-m onth-old 
infants are able to acquire bidirectional action-effect associations and is in line w ith other 
recent findings that employed response latency m easures w ith 9-m onth-old infants 
(V erschoor et al., 2010). Follow ing the ideom otor theory (cf. Hommel et al., 2001), these 
associations m ight provide the neurocognitive basis o f infants’ ability to voluntarily control 
their actions (cf. Gibson & Pick, 2000; von Hofsten, 2007).
Recently, cortical m otor activation during action observation (i.e., m otor resonance) 
has been reported in several developmental studies (e.g., M arshall et al., in press; Nystrom  et 
al., in press; Reid et al., 2011; Stapel et al., 2010), and it has been suggested that m otor 
resonance is related to infants’ own action experience (van Elk et al., 2008). In the study by 
van Elk and colleagues (2008), however, infants w ere presented w ith recordings o f human 
actions and infants’ ability to perform these actions was not experim entally manipulated. Our 
study is the first to systematically m anipulate infants’ active action experiences and provide 
electrophysiological evidence that m otor resonance is directly m odulated by action- 
experience. Furtherm ore, supporting the theoretical models proposed by Hommel et al. 
(2001) and Heyes (2010), our results show that m otor resonance can be elicited not only 
through the observation o f an action itself, but also through the perception o f the distal effects 
o f this action (cf. James, 1890).
Some studies have shown that the perception o f an action leads to activation in the 
observer’s m otor cortex (e.g., M arshall & M eltzoff, in press; Nystrom  et al., in press). Other 
studies have provided evidence that such m otor activation is m easurable on a m uscular level 
(e.g., Cattaneo et al., 2007) or in overt behavior (e.g., Kilner, Palignan, & Blakem ore, 2003). 
In the present study, the relation o f m u-desynchronization to overt behavior and covert motor 
activation rem ains an open question. Further research is thus necessary to investigate w hether 
infants’ m otor activation upon hearing the auditory effect, w hich has previously been caused 
by their own action, is restricted to covert m otor activation or can also lead to behaviorally 
measurable consequences (i.e. the child m aking sub-threshold or small arm m ovements 
during the hearing o f the sound).
Our results parallel findings on audiovisual m irror neurons in the m onkey brain (e.g., 
Keysers et al., 2003; K ohler et al., 2002). In particular, it has been found that the perception 
o f an action’s specific auditory effect (e.g., cracking a nut) activates the same neurons in the 
m onkey’s prem otor cortex that are activated w hen the m onkey perform s the action himself.
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The results o f our EEG  study show cortical m otor activation in response to a specific auditory 
action effect. It has been suggested that activation in these cortical areas during action 
perception probably reflects the w orking o f a hum an m irror neuron system (Kilner & Frith, 
2007; see also Caetano et al., 2007). Our findings are thus in line with the suggestion that a 
m irror neuron system (M NS) m ight also exist in the hum an brain (e.g., Rizzolatti & 
Craighero, 2004). Supporting this notion, we found stronger m otor activation for the 
perception o f a sound that was previously the effect o f the infants’ own actions than o f 
sounds that w ere either unfam iliar or familiar, but not related to infants’ actions. Furtherm ore, 
the strength o f this effect was partly dependent on the num ber o f training days. In other 
words, the more active action experience infants had, the m ore m otor activation they showed 
for the rattle’s sound com pared to an unfam iliar sound. I f  we assum e that m otor activation for 
the rattle’s sound reflect the activation in a hum an m irror neuron system, then our results 
provide empirical support for the notion that the developm ent o f the M NS is experience- 
dependent and the consequence o f sensorim otor learning experiences (Catm ur et al., 2007; 
Del Giudice et al., 2008; Heyes, 2010) rather than based on an innate m atching system (cf. 
Ferrari et al., 2006). Our results are therefore inform ative w ith respect to the question o f how 
the m irror neuron system changes in the course o f developm ent (cf. K ilner & Blakemore,
2007).
Our results have im plications for current theories on infants’ action understanding and 
imitation, as it has been argued that infants’ own action capabilities and experiences are 
related to these abilities (e.g., M eltzoff, 2007; Paulus et al., in press-b; Paulus, Hunnius, 
Vissers, & Bekkering, in press-c; Sommerville & W oodward, 2005). For example, it has been 
argued that the perception o f an action or action effect is automatically m apped onto infants’ 
own action system (cf. Heyes, 2010; Ray & Heyes, 2011) and that this m apping process plays 
an im portant role in infants’ understanding o f this action (e.g., Falck-Ytter, Gredeback, & von 
Hofsten, 2006). In particular, it has been proposed that such a m apping m echanism  enables 
humans to employ their own m otor system to predict the goal o f  an ongoing action. This 
suggestion is in line with recent theoretical approaches that stress the embodied nature o f 
infants’ action perception and action understanding (e.g., Daum, Sommerville, & Prinz, 
2009). Infants’ growing experience w ith different actions and their effects should thus enable 
them  to gradually understand more o f other people’s intentional action (Barresi & Moore,
2008). Our results provide clear evidence for cortical m otor activation during the perception
SB
o f the effects o f well-know n actions and are thus in line w ith suggestions that infants map 
others’ actions onto their own m otor repertoire.
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Chapter 4
Can 14- to 20-month-old infants learn that a tool serves multiple 
purposes? A developmental study on children’s action goal prediction
Based on:
Paulus, M., Hunnius, S., & Bekkering, H. (2011). Can 14- to 20-m onth-old children learn that 
a tool serves m ultiple purposes? A  developmental study on children’s action goal prediction. 
Vision Research, 51, 955-960.
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Abstract
W e investigated infants’ visual anticipations to the target o f an ongoing tool-use action. In 
particular, we exam ined i f  infants can learn that tools serve m ultiple functions and can thus 
be used on different targets. Specifically, we addressed the question at w hat age children are 
able to predict the goal o f an ongoing tool-use action on the basis o f how the actor initiates 
the action. Fourteen- and 20-m onth-old children w atched a model using a tool to execute two 
different actions. Each way o f grasping and holding the tool was predictive for its use on a 
particular target. Analyses revealed that the 20- but not the 14-month-olds were able to 
visually anticipate to the correct target during action observation, w hich suggests that they 
perceived the initial part o f the tool-use action as predictive for its use on an action target.
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1. Introduction
Only few  non-hum an species use tools (e.g., de Resende, Ottoni, & Fragaszy, 2008). Yet for 
humans, their culture and survival appear to be closely linked to their sophisticated use o f 
tools. It has been argued that humans use tools to extend the lim its o f their own body 
(Alsberg, 1922). Additionally, researchers have assum ed that the ability to develop tools and 
learn about them  by observing other people’s tool-use actions is deeply rooted in hum ans’ 
unique social-cognitive skills, w hich allow the transm ission and accum ulation o f cultural 
knowledge (Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & M oll, 2005).
W hile there is disagreem ent about the evolutionary roots o f tool-use (cf. Byrne & 
Russon, 1998; Csibra & Gergely, 2009; Gehlen, 1940; Tom asello et al., 2005), research has 
provided substantial evidence that the hum an ability to use and learn about tools through 
observation emerges early in development, namely during the first years o f life. For example, 
recent studies on infants’ visual expectations show that infants as young as 6 months have 
acquired rudim entary knowledge about the use o f functional objects (Hunnius & Bekkering, 
2010; Kochukhova & Gredeback, 2010; Reid, Csibra, Belsky, & Johnson, 2007) and are able 
to relate the aperture size o f an actor’s grasping action to the size o f the goal object (Daum, 
Vuori, Prinz, & Aschersleben, 2009). W hereas this knowledge m ight provide the basis o f 
early m eans-end behaviors that can already be observed in the second ha lf o f the first year o f 
life (Bates, Carlson-Luden, & Bretherton, 1980; Piaget, 1952; W illats, 1999), the ability to 
use tools unfolds largely during the second year o f life (e.g., Barrett, Davis, & Needham, 
2007; Berger & Adolph, 2003; Connolly & Dalgleish, 1989; Elsner & Pauen, 2007; M cCarty, 
Clifton, & Collard, 2001; van Leeuwen, Smitsman, & van Leeuwen, 1994) and develops 
further during early childhood (Smitsm an & Cox, 2008).
One im portant aspect o f tool-use is that a tool can be used flexibly in different ways to 
serve different functions and to act on different targets (e.g., German & Defeyter, 2000; 
German & Johnson, 2002). A  claw  hammer, for example, can either be used to hit a nail or to 
remove it. Based on the different action goals, the ham m er needs to be grasped and moved 
differently. As a consequence, the way o f acting on the tool (i.e. grasping and holding it 
differently) becom es predictive for its subsequent use and enables an observer to predict the 
goal (i.e. target or end-location) o f an ongoing tool-use action (cf. van Rooij, Haselager, & 
Bekkering, 2008). Given the im portance o f tools in daily life and for jo in t activities in
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particular, the question arises as to at w hat age children are able to flexibly predict the goal o f 
an ongoing tool-use action on the basis o f how the actor initiates the tool-use action. 
Interestingly, research on infants’ own tool-use abilities has shown that infants’ ability to 
efficiently grasp a tool (i.e., w ith respect to the goal o f the action) im proves substantially over 
the second year o f life (e.g., M cCarty, Clifton, & Collard, 1999; M cCarty et al., 2001). 
M cCarty and colleagues (1999) found that in situations in w hich participants needed to plan 
their grasping action in advance, only about 30% o f the 14-month-old infants, but 85% o f the
19-month-old infants were able to grasp the tool w ith the appropriate radial grip. This finding 
provides evidence that infants’ ability to efficiently plan their grip w ith respect to the goal o f 
a tool-use actions develops largely betw een 14 and 19 months o f age. Based on findings that 
infants’ action production influences their action perception (Hauf, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 
2007; Paulus, Hunnius, Vissers, & Bekkering, in press-c; Sommerville & W oodward, 2005; 
Sommerville, Hildebrand, & Crane, 2008; van Elk, van Schie, Hunnius, Vesper, & 
Bekkering, 2008), we hypothesized that infants’ ability to predict the target o f an ongoing 
action by taking into consideration the w ay a tool is initially being grasped and acted upon 
should develop betw een 14- and 20-m onths o f age.
To investigate this hypothesis we employed a predictive looking paradigm. This 
paradigm  is based on findings that infants visually anticipate the target o f object-directed 
actions they observe (Falck-Ytter, Gredeback, & von Hofsten, 2006; Hunnius & Bekkering, 
2010; see also Gredeback, Johnson, & von Hofsten, 2010). In our study, infants w atched a 
series o f short action sequences in w hich an actor perform ed tw o different tool-use actions 
w ith the same tool, either using it to insert it into a box or to hit on a bell. The w ay the model 
grasped and subsequently held the tool (i.e. w hich part o f the tool was visible) was predictive 
o f its use on one o f the tw o targets. I f  infants are able to learn to predict the target o f the 
ongoing tool-use action, we expected them  to visually anticipate to the correct object on the 
basis o f the m odel’s way o f holding the tool.
2. Method
2.1 Participants
The final sample o f the study consisted o f 32 infants, including sixteen 14-month-old infants 
(range: 13 months, 15 days to 14 months, 30 days; mean age 423 days; 11 boys) and sixteen
20-m onth-old infants (range: 20 months, 1 day to 21 months, 10 days; m ean age 624 days; 7
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boys). Five additional 14-month-olds and four additional 20-m onth-olds were tested but not 
included in the final sample because o f general inactivity, refusal to rem ain seated, or 
inattentiveness during the experiment. The participants were recruited from public birth 
records and were healthy, full-term  infants w ithout any pre- or perinatal complications. 
Inform ed consent for participation w as given by the infants’ parents. The families received a 
baby book or monetary compensation for their visit.
2.2 Stimuli
The stimulus material consisted o f m ovies w hich displayed short action sequences depicting 
the use o f a tool. They showed a frontal view  o f a male model sitting at a table (see Figure 
1B, 1C). The face o f the actor was not shown to prevent infants from focusing attention on 
his face rather than on the ongoing action (cf. Falck-Y tter et al., 2006). Before the actions 
started, the tool was lying in front o f the actor on the table. The tool (see Figure 1A) w as a 
gray object. It had a long shape (about 18 cm) and consisted o f tw o parts which w ere o f 
distinct color (light grey and dark grey). The tool was placed in a vertical position to the body 
o f the actor so that one end o f the tool w as always directed towards him. On the left and right 
side o f the table, there were tw o target objects on yellow  cloths, a bell and a box w ith a small 
opening on top.
During the tool-use action sequence, the actor grasped the tool w ith his right hand at 
one o f its ends and moved his hand w ith the tool straight away from his body. I f  the tool was 
grasped w ith a full grip at the dark grey end, then the actor always inserted the light grey part 
into the box and turned it as he would do w ith a key. I f  the tool was grasped w ith a precision 
grip at the light grey end, the actor brought it to the bell and hit the bell w ith the dark grey 
part. N o other action com binations o f type o f grasp, tool-use action, and target object were 
performed. To draw infants’ attention to the action target and not to any acoustical effects o f 
the actions, the stimulus m ovies were presented w ithout sound. Both action m ovies had a 
duration o f approximately seven seconds (see Figures 1 B and 1 C for key frames). The 
movem ent path w hich the actor perform ed w ith the object consisted o f tw o phases: an 
am biguous phase (starting w hen the model grasped the tool, approxim ately 3-4 seconds after 
stimulus onset) in which the actor’s m ovem ent was ambiguous with respect to the two 
possible target objects, as the actor moved his hand along the m iddle line betw een both target 
objects; and the subsequent phase (starting approxim ately 5-6 seconds after stimulus onset), 
during w hich the actor deviated from the m idline and the tool w as brought to one o f the two
59
C h a p te r  4: ACTION GOAL PREDICTION DURING OBSERVATION OF TOOL-USE
target objects. N ote that during the am biguous phase only the way o f grasping the tool and 
the orientation o f the tool w ere predictive o f the action’s target.
For the action sequences, the part o f the tool which was grasped by the actor, the 
position o f the target objects (left or right on the table), and the initial orientation o f the tool 
on the table (which end was pointing to the actor) was counterbalanced. From  each o f the 
eight (2 x 2 x 2) possible combinations tw o movie versions were made, and thus the stimulus 
material consisted o f 16 action movies.
Piloting w ith sim ilar stimulus material showed that infants would attend to the too l­
use actions for approximately twelve action sequences. Therefore, twelve o f the 16 action 
sequences were composed pseudo-random ly to create movies, w hich served as stimuli in the 
experiment. The action sequences w ere always presented in an ABBABAABABAB order. 
N ote that all trials, in w hich the target were presented on the same side o f the table, were 
blocked w ithin a movie. Before each block, a still frame (duration 3 seconds) was presented 
to allow  infants to becom e fam iliar w ith the scene. E ight different versions o f these movies 
were com posed out o f the action sequences in a way that all conditions (i.e. action sequences) 
were balanced over all movies. Furtherm ore, the first tw o action sequences in every movie 
showed each o f the tw o actions that could be perform ed w ith the tool (see D ata analysis 
section).
60
C h a p te r  4: ACTION GOAL PREDICTION DURING OBSERVATION OF TOOL-USE
A
Figure 1. Figure A shows the tool used in the experiment. Figures B and C give each five key frames 
from two different stimulus movies.
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2.3 Experimental setup and procedure
The infants were seated in an infant seat on the lap o f their caregiver. The caregiver sat on a 
chair that was approxim ately 60 cm away from the com puter monitor. The gaze o f both eyes 
was recorded using a corneal reflection eye-tracker at 50 H z w ith an average accuracy o f 0.5° 
visual angle (Tobii 1750, Tobii Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). The stimuli were shown 
on a 17” TFT flat-screen monitor. A  9-point calibration procedure w ith a 3 x 3 grid o f 
calibration points w as used to calibrate the gaze o f each participant before testing. I f  only 
seven or less points were calibrated successfully, the calibration o f the m issing points was 
repeated; otherwise the experim ent was started. First, an attention getter was presented to 
attract infants’ attention to the screen. Then, the experim enter started the experim ent w ith a 
button press.
2.4 Data analysis
W e analyzed infants’ visual anticipations, i.e. their first eye m ovem ent to one o f the two 
target objects during the ambiguous phase o f the tool-use action (cf. Falck-Y tter et al., 2006), 
using a custom -m ade eye-tracking data analysis software (GSA, Donders Institute for Brain, 
Cognition and Behaviour, The Netherlands). To this end, tw o sam e-sized areas o f interest 
were defined around both targets. Only the last ten o f  the twelve action sequences w ithin a 
movie w ere analyzed because infants saw both actions in the first tw o action sequences for 
the first tim e (see Stimuli section). M easures w ere taken separately for each trial and then 
averaged over the ten trials for every participant.
3. Results
Infants showed anticipatory looks to one o f the tw o targets during the am biguous m ovem ent 
phase o f the tool-use action on average in 53% (14-month-olds: 57%; 20-month-olds: 49%) 
o f the action sequences. For further analysis we dismissed the trials in which infants did not 
anticipate to either o f the tw o target objects, but showed in their looking pattern that they 
only followed the action or did not pay attention. An analysis o f infants’ first anticipatory 
looks to one o f the tw o target objects revealed that 69% (SE = 6.9) o f the 20-m onth-olds’ first 
look were directed to the correct target o f the ongoing action, whereas the 14-month-old 
infants directed their gaze in 49%  (SE = 5.1) o f the trials to the correct target object. O ne­
sided t-tests revealed that the 20-m onth-old infants directed their first look significantly more
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often to the correct target object, i(15)=2.693, p<0.01, w hereas the 14-month-olds showed no 
systematic effect in their anticipation behavior, i(15)=-0.251, p=0.40.
For further analyses o f infants’ anticipations and changes in anticipation frequency 
throughout the task, we divided the ten test trials into three blocks (see Figure 2). The first 
block included the first four trials and the second and third block included three trials each. 
N ote that not every participant contributed data to each block as infants anticipated on 
average only in 50% o f the trials. As a result, data points could be dependent (e.g., when 
participants contributed data for block 1 and block 2), but also independent (e.g., w hen the 
participants did not contribute data for block 3). As this data structure does not fulfill the 
requirem ents for conducting an analysis o f variance (ANOVA), we im plem ented a 
perm utation m ethod to test the significance o f differences between the groups. Perm utation 
methods allow to calculate the probability that an observed data set can be explained by the 
null hypothesis w ithout relying on further assum ptions (see for a review Good, 1999). The 
analyses revealed that there was no significant difference between the blocks, neither for the 
14-month-olds (all ps>0 .32) nor for the 20-m onth-olds (all ps>0.16), suggesting that there 
was no im provem ent o f perform ance over time.
Figure 2. The figure shows infants’ performances split up into three blocks (1-3). The first block 
comprises the first four test trials and the second and third block three test trials each. Error bars 
indicate standard error of the means. The bold horizontal line emphasizes the 50%-value.
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To examine w hether infants’ anticipation perform ances w ere different w ith respect to 
the tw o ways in which the tool could be used, we com pared infants’ perform ances in both 
conditions. The analysis (based on a perm utation m ethod) shows that the num ber o f 14- 
m onth-old infants’ correct anticipations was not different betw een the conditions in which the 
dark (43%) or the light grey end (57%) was grasped, p= .25. The same pattern o f results was 
obtained for the 20-m onth-old infants whose perform ance did not significantly differ between 
the conditions in which either the dark grey (60%) or the light grey end (73% ) was grasped, 
p= .29. This suggests that there w ere no significant differences in visual saliency or 
complexity betw een conditions for the infants.
4. Discussion
The aim o f this study was to examine w hether 14- and 20-m onth-old infants and toddlers can 
learn to predict the target o f object-directed tool-use during an ongoing action by taking into 
consideration the way a tool is initially being grasped and acted upon. Infants’ anticipatory 
eye m ovem ents and their looking times revealed that the 20-m onth-old toddlers, but not the 
14-month-old infants anticipated the actor to move towards the target object o f the ongoing 
tool-use actions. This suggests that the 20-, but not the 14-month-old children recognized the 
initial part o f the tool-use action as predictive for the target on which the actor w as going to 
act upon.
Our findings add to recent studies on infants’ developing knowledge about functional 
object use. Infants from 6 months acquire knowledge about objects’ usual end locations 
(Hunnius & Bekkering, 2010; K ochukhova & Gredeback, 2010; Reid et al., 2007). 
Additionally, they are able to use grip apertures to predict the object that an actor is going to 
grasp (Daum et al., 2009). M cCarty and colleagues (1999) showed that infants’ own tool-use 
abilities, in particular their ability to grasp a tool efficiently w ith respect to its final use, 
im prove largely over the second year o f life. However, an im portant task in cultural learning 
is to realize that tools can be flexibly used in different ways and on different targets. Our 
study thus extends the previous findings by showing that around 20 months o f age infants can 
learn to predict that a certain tool can be used in a functionally flexible way on different 
targets.
W hat are the cognitive mechanism s that allow 20-m onth-old, but not 14-month-old 
infants to predict the target o f an ongoing tool-use action? Three possible mechanism s might
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underlie this ability and will be discussed in the following paragraphs: statistical learning, 
affordance perception, and m otor resonance.
The first notion, associative or statistical learning, suggests that infants acquire 
associations betw een perceptual events w hen these events occur frequently in close 
succession to each other (e.g., K irkham , Slemmer, & Johnson, 2002). In the present study, 
infants m ight have associated the appearance of the hand or of the visible end of the tool with 
the target and used this inform ation to  predict the goal of the ongoing action. This 
explanation is partially supported by studies that show that perceptual aspects play a m ajor 
role in infants’ learning about tools (e.g., Bates et al., 1980). M oreover, recent findings that 
have provided direct evidence for the importance o f statistical learning in infants’ action 
prediction (Paulus et al., in press-a).
A  second mechanism, affordance perception, is based on the idea that action 
possibilities are directly perceivable (Gibson, 1979). Research w ith infants has provided 
evidence that object affordances can already be perceived in the first year o f life (e.g., Paulus 
& Hauf, in press; see also G ibson & Pick, 2000), and it has been suggested that infants’ 
learning about the use o f tools m ight be based on the detection o f affordances (Lockman, 
2000). In our study, grasping the dark grey end o f the tool m ight have directed the observer’s 
attention at the too l’s thin end that fitted into the hole o f the box-like target. Thus, the 
perception o f the thin end afforded the inserting action into the opening. Likewise, one can 
assum e that the ham m er-like ending afforded the hitting action on the bell.
The third m echanism  that m ight provide an explanation for our results is motor 
resonance. It has been suggested that m otor resonance, a process o f direct perception-action 
matching, m ight support our capacity to predict the goals o f other people’s actions (Knoblich, 
2008; W ilson & Knoblich, 2005). Previous research has indeed dem onstrated that an infant’s 
own action capabilities and experiences are related to  how they perceive the actions of others 
(e.g., Paulus, Hunnius, Vissers, & Bekkering, in press-c; Sommerville et al., 2008; van Elk et 
al., 20087; cf. Hauf, 2007). As infants’ own tool-use and action planning abilities improve 
over the second year o f life (e.g., Cox & Smitsman, 2006; M cCarty et al., 1999), they might 
have matched the observed action onto their own m otor repertoire and m ight thus have used 
their own experiences w ith complex tool-use actions to predict the goal o f the observed too l­
use action.
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All three m echanism s provide thus explanations for the 20-m onth-old children’s 
performance. However, a m ore thorough consideration of our findings suggests that some 
explanations are more likely w ith respect to our findings than others. Concerning associative 
and statistical learning it has frequently been suggested that such learning should occur 
gradually, based on the repeated experience o f successive events (e.g., Hihara, Obayashi, 
Tanaka, & Iriki, 2003; Visalberghi & Tomasello, 1998). A  closer inspection o f the data, 
however, showed that there was no gradual im provem ent of perform ance over time, neither 
for the 14-month-old nor the 20-m onth-old infants. In particular, infants did not perform 
better in the third block than in the first or second block o f trials. Additionally, infants show 
sophisticated statistical learning capabilities w ith far more complex stimuli already during 
their first year o f life (e.g., F iser & Aslin, 2002; K irkham  et al., 2002; Saffran, Pollak, Seibel, 
& Shkolnik, 2007), w hereas in our study even 14-month-old infants showed no im provem ent 
over the 12 trials. Nevertheless, one cannot fully exclude the possibility that the 14-month- 
old infants might have needed more learning trials to learn the relation betw een the initial 
tool grasping action and the action’s goal object. For example, in a study by W oodw ard and 
Guajardo (2002), 12-month-old infants needed 9 habituation trials to acquire knowledge 
about an actor’s target. However, it should also be noted that the 20-m onth-old children 
showed good perform ances from the first test trials onwards. Such a rapid acquisition o f 
knowledge that does not rely on many repetitions of the same events is usually interpreted as 
a sign for a cognitive insight into the relation betw een the events rather than for associative 
learning between m eaningless stimuli (Kummer, 1995; Visalberghi & Tomasello, 1998). This 
pattern of results renders it unlikely that statistical learning is the most im portant m echanism 
subserving participants’ perform ances in our task.
Concerning the im pact of affordance perception, one might object in a similar m anner 
that already 6- to 12-month-old infants are able to perceive the affordances o f objects (e.g., 
Adolph, Eppler, & Gibson, 1993; Paulus & Hauf, in press). However, in tool-use not only 
affordances between a person’s effectors and objects bu t also betw een different objects (i.e. 
the tool and its target) have to be detected (Lockman, 2000). W e can assum e that the 
perception of these kinds of affordances is more difficult and m ight thus develop later, maybe 
betw een 14 and 20 months o f age as indicated by our results. However, it remains unclear 
why children’s ability to detect these affordances develops over the second year o f life.
The last theoretical notion, m otor resonance, might offer the most plausible 
explanation for the age differences that we found in our study. As m entioned before, it has
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been suggested that in an effort to predict others’ actions people employ their own m otor 
system (Knoblich, 2008; W ilson & Knoblich, 2005), thus infants’ own tool-using skills 
should also affect their perform ance in this task (cf. Daum, Prinz, & Aschersleben, in press). 
The fact that infants’ own tool-use and action plan abilities im prove largely over the second 
year o f life (e.g., M cCarty et al., 1999), m ight underlie the fact that 20-m onth-old infants 
picked up the relevant inform ation immediately and not the 14-month-old infants. However, 
to further validate this claim infants’ own tool-use abilities should be more directly assessed 
in future studies.
Further research is thus necessary to investigate the im pact o f each o f these 
m echanism s on infants’ beginning understanding o f other people’s tool-use actions in more 
detail. For example, directly assessing infants’ tool-use abilities, m anipulating the num ber o f 
learning trials, and changing the affordances between tool and target would provide more 
insight into the developmental trajectory o f this ability. However, w hatever the precise 
psychological m echanism  m ight be, our results provide evidence that 20-, but not 14-month- 
old infants are able to flexibly predict the target object o f an ongoing tool-use action.
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Chapter 5
Whom to ask for help? Children’s developing understanding of other
people’s action capabilities
Based on:
Paulus, M., & M oore, C. (in press). W hom  to ask for help? C hildren’s developing 
understanding o f others’ action capabilities. E xperim ental Brain Research.
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Abstract
W e often rely on other people’s help to accom plish tasks and to attain goals. People, 
however, differ in their physical action capabilities. Some persons are therefore better able to 
provide help than others. W e investigated 2.5-, 3.5-, and 5-year-old children’s ability to take 
other person’s action capabilities in a helping situation into account. To this end, they 
observed a protagonist who needed the help of friends to  accom plish several tasks. For each 
task, tw o friends w ere available but only one was physically able to  provide the help. Our 
results showed a developmental effect w ith children in the older tw o groups performing 
significantly better than those in the youngest group. Additionally, we found evidence that 
the 5-year-olds outperform ed the younger age groups in their ability to justify  their choice. 
Our findings thus suggest that children’s ability to consider others’ physical action 
capabilities in helping situations develops around 3 years of age. The results are interpreted in 
term s o f children’s ability to perceive others’ affordances. The im plication o f these findings 
for theories on the developm ent of action understanding and jo in t action are discussed.
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1. Introduction
Imagine searching around for a lost object. Eventually you see it on the top o f a high 
cupboard, but it is too high for you to  reach. Luckily, there are some people around you 
whom  you could ask for help. Clearly, as you w ant to  retrieve an object from a high 
cupboard, you would ask the taller person to help you, but not the smaller person. As this 
example nicely illustrates, the ability to correctly judge other people’s action capabilities 
plays an im portant role in our social life, not only in collaborative, but also in competitive 
situations. W hereas adults indubitably possess a certain proficiency in taking others’ action 
capabilities into account w hen looking for help, almost nothing is known about the 
developm ent of this ability in childhood.
Generally, young children rely on other persons’ help to a great extent. It is well 
established that young children show social referencing behavior w hen they are uncertain 
about situations (e.g., M oore, 2006; W alden & Ogan, 1988) and they seek inform ation (e.g., 
Baldwin & M oses, 1996) and help from others to accom plish tasks and attain goals (e.g., 
Newm an, 2000; Puustinen, 1998). However, as illustrated by the presented example, proper 
functioning in a dynamic social environm ent requires sophisticated knowledge about with 
whom  to interact to  attain a goal and whom  to ask for help or for inform ation in certain 
situations.
Interestingly, recent research on children’s selective social learning has indicated that 
preschoolers use inform ation about the success o f a person’s past actions (Birch et al. 2008), 
or the past accuracy of inform ation provided by a person (Corriveau & Harris, 2009; 
Pasquini, Corriveau, Koenig, & Harris, 2007), to decide on whom  to rely w hen different 
persons offer conflicting information. For example, it has been shown that 4- but not 3-year- 
old children selectively trusted a previously correct person in a w ord learning situation, when 
he gave different inform ation than a previously incorrect or ignorant speakers (Koenig & 
Harris, 2005). Interestingly, a person’s past accuracy seems to be m ore im portant than an 
actor’s age as preschoolers rely more on a previously accurate person than on an older person 
(Jaswal & Neely, 2006). Furtherm ore, selective learning is not restricted to the acquisition o f 
novel words. Rakoczy and colleagues (Rakoczy, W arneken, & Tomasello, 2009) showed that
4-year-old children also preferred to learn novel rules (i.e. norm ative appropriate actions) 
from a previously reliable com pared to an unreliable model.
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The reviewed literature provides evidence for preschool children’s selective reliance 
on persons w hen acquiring novel knowledge. W hereas these studies have provided im portant 
insights, research has neglected the domain o f others’ physical action capabilities. Research 
w ith adults has shown that humans are quite proficient in estimating other people’s action 
capabilities (e.g., Stoffregen, Gorday, Sheng, & Flynn, 1999) and subsequent research, 
inform ed by Ecological Psychology (see M arsh, Johnston, Richardson, & Schmidt, 2009, for 
a current overview), has suggested that such an estimation is based on the detection o f action­
relevant properties o f other agents in relation to their environm ent (i.e. action affordances; 
Ram enzoni, Shockley, Fajen, Riley, & Turvey, 2008). K now ledge about the developm ent o f 
this ability is o f relevance for developmental psychologists as it provides insight into 
children’s ability to select appropriate persons w hen seeking help (e.g., w hen w e need to 
retrieve something from a high cupboard). Furtherm ore, this domain is o f relevance for 
researchers interested in the developm ent o f  the ability to engage successfully in jo in t action 
because efficient interaction w ith others relies on an appropriate evaluation o f their action 
capabilities (Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006).
The present study investigated the developm ent o f children’s understanding o f others’ 
action capabilities. To be able to examine systematically children’s evaluations o f other’s 
action capabilities across a num ber o f different person characteristics (e.g., such as strength 
or height) we decided to employ a third-person helping task in w hich dolls represented the 
actor as well as possible helpers in a num ber o f different situations (for com parable third- 
person approaches see, for example, Faw cett & M arkson 2010-a, 2010-b; Olson & Spelke 
2008; Vaish, M issana, & Tomasello, in press). In particular, children w ere introduced to a 
protagonist w ho needed the help o f others in five tasks. For example, one task required 
retrieving a displayed item while another task involved carrying a heavy object. In every 
situation, tw o friends o f the protagonist w ere present. In each case, only one o f the friends 
was able to provide the help as only he/she was, for example, tall or strong enough.
To examine children’s ability to choose the adequate person for help, we assessed 
their judgm ents o f w hich o f the friends the actor would ask for help. Furtherm ore, children 
were asked to justify their choice. A  com parison between both m easures would be 
inform ative w ith respect to the possible social-cognitive m echanism s that underlie children’s 
developing ability to evaluate others’ action capabilities. I f  children were able to choose 
correctly the adequate helper before they were able to justify  their choice, this would suggest 
that their ability to evaluate others’ action capabilities is initially m ore practical form o f
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knowledge that over developmental time becom es explicated in conceptual or discursive 
knowledge (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; for detailed epistemological analyses o f this account see 
Brandom , 1994; Habermas, 1985). However, i f  there was no developmental lag betw een the 
tw o measures, this would indicate that even at its developmental origin this knowledge is o f 
conceptual nature (for a sim ilar discussion concerning the cognitive m echanism s behind 
children’s selective learning from other people see K oenig & Jaswal, in press; Lucas & 
Lewis, 2010). As it has been suggested that children from 3 years on are able to estimate 
other people’s reachability space (Rochat, 1995), we investigated 2.5-, 3.5- and 5-year-old 
children.
2. Method
2.1 Participants
The final sample o f the study consisted o f 36 children, including tw elve 2.5-year-old children 
(range: 2 years, 5.8 months to 2 years, 11.3 months; 6 boys), tw elve 3.5-year-old children 
(range: 3 years, 5.2 months to 3 years, 10.7 months; 7 boys), and twelve 5-year-old children 
(range: 4 years, 6.2 months to 5 years, 4.2 months; 7 boys). The participants were recruited 
from a database o f parents who volunteered to participate in psychological studies, all being 
native English speakers from heterogeneous socioeconomic background in N ova Scotia, 
Canada. Inform ed consent for participation w as given by the children’s parents. The families 
received a certificate for their visit.
2.2 Tasks and Materials
Children w ere presented w ith ten dolls over the course o f the five tasks (see Figure 1). One 
doll represented the protagonist (Piglet). In every task tw o dolls represented friends o f Piglet. 
The tasks w ere perform ed by one experim enter and varied in the type o f problem  that the 
protagonist encountered and the type o f action capability required. Action capability was 
varied between the tw o dolls that represented P iglet’s friends. Every task started w ith Piglet 
appearing in the scene, greeting his friends, and subsequently either trying, but failing to 
perform an action or announcing that he was not able to perform the action. A fter admitting 
that he could not perform the action himself, he articulated that he could ask one o f his 
friends for help. He subsequently approached his friends. The experim enter asked the child to 
show him, which o f his tw o friends P iglet would ask for help: “W hat do you think: W hom  o f
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his friends is Piglet going to ask for help?” I f  the child did not react, the question was 
repeated in another wording: “W ho is Piglet going to ask for help?” I f  the child m ade the 
correct choice, he or she was further asked to justify, why Piglet w ould ask this friend and not 
the other. The order o f tasks was balanced among participants w ith the exception o f the 
balcony task and the dog’s house task; as both tasks involved the same dolls, they were 
always presented after each other.
Figure 1. The figure displays the stimuli used in the experiment. The doll in the front shows the main 
protagonist Piglet. The dolls behind Piglet show (from left to right) the two male dolls used in the 
basket task, the two princesses used in the balcony and the dog’s house task, the two male dolls used 
in the wall task, and the two girls used in the letter task. The doll on the top of the toy house is Elmo 
who has been employed for the balcony and the dog’s house task.
The balcony task (Out o f  reach)
A tall and a small princess were standing in front o f a toy house. Piglet entered the scene with 
tw o objects in his hand. H e greeted the princesses and started playing w ith his objects. 
Suddenly, another actor (Elmo) showed up, took one o f the objects, and put it on the balcony
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o f the toy house. P iglet expressed sadness that the object was gone and tried to get it back. He 
reached for it, but was not tall enough to get it. He admitted that he could not get it and might 
need the help o f one o f his friends.
The d o g ’s house task (Sm allhole)
The same princesses were standing in front o f the house. Piglet continued to play w ith his 
items. Elm o showed up again, took the other object, and put it into the dog’s house. Piglet 
expressed sadness that the object was gone and tried to get it back. He tried to get into the 
dog’s house, but w as not small enough to enter it. H e adm itted that he could not get his object 
and m ight need the help o f one o f his friends.
The basket task (Two hands)
Two m en were standing in front o f the house. The dolls were identical apart from the fact that 
one had a sling around his arm and neck as i f  he had broken his arm. Piglet entered by 
jum ping onto the table carrying a basket w ith two handles. He greeted the m en and asked 
them  how they have been doing. W hereas one expressed that he is enjoying the day, the other 
said that he had broken his arm and cannot do anything w ith it. P iglet then picked up the 
basket again, taking each handle w ith one hand while verbalizing that he needs one hand for 
each handle. He carried it around, but stopped after a couple o f seconds and announced that 
the basket is very heavy. H e adm itted that he could not carry it and m ight need some help 
from one o f his friends.
The letter task (Reading task)
Two girls were standing in front o f the house. The dolls were identical besides the fact that 
one had a blindfold over her eyes. P iglet entered the table w ith a piece o f paper in his hand. 
He greeted the girls and asked w hat they were doing. The girl who w as not blindfolded 
announced that she had blindfolded her sister to play a game w ith her. She danced around her 
sister and asked her, i f  she could see her. The blindfolded sister responded that she could not. 
Thereupon, the girl w ho was not blindfolded asked Piglet, i f  he w anted to join, but Piglet 
declined. He told the girls that he had ju st received a letter from his m other and would like to 
know, w hat is w ritten on this letter. He adm itted that he could not read it and m ight need the 
help o f one o f his friends.
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The w a ll task (H eavy object)
Two men were standing in front o f the house. Both dolls showed shirtless men, o f w hich one 
was clearly m ore m uscular than the other. P iglet entered the scene. He greeted the m en and 
asked them  how they have been doing. The less m uscular man responded that he was 
enjoying the day, whereas the other responded that he has recently w on a prize for being the 
strongest m an in Canada and invited Piglet to feel his muscles. P iglet felt his m uscles and 
then announced that he has to get some w ork done, in particular, that he has to move a wall. 
W hen repeatedly trying to move it, the wall moved only slightly. P iglet adm itted that he 
cannot move it and m ight need some help from one o f his friends.
2.3 Coding and Analysis
All sessions were videotaped and coded by the first author o f the study. A  research assistant 
who was unaware o f the hypothesis o f the study coded a random sample o f 33% o f each age 
group’s data. First, we coded which o f the tw o friends were chosen by participants as the one 
whom  Piglet will ask for help. A  value o f 1 was assigned for every task if  participants choose 
the appropriate doll (i.e., the taller doll for retrieving an object from the balcony) by either 
verbally indicating, grasping or clearly pointing (to) this doll. A  value o f 0 was assigned for 
the incorrect choice. Subsequently, the results were summed per child and divided by the 
num ber o f tasks to yield a total correct score (choice value). A  correlational analysis (based 
on the choice values per child) showed a perfect agreem ent betw een both raters, r=1, 
p<0.001. D ata w ere analyzed for age effects em ploying a univariate analysis o f variance 
(ANOVA) w ith the between-subjects factor age group (2.5 years, 3.5 years, 5 years). 
Furtherm ore, we employed independent samples t-tests for every group (corrected by the 
Bonferroni procedure) to assess i f  children’s perform ance differed from chance level.
Second, we analyzed the justifications o f all trials, in which the participants had 
chosen the correct doll. The justifications were coded as either being appropriate or not (see 
Figure 2B). An appropriate answer was defined as being relevant and precise. That means 
that an appropriate answer m ust point to the inform ation that is relevant for the situation and 
it m ust be precise with respect to this im portant person characteristic (e.g., w hen in the 
balcony task  the participant answered: “this doll is taller than the other”, “ she is tall 
enough”). I f  the child’s answer was not appropriate, the answer was further coded as being 
only relevant but not precise (e.g., “because he needs help”, “because she can get the 
candle”), only precise but not relevant (e.g., “because she is a princess”, “because he wears
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pants”), explicit statem ent o f ignorance (e.g., “I don’t know ”), something else (e.g., “Look. 
There.”) or no answer given (see Figure 2C). A  justification value was defined for each 
participant based on the proportion o f trials, in which a relevant and precise answer was 
given. An interrater reliability analysis using the K appa statistic was perform ed to determine 
consistency among raters. The analysis yielded a good level o f agreem ent (k = 0.80, 
^<0.001). D ata were analyzed employing an ANOVA w ith the between-subjects factor age 
group (2.5 years, 3.5 years, 5 years).
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C)
Figure 2. Figure A shows the average choice value (i.e., average correct choice) for the 2.5-, 3.5-, and 
5-year-old children. Error bars indicate standard error of the means. The bold horizontal line 
emphasizes the 50%-value (i.e., chance performance). Figure B shows the average justification value 
for the 2.5-, 3.5-, and 5-year-old children. Error bars indicate standard error of the means. Figure C 
gives a more detailed overview over the different categories of answers provided by the 2.5-, 3.5-, and 
5-year-old children in the justification question.
Balcony task Dog’s house 
task
Basket task Letter task Wall task
2.5 years 33% 67% 67% 58% 50%
3.5 years 83% 67% 83% 92% 92%
5 years 100% 100% 100% 92% 100%
Table 1. Table 1 displays the results by age group (rows) and task (columns). Each cell shows the 
average performance of children of a particular age group in a task.
3. Results
Figure 2A displays the averages o f the choice values per age group. A  prelim inary analysis 
yielded no significant differences between tasks (C ochran’s Q(4)=2.250, p=0.69; see Table 
1). The analysis yielded a significant effect o f age group, F (2, 33)=15.152,/><.001, r |p2=0.48.
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Post-hoc t-tests revealed that the perform ances o f the 2.5-year-olds differed significantly 
from the 3.5- and 5-year-olds, t(22)=3.081, p<0.01 and t(22)=7.601, p<0.001, respectively, 
whereas no significant differences were found betw een these age groups, t(22)=1.658, 
p=0.11. The t-tests against chance level showed that the perform ances o f the 3.5-year-olds, 
t(11)=4.318, p<0.005), and o f the 5-year-olds differed from chance, t(11)=20.765, p<0.001, 
but the perform ance o f the 2.5-year-olds4, did not t(11)=1.000, p=0.34.
Next, we analyzed the justification values (i.e. the frequency o f relevant and precise 
justifications in trials, in which participants had chosen the correct doll). The analysis o f the 
justification values revealed a significant effect o f age group, F(2, 33)=13.054, p<0.001, 
r |p2=0.44. Post-hoc t-tests showed that the perform ance o f the 5-year-olds (M =97.9%, 
SD=7.2) differed significantly from the 3.5- and 2.5-year-olds (M =56.1%, SD=41.1 and 
M =29.2% , SD=39.6, respectively), t(22)=3.476, p<0.01 and t(22)=5.910, p<0.001, 
respectively, whereas no significant differences was found betw een the latter age groups, 
t(22)=1.634, p=0.12.
4. Discussion
The goal o f this study was to assess the developm ent o f children’s ability to take other 
person’s action capabilities in a helping situation into account. To this end, 2.5-, 3.5-, and 5- 
year-old children observed a protagonist who needed the help o f friends to accomplish 
several tasks. Typically, only one o f the friends was physically able to provide the help. Our 
results showed a significant developmental effect with children in the two older groups 
perform ing significantly better than those in the youngest group. Furtherm ore, children in the 
two older groups chose the appropriate character at levels well above chance, whereas the 
perform ance o f the younger children did not differ from chance. W e may infer therefore that 
the 3.5- and 5-year-old, but not the 2.5-year-old children w ere able to choose the appropriate 
doll for help. W e interpret our findings as evidence that children’s ability to consider others’ 
action capabilities in helping situations develops at least around 3 years o f age.
4 To ensure that 2.5-year-olds’ failure was not merely due to the verbal demands of the task, we 
randomly asked eight participants in one of the tasks, in which they failed to choose the appropriate 
doll, to show what the chosen doll has to do to help Piglet. Seven out of the eight participants 
correctly initiated the appropriate action (e.g., choosing the weaker doll in the wall task to move the 
heavy object). This suggests that the participants understood the task.
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In the following, we will first discuss the relation o f our findings to the literature on 
selective social learning in preschool children. Then, w e will discuss the im pact o f the task on 
children’s perform ance and the possible m echanism s that could subserve children’s 
perform ance in the choice and the justification measure. Finally, the im plications o f our 
results for theories on the developm ent o f action perception and jo in t actions are considered.
Our results add to recent findings on children’s selective reliance on other people in 
social learning tasks (e.g., Birch, Vauthier, & Bloom, 2008; Clement, Koenig, & Harris, 
2004; Pasquini et al., 2007; Sobel & Corriveau, 2010; Sodian, Thoermer, & Dietrich, 2006). 
In particular, it has been found that 3- to 4-year-old children m onitor others’ past 
perform ances and selectively learned novel object labels from the previously more accurate 
person (Koenig et al. 2004). Furtherm ore, selective learning is not restricted to language 
acquisition. Birch and colleagues (2008) provided evidence that preschool children also 
selectively relied on a previously accurate person to acquire knowledge about a novel 
object’s function. Our results extend these findings to the realm o f physical action capabilities 
by dem onstrating that by 3.5 years o f age children take physical action capabilities into 
account w hen assessing situations, in which someone needs others’ help.
It should be noted that we employed a third-person approach to study children’s 
developing ability to evaluate others’ physical action capabilities. Em ploying such an 
approach enabled us to examine children’s perform ances across a num ber o f diverse tasks 
that assessed different person characteristics. This allows us to rule out that the 
developmental trends in our results are restricted to one kind o f physical action capability 
(e.g., strength but not height). However, even though developmental research on children’s 
social-cognitive developm ent has successfully used tasks that employed dolls (e.g., Fawcett 
and M arkson, 2010-a) or photos (Shutts, Banaji, & Spelke, 2010) to depict human actors, it 
would be interesting to explore the im pact o f different kind o f tasks on children’s ability to 
evaluate others’ action capabilities. In particular, future research is necessary to investigate 
w hether children would show earlier success in a task, in which the children need to seek 
help for them selves and can choose among possible helpers whose action capabilities differ. 
Notw ithstanding this possibility, our results point to an im portant developm ental lag between 
children’s ability to choose the appropriate person for help and to justify  their choices.
The present finding raises the question o f how this ability develops. D ifferent 
m echanism s have been suggested to affect and subserve the processing o f other’s actions.
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W ithin a m otor sim ulation account it has been proposed that observers use their own action 
experiences and action capabilities to process inform ation about other people’s actions 
(W ilson & Knoblich, 2005). A lthough previous research with adults and young children has 
provided evidence for an im pact o f one’s own action capabilities on their action perception 
(e.g., Eskenazi, Grosjean, Humphreys, & Knoblich, 2009; Paulus, Hunnius, Vissers, & 
Bekkering, in press-c), it is unlikely that this m echanism can be the main cause for children’s 
im provem ent in the perception of others’ action capabilities as there are no obvious m otor 
developm ents around 3 years o f age that could affect the perception o f such different 
properties as strength and height, or the use o f one or both hands.
In particular, it has been argued that “action understanding and prediction may reflect 
a situated, online sensitivity to optical information, especially in the case o f predicting 
possibilities for action” (Ram enzoni et al., 2008, p. 1060). Based on these findings one could 
argue that, for example, the affordance for grasping the object on the balcony in one o f our 
tasks was different for the tall compared to the small person . The fact that only 3.5-, but not 
2.5-year-old children w ere able to choose the appropriate helper could thus indicate that the 
ability to perceive the affordances o f others’ actions develops around the fourth year o f life. 
Is this a reasonable explanation given the findings w ithin the object perception literature that 
already infants are able to perceive the action affordances for different objects (e.g., Paulus & 
Hauf, in press; Gibson & Pick, 2000)? N ote that our task differs from studies on infants’ 
object perception, in that our study did not require the perception o f the actions the objects 
afforded for the children themselves, but rather the actions the objects afforded for another 
person. Furtherm ore, as they had to choose am ongst two possible helpers, they had to 
compare the actions afforded by the objects for two different persons. Such a com parison 
likely dem ands more cognitive resources and thus develops later than the direct perception o f 
object affordances. However, our results do not directly point to cognitive m echanism 
underlying children’s behavior in the choice task. Further research is necessary to investigate 
the im pact o f m otor resonance and affordance perception on children’s perception o f other 
people’s action capabilities.
The question o f the cognitive m echanism s relates also to a currently debated topic in 
the literature on children’s selective learning (cf. Koenig & Jaswal, in press; K oenig & 
W oodward, 2010; Lucas & Lewis, 2010). It has been discussed that children’s reliance on a 
more reliable actor in a selective social learning task m ight rather be due to a general 
preference for this actor on basis o f one particular person characteristic (e.g., a halo effect)
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than due to an expectation that this actor has specific knowledge that another actor does not 
have (Koenig & Jaswal, in press). Applied to our study one could ask i f  children’s 
perform ance m ight be due to a diffuse knowledge that, for example, taller is better and that 
they therefore choose the taller doll in the balcony task. W hereas this explanation cannot be 
excluded for all o f our tasks, a com parison o f the balcony task and the dog’s house task 
suggest that this is not the case. In particular, for both tasks the same dolls were used (i.e. tall 
and small princess). Yet, in one task the tall princess, in the other task the small princess was 
the more appropriate helper. The fact that the majority o f the 3.5-yr-old children and all o f the
5-yr-old children chose the appropriate doll in each task suggests that their choices were not 
subserved by a general preference for the tall or the small doll, but rather by more 
differentiated knowledge about w ho was more appropriate for w hich task. Our findings are 
thus in line with findings by K oenig and Jaswal (in press) that children have a specific 
expectation for which knowledge domain someone is expert in by showing that they also 
have a specific expectation o f w hat a person can or cannot do.
Importantly, further insight into the nature o f children’s developing understanding o f 
other people’s action capabilities is provided by a com parison betw een the choice data and 
the justification data. Even though the 3.5- and 5-year-olds perform ed at approxim ately the 
same level in term s o f choices alone, our analysis revealed profound age differences in their 
ability to justify  their choices. Justifying a correct choice means explicating im plicit or 
practical knowledge in a discursive form at (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; see also Brandom, 
1994;), a form at that is open to reflection and that allows assessm ent o f the validity o f 
reasons (cf. Habermas, 1985). The fact that the younger children were able to adequately 
judge others’ action capabilities w ithout necessarily being able to justify  their choice is thus 
not only in line w ith other studies showing that children’s justifications lag their judgm ents in 
developm ent (e.g., Thomas & Horton, 1997; for a controversial discussion o f w hich criteria 
to use in the attribution o f knowledge to a child see also van der M aas, Jansen, & Raijmakers, 
2004; Smith, 1992). It also supports the theoretical notion that perceiving the relation 
betw een an actor and the possible targets o f his action has to be conceived o f being practical 
(or implicit) knowledge that is not reflected in conceptual terms.
However, our research leaves open the question o f what m echanism s subserve the 
developing ability to justify one’s own actions. It has been argued that children’s embedding 
in social discourses plays a fundamental role in their cognitive developm ent (Nelson, 2007; 
Vygotsky, 1991). Support for this theoretical approach comes from studies that show
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relations betw een between m others’ and their children’s use o f justifications in disputes 
(Dunn & M unn, 1987) or the im pact o f training in exploratory talk on subsequent reasoning 
in school children (W egerif, M ercer, & Dawes, 1999). Accordingly, children’s ability to 
explicate their knowledge could be prom oted by their progressive em bedding in discourses in 
which they are asked to justify  their actions. However, it remains an open question whether 
children’s developing justification abilities are due to a general developm ent in reasoning 
skills (i.e dom ain-independent) or restricted to a particular knowledge domain (see Sodian & 
Bullock, 2008). Furtherm ore, in this study we did not control for general language or 
cognitive abilities. Even though our results indicate that the 3.5-year-old children were able 
to understand the question and to provide relevant answers, suggesting that their worse 
perform ances in the justification task were not due to lacking language skills, the precise 
im pact o f children’s language skills on their task perform ance remains an open question. 
Future research is necessary to directly examine the developm ent o f justification skills in 
preschool children. W hatever the precise developmental origin o f this ability may be, our 
results provide clear evidence that from 5 years on children are able to explicitly reason about 
another person’s action capabilities w hen they have to decide whom  to ask for help.
Our results have im plications for research on children’s developing action 
understanding and their ability to engage in successful jo in t actions with others. W hereas 
research has shown that infants from their first year o f life use inform ation about another 
agent’s previous behavior and own action experiences to predict or understand others’ actions 
(Paulus et al. in press-a; Sommerville & W oodward 2005), it has remained an open question 
how children process others’ action capabilities, i.e. action-related inform ation w hen no 
ongoing action is presented. Our finding that 3.5-, but not 2.5-year-old children are able to do 
so indicates that having an understanding of others’ action capabilities is a more complex 
com putation (i.e. a rather abstract evaluation o f w hat somebody could do, i f  he would act in a 
certain situation) than predicting, for example, the goal o f an ongoing action. Our findings are 
therefore inform ative for theories on the developm ent o f social understanding (e.g., Barresi & 
M oore, 1996).
Our results also inform current research on the developm ent o f children’s developing 
ability to engage in successful jo in t actions. To effectively collaborate w ith other people in 
jo in t activities, one m ust be able to take another person’s physical action capabilities into 
account (Sebanz et al., 2006). Our findings provide evidence that this essential social­
cognitive ability for successful jo in t action develops around 3 years o f age. Together with
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recent studies showing that other crucial social-cognitive abilities for the ability to engage in 
successful jo in t actions develop around 3 years o f life (forming jo in t commitment: 
Grafenhain, Behne, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009; action coordination: M eyer, Bekkering, 
Paulus, & Hunnius, 2010) our results suggest thus that by approxim ately 3 years o f age 
children have developed the necessary social-cognitive prerequisites to successfully 
cooperate w ith others.
Taken together, the present study extends current knowledge by showing that children 
from at least 3.5 years o f age on are able to perceive others’ physical action capabilities and 
that 5-year-olds, but not younger children are able to adequately reason about others’ action 
capabilities.
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Chapter 6
Imitation in infancy: Rational or motor resonance?
Based on:
Paulus, M., Hunnius, S., Vissers, M., & Bekkering, H. (in press). Im itation in infancy: 
Rational or m otor resonance? C hild  Developm ent.
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Abstract
The present study investigates the contribution o f tw o m echanism s to im itation in infancy. 
The principle o f rational action suggests that infants norm atively evaluate the efficiency o f 
observed actions. In contrast, it has been proposed that m otor resonance (i.e. the m apping o f 
others’ actions onto one’s own m otor repertoire) plays a central role in imitation. W e tested 
14-month-old infants (n=95) in five conditions and m anipulated the extent to which the 
observed actions could be m atched onto the infants’ own m otor repertoire as well as w hether 
the observed behavior appeared to be efficient. The results suggest that m otor resonance 
plays a m ore central role in im itation in infancy than does a rational evaluation o f the 
observed action.
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1. Introduction
One o f the reasons for homo sapiens’ success is the ability to transm it knowledge from one 
generation to the next (Gould, 1979). This transm ission is often organized formally in 
specialized institutions like schools and relies to a large extent on language as the m edium o f 
transm ission (Habermas, 1985). However, cultural knowledge is transferred also in a non­
verbal way and even at an age before language has fully developed. Infants acquire new 
behaviors, the basics o f their own language, and knowledge about the use o f objects partly by 
im itating others. Im itation o f observed actions therefore plays an im portant role in the 
socialization o f the child and the acquisition o f cultural knowledge (Byrne & Russon, 1998; 
Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & M oll, 2005).
Studying early im itation offers unique possibilities to investigate infants’ perception 
and understanding o f other people’s actions (Elsner, 2007). An intriguing example has been 
provided by M eltzoff (1995): Infants who observed an adult trying but failing to perform an 
action im itated the action w ith successful goal attainment. The infants’ im itation behavior 
revealed that they perceived the adult’s action as goal-directed although they never fully 
observed it. Subsequently, numerous studies have shown that infants’ and children’s 
im itation o f actions is indeed goal-directed (e.g., Bekkering, W ohlschläger, & Gattis, 2000; 
Gleissner, M eltzoff, & Bekkering, 2000; Hamlin, Hallinan, & W oodward, 2008).
The present study aims to investigate the m echanism s w hich subserve infants’ 
im itation o f actions in more detail. Am ongst others (see, for an overview, M eltzoff & Prinz,
2002) tw o different mechanism s have been proposed to underlie im itation in infancy and 
have recently received considerable attention: teleological reasoning, and direct motor 
matching, usually labeled m otor resonance.
The first approach, the notion o f teleological reasoning, assumes that infants 
norm atively evaluate an action by applying the principle o f rational action (Gergely & Csibra,
2003). Consequently, they understand and predict others’ action goals by observing the 
actions, under the assum ption that the action is efficient. Furtherm ore, given a particular goal, 
the principle o f rational action allows assessm ent o f the rationality o f the means chosen to 
perform the action (Csibra & Gergely, 2007). Support for this view  comes to a large extent 
from studies o f infants’ action perception using habituation procedures (e.g., Csibra, Gergely,
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Biro, Koos, & Brockbank, 1999; Gergely, Nadasdy, Csibra, & Biro, 1995; Sodian, 
Schoeppner, & M etz, 2004).
The second mechanism, m otor resonance (e.g., W ilson & Knoblich, 2005), focuses on 
well-established findings that the observation o f others’ actions facilitates the execution o f 
the same m otor act (e.g., Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, & Rizzolatti, 1995; Brass, Bekkering, 
W ohlschläger, & Prinz, 2000), w hich suggests that action perception and action production 
share a com m on representational form at (Prinz, 1997). M oreover, action perception and 
action execution have been shown to involve overlapping brain areas (Iacoboni et al., 1999; 
Gazzola & Keysers, 2009), and it has been suggested that the m irror neuron system is at the 
basis o f this capacity to match observed actions onto one’s own m otor repertoire (e.g., 
Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). Infants’ ability to relate an observed m ovem ent on their own 
action system m ight thus be based on such a m apping m echanism  (H auf & Prinz, 2005; 
M eltzoff, 2007). The possibility to match another person’s action onto one’s own m otor 
repertoire is especially im portant w ithin an ideom otor approach to action production and 
im itation (W ohlschläger, Gattis, & Bekkering, 2003). The ideom otor principles supposes that 
actions are represented in term s o f their effects so that w hen attem pting to achieve an effect 
the corresponding action will be activated (bidirectional action-effect associations; Hommel, 
M üsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001). Accordingly, to be able to im itate an observed 
action infants need to match this action onto their own m otor repertoire during observation 
and connect it to their representation o f the action’s effect. A  bidirectional action-effect 
association is built and infants are subsequently able to retrieve the appropriate action when 
they w ant to reproduce the effect (see Hommel, 2009).
W ithin the last years research has yielded evidence that infants’ action perception is 
influenced by their own action capabilities and action experiences (e.g., Hauf, Aschersleben, 
& Prinz, 2007; Sommerville & W oodward, 2005; van Elk, van Schie, Hunnius, Vesper, & 
Bekkering, 2008; for an overview see Hauf, 2007). Van E lk and colleagues (2008), for 
example, showed that an infant's experience w ith crawling is directly related to the am ount o f 
m otor resonance during observation o f the same action. Sommerville and W oodw ard (2005) 
provided evidence that 10-month-old infants tend to perceive other people’s m eans-end 
behavior as goal-directed i f  they them selves are able to perform the same actions. Altogether, 
the above-m entioned findings of an im pact of infants’ own action experiences and action 
capabilities on their action perception support the notion that m otor resonance is an im portant 
factor o f action perception in infancy.
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Recently, however, the results o f a widely noticed study seemed to support the role o f 
teleological reasoning in infants’ im itation (Gergely, Bekkering, & Kiraly, 2002). In this 
study, tw o groups o f 14-month-old infants w atched an adult model acting on a light box. The 
adult was sitting at a table w ith a black box in front o f her. A  lamp was m ounted onto the 
box, which could be switched on by touching its upper part. The adult leant forward and 
touched the lamp w ith her forehead, thereby causing a salient light effect. In one condition 
the adult was pretending to be cold, holding a blanket w ith her hands (hands occupied  
condition) w hen perform ing the head touch, while in a second condition her hands were free 
and the blanket was hanging loosely around her shoulders (hands fre e  condition). W hen 
confronted w ith the lamp them selves one w eek later, m ore infants from the hands fre e  
condition perform ed the head touch than did infants from the hands occupied  condition. The 
authors concluded that infants applied the efficiency principle o f rational action and assessed 
the head touch in the hands occupied  condition as caused by the situational constraints, as the 
actor had to use her head because her hands were occupied by holding the blanket. In the 
hands fre e  condition, however, since the model appeared to use her head deliberately as her 
hands were not occupied, the infants reproduced the head touch. This finding, w hich has been 
interpreted as evidence that im itation in infancy is guided by a rational evaluation o f 
situational constraints and an attribution o f subjective reasons to another person, has inspired 
a new line o f research. For instance, it has been reported that younger infants (Zmyj, Daum, 
& Aschersleben, 2009), apes and monkeys (Buttelmann, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2007, 
2008; W ood, Glynn, Phillips, & Hauser, 2007) as well as dogs (Range, Viranyi, & Huber, 
2007) also imitate rationally. In many o f these studies a version sim ilar to the head touch 
paradigm  was used in which a lamp could be switched on by touching it w ith a body part 
other than the hands (e.g., Buttelm ann et al., 2007; W ood et al., 2007; Zmyj et al., 2009).
A  critical, but often neglected finding o f studies using the head touch paradigm  is that 
almost all infants -  even in the hands fre e  condition -  first use their hands to turn on the light, 
before they perform the head action (e.g., Gergely et al., 2002; Zmyj et al., 2009). The 
question arises how infants’ use o f their head to turn on the lamp can be viewed as a result o f 
their rational reasoning as in m ost cases they have ju st experienced that the lamp can equally 
well be switched on using the hands. M oreover, theoretical analyses o f infants’ behavior have 
repeatedly pointed out that infants’ perform ance in certain tasks, albeit superficially sim ilar to 
adults’ behavior, is not necessarily subserved by the same mechanism s (see the argum ent by 
analogy; cf. M oore, 2006). This is particularly im portant for the claim that infants imitate
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rationally. As such sophisticated cognitive abilities are otherwise not evident in this age 
group (e.g., counterfactual reasoning; Rafetseder, Cristi-Vargas, & Perner, 2010; see also 
Perner, 1991) one m ight w onder i f  infants’ im itation in the head touch task is indeed 
subserved by an evaluation o f the action’s efficiency and not by another mechanism. 
Additionally, key epistemological arguments have been provided that the ability to reflect 
rationally about other people’s actions is closely linked to the ability to use language 
(Brandom, 1994; Davidson, 1982; Haberm as, 1985). Considering these issues, more research 
is needed before teleological reasoning can be accepted as a m ajor mechanism  subserving 
infants’ im itative behavior in the head touch paradigm.
Importantly, in the experim ent by Gergely et al. (2002) there are possibly im portant 
differences in the m odel’s actions between the tw o conditions: In the hands fre e  condition the 
model put her hands on the table w hen perform ing the head touch, while in the hands 
occu pied  condition her arms were folded across her chest. N ote that w hen infants perform a 
head touch themselves, they put their hands on the table next to the lamp, probably to be able 
to m aintain a stable position. Interestingly, this action m atches closely the m ovem ent the 
adult m odeled in the hands fre e  but not in the hands occupied  condition. In other words, the 
action o f the model w hen perform ing the head touch can be matched to a larger extent in the 
hands fre e  condition than in the hands occupied  condition. Follow ing the notions o f 
ideom otor theory and m otor resonance this should enable infants to relate the observed head 
touch action to the light effect in the hands fre e  condition to a larger extent than in the hands 
occu pied  condition. Consequently, w hen given the lamp, infants in the hands free condition 
were more likely to activate the m otor program  o f turning on the lamp w ith the head.
Our study contrasts the role o f rational reasoning and o f m otor resonance in the head 
touch paradigm  in more detail. W e introduced three new  conditions besides the tw o classical 
ones used in the Gergely et al. (2002) study to separately examine both mechanisms. The new 
button  condition was com parable to the hands occupied  condition, as the model had a blanket 
wrapped around her shoulders w hich covered her upper body. However, this tim e the blanket 
was held by a salient button so that the model was able to use her hands to switch on the 
light. Follow ing the rational im itation approach a high num ber o f infants should use their 
head to turn on the lamp in the button  condition, since the model could have used her hands, 
but chose freely to turn on the lamp w ith her head. Following the m otor resonance approach, 
infrequent head touches are expected as this action did not match the infants’ own m otor 
repertoire. The second new condition, hands up, resem bled the hands fre e  condition w ith the
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difference that this tim e the model raised her hands instead o f putting them  next to the lamp. 
By doing so the head touch action did not match with any action in the infants’ m otor 
repertoire since infants cannot raise their arms and lean forward at the same tim e without 
being held by somebody. Observing this action should thus activate the infant’s m otor system 
to a much lesser extent and should lead to a low  num ber o f infants turning on the lamp with 
the head. A ccording to the rational im itation approach, however, it is expected that infants 
would use their heads to turn on the lamp due the fact that the model obviously voluntarily 
used her head to turn on the lamp. The third new condition, balls, resem bled the hands fre e  
condition w ith the difference that the m odel’s hands were occupied by tw o foam balls with 
which she had played before m odeling the head touch. Following the rational approach to 
imitation, infrequent head touches are expected since the m odel’s hands w ere restricted. 
However, according to the m otor resonance account, a large num ber o f infants should 
perform the head action in this condition due to the m atching o f the observed action onto the 
infants’ own m otor repertoire. N ote that for each o f the three new conditions contradicting 
predictions were derived from the tw o theories whereas they made exact the same predictions 
for the original tw o conditions (see Figure 2A).
2. Method
2.1 Participants
Participants were 95 14-month-old infants (M  = 14 months, 16 days; range 13;15 to 14;31; 50 
boys). In particular, the final sample included 19 infants in the hands fre e  condition (M = 14 
months, 17 days; 9 boys), 19 infants in the hands occu pied  condition (M  = 14 months, 18 
days; 8 boys), 19 infants in the button condition (M  = 14 months, 20 days; 9 boys), 19 infants 
in the hands up condition (M  = 14 months, 22 days; 12 boys), and 19 infants in the balls 
condition (M  = 14 months, 12 days; 12 boys). An additional 32 infants did not complete the 
experim ent due to inattentiveness or fussiness (n=21), interference by the parent (n=5), or a 
procedural (n=3) or technical (n=3) error. The infants who were inattentive or fussy were 
equally distributed across the experimental conditions. The participants were healthy, full- 
term  infants w ithout any pre- or perinatal complications. They w ere recruited from a database 
o f parents who expressed interest in participating in research w ith their child. Infants were 
primarily white and from m iddle class families, living in a m edium -sized European city. The 
infants’ parents gave inform ed consent for participation o f their child in the study and were
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given a baby book or monetary com pensation for their visit.
2.2 Setting
The light box consisted o f a lamp (diam eter 13 cm) which was m ounted onto a black box (27 
x 19 x 5.5 cm). The box was filled w ith lead so that the infants were unable to move it. The 
experim ent took place in an experimental booth to minim ize distraction for the child. During 
the experiment, the infants were sitting on their parent’s lab. The experim enter and the parent 
and infant w ere sitting at a table, w hich had a rectangular recess on the side at w hich the 
parent and infant w ere seated. The blankets used in the experim ent were made o f blue fleece 
(130 x 158 cm). The blanket for the condition button  had a clearly visible red button 
(diam eter 8 cm) attached to it, and a buttonhole had been m ade for the button. The two 
softballs (diam eter 7 cm) for the condition balls consisted out o f soft, yellow  foam. Two 
cameras w ere used to record the infant’s as well as the experim enter’s behavior during the 
experiment.
2.3 Procedure
Infants were random ly assigned to one o f the five conditions. Before starting the experiment, 
the experim enter took time to let the infant get used to the testing room. Parents w ere given 
instructions w hich contained inform ation about the way the infant had to be positioned on the 
lap and how to behave during the experiment. In particular, they were asked not to interact 
w ith their child during the experim ent and to remain silent w ith a neutral, but friendly facial 
expression. N o details about the scientific question o f the experim ent w ere given beforehand. 
W hen parent and infant were seated properly, the experim enter left the experimental booth 
for a few  moments. L ight was dimmed to a m oderate level in order to make the light o f the 
light-box more salient. The experim enter grasped the blanket and re-entered the booth, and 
m odelled the action sequence which belonged to the specific condition.
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A) B) C) D)
Figure 1. Pictures of the five experimental conditions (A hands free, B hands occupied, C button, D 
hands up, E balls) showing the model’s position before performing the head touch.
In all conditions the model entered the experimental booth and m ade sure that the 
infant paid attention to her. In the hands fre e  condition, she placed the blanket around her 
shoulders. To make sure that the infant perceived that her hands were free, she first rubbed 
her hands and then grasped her chair and moved it a few  centimeters. Then she sat down and 
put her hands next to the lamp (see Figure 1 for the different positions o f the model). She 
m ade sure to have the infant’s attention by calling his or her name and saying „Look w hat I 
am going to do!’. Then, the model turned on the lam p using her forehead and returned to the 
initial upright position. The head touch was m odeled four times. In betw een the head touches, 
the experim enter used the words „Yes!’ or „Look!’ in order to keep the infant focused. 
Additionally, she called the infant’s name w hen the infant did not pay attention anymore. The 
experim enter’s verbal and facial expressions were the same in all conditions. A fter having 
perform ed the action sequence, the experim enter let the blanket slip on the chair. Then she 
said „Would you like to try as w ell?’ to the infant and pushed the lamp across the table in 
front o f the infant, stood up and left the experimental booth. After the experim enter left, the 
child was given 60 seconds to explore the lamp. W hen the 60 seconds had passed, the 
experim enter re-entered the booth and debriefed the parent.
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The hands occu pied  condition differed from the hands fre e  condition as the 
experim enter held the blanket up w ith her hands tightly wrapped around her shoulders. 
Instead o f showing that she could use her hands she sat down at the table. The rest o f the 
procedure was exactly the same as in the hands fre e  condition w ith the only exception that 
the experim enter was holding up the blanket w ith her hands the w hole time. On a perceptual 
level, the condition button  was very sim ilar to the hands occu pied  condition since the 
m odel’s hands were covered by the blanket w hen perform ing the head touch. However, 
instead o f w rapping the blanket around the shoulders and holding it w ith the hands, the 
experim enter used the button to fix it. She also dem onstrated that her hands w ere free and she 
could use them, for exam ple by m oving the chair she w as going to sit on. Furtherm ore, this 
ensured that infants w ere able to observe that the button held up the blanket even though the 
model was using her hands. The condition hands up was sim ilar to the hands fre e  condition 
and followed exactly the procedure o f this condition. It differed only in the fact that the 
experim enter held her hands up in the air w hen perform ing the head touch instead o f putting 
them  on the table. In the condition balls the experim enter was wearing the blanket and 
dem onstrated that the hands were not constrained as she did in the hands fre e  condition. N ext 
to the lamp, there w ere two softballs lying on the table. A fter taking a seat, the experim enter 
started to play w ith these softballs for approxim ately 8 seconds. The experim enter kept one 
softball in each hand and put her hands next to the lamp. Then, the procedure followed 
exactly the procedure o f the hands fre e  condition w ith the only difference that the 
experim enter was holding the tw o softballs in her hands during the experiment.
2.4 Coding
The first 60 seconds after the child was given the lamp and attended to it w ere coded (cf. 
Zmyj et al., 2009). An action w as coded as a head touch w hen infants touched the lamp with 
their head or approached the lamp with their head to a distance o f m axim ally 10 cm (cf. 
Gergely et al., 2002; Zmyj et al., 2009). Additionally, we coded how many o f the infants who 
perform ed a head action only bent over the light to a distance o f 10 cm from the lamp and 
how many touched the lamp w ith their head. To investigate the extent to w hich infants relied 
on their hands and heads, we coded w hich action infants perform ed first w hen switching on 
the lamp (hand or head action) and how often they turned on the lamp using their hands (hand 
touch) and heads. Chi square tests were carried out to examine differences in the num ber o f 
infants perform ing a head touch betw een the conditions (e.g., Gergely et al., 2002). An
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analysis o f variance (ANOVA) w ith the factor condition was calculated to analyze the 
frequency o f hand touches.
3. Results
As can be seen in Figure 2B, the num ber o f infants who im itated the head action was 
different in the five conditions. As in the original experim ent by Gergely et al. (2002) the 
head touch w as im itated by more children in the condition hands free  than in the condition 
hands occupied. 14 out o f 19 infants (74%) performed the head touch in the condition hands 
fre e  (11 w ith a full head touch), whereas in the condition hands occu pied  only 6 out o f 19 
infants (32%) im itated the head action (5 w ith a full head touch). A  Chi Square Test revealed 
that the difference between the num ber o f infants perform ing a head touch in these two 
conditions was significant, / 2(1, 38) = 6.756 , p  < 0.01.
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A
Figure 2. Figure A shows the predictions derived from the motor resonance account (left picture) and 
the teleological reasoning account (right picture). The y-axis represents the percentage of infants 
performing a head touch according to the predictions. Figure B shows the percentage of infants who 
performed a head touch in each of the five experimental conditions.
A  further com parison betw een the condition hands occupied  and the condition button  
was conducted to investigate w hether the head touch was im itated w ith different frequencies 
in these tw o conditions. N o significant difference was found between the hands occupied  and 
the button  condition, in w hich 5 out o f 19 infants (4 w ith a full head touch) im itated the head 
action (26%), / 2(1, 38)=0.128, p=0.72. The num ber o f infants im itating the head touch was
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significantly larger in the condition hands fre e  than in the condition hands up, in w hich 5 out 
o f 19 infants (4 w ith a full head touch) im itated the head touch (26%), / 2(1, 38)=8.526, 
p<0.01. In the balls  condition, 13 out o f 19 infants (68%) im itated the head action (7 w ith a 
full head touch); this was not different from the hands fre e  condition, / 2(1, 38)=0.128, 
p=0.72. A  com parison between the num ber o f infants perform ing a head touch in the 
conditions balls and hands occu pied  yielded a significant effect, / 2(1, 38)=5.158, p<0.05, as 
did a com parison betw een the num ber of infants perform ing a head touch in the conditions 
balls and button, / 2(1, 38)=6.756, p<0.01 .
Only a small subgroup o f infants im m ediately used their head to switch on the lamp, 
but by far m ost o f the infants first used their hands (see Table 1). A  F isher’s exact test 
showed that there was no significant difference in the num ber of infants who showed the 
head touch as first action between the five conditions (Fisher’s exact test, p=0.78). The 
ANOVA revealed that there w as no difference in the average num ber o f hand touches per 
infant betw een the conditions (range 16.4-23.9), F(4,90)=0.890, p=0.47 (see Table 1), while a 
t-test over all infants showed that the average num ber of 19.3 hand touches per infant clearly 
outperform ed the average num ber o f 2.1 head touches per infant, t(94)= 10.631, p<0.001. W e 
additionally exam ined the extent to which infants in the hands up condition showed an 
attem pt to lift his or her arms in the air w hen acting on the lamp; no infant tried to lift his 
arms.
hands free hands occupied button hands up balls
H T-first 2 (11%) 2 (11%) 1 (5%) 3 (16% ) 4 (21%)
hands 18.6 (2.6) 17.1 (2.7) 23.9 (4.7) 20.3 (2.9) 16.4 (2.6)
Table 1. Number of infants in each condition performing a head touch before using their hands to 
switch on the light (HT-first) and average number of hand actions to switch on the light in each 
condition (hands). The number of infants and hand actions is given, percentages for the numbers of 
head touches and standard errors for the hand actions are given in brackets.
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4. Discussion
The aim of this study was to investigate the role of tw o proposed mechanism s of im itation in 
infancy: m otor resonance and teleological reasoning. W e em ployed five conditions using the 
classical head touch im itation task (Gergely et al., 2002) and examined how often infants 
im itated a novel action that was dem onstrated to them  (i.e., switching on a lamp using the 
head). W e m anipulated the extent to w hich the observed actions could be m atched onto the 
infants’ own m otor repertoire as well as w hether the m odel’s head touch appeared to be 
efficient. The results provided evidence that m otor resonance, the m atching o f another’s 
actions onto one’s own behavioral repertoire, is an im portant m echanism  o f im itation in 
infancy. In contrast, no support was found for the role of a rational evaluation of the others’ 
actions for im itative behavior in infancy.
In the condition button  the blanket around the m odel’s shoulders was held by a button 
so her hands were free. A ccording to the rational im itation approach, infants should interpret 
her head action as being perform ed deliberately and hence many infants should im itate the 
head touch. This prediction was not confirmed, w hich casts doubt on the claim that the 
rational estim ation o f another person’s actions plays an im portant role in im itation in infancy 
(e.g., Gergely et al., 2002). However, as the model perform ed the head action in a way the 
infants could hardly match onto their own m otor repertoire, few  infants were expected to 
im itate the head touch according to the m otor resonance approach. Our results are in line with 
this prediction.
In the condition hands up, the model held her hands up in the air w hile perform ing the 
head touch. Follow ing the rational approach, it was expected that many infants would imitate 
the head action because the model voluntarily used her head to turn on the lamp as her hands 
were free. However, holding her arms in the air reduced the infants’ possibility to match the 
m odel’s head action onto their own action repertoire. Critically, the num ber o f infants who 
im itated the head touch was small as predicted by the m otor resonance account.
Furtherm ore, it should be noted that we did not observe a single infant trying to lift his 
or her own arms in the air. This observation rules out the possibility that infants perceived 
this particular aspect of the action as more relevant than the head touch and tried to copy this 
action at the expense o f the head touch action. This finding is in line w ith our hypothesis as 
the head action -  and not the position o f the hand - was associated w ith the light effect.
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Therefore, w hen attempting to achieve the light effect, the corresponding head action gets 
activated (cf. Hom m el et al., 2001; Verschoor, W eidema, Biro, & Hommel, 2010). The way 
the model perform s the action (e.g., hands on the table) determines only how easily the head 
action can be m apped onto the infants’ m otor repertoire and thus how easily an action-effect 
association between head touch and light effect can be built in the m odeling phase.
In the third new condition, balls , the m odel’s hands w ere functionally occupied so that 
-  following the teleological reasoning approach -  only a few  infants would be expected to 
im itate the head action. Since the m odel’s head action was com parable to her head action in 
the hands fre e  condition, the m otor resonance account predicts that a high num ber o f infants 
should show the head touch in this condition. The results w ere in accord w ith the predictions 
derived from the m otor resonance account and therefore provide further evidence for the 
notion that an im portant mechanism  subserving infants’ im itation is the m atching o f observed 
actions onto their own action repertoire (e.g., H auf & Prinz, 2005; M eltzoff, 2007).
Recent evidence from behavioral and im aging studies supports our notion that m otor 
resonance is dependent on action experience and action capabilities (e.g., Calvo-M erino, 
Glaser, Grezes, Passingham, & Haggard, 2005; Eskenazi, Grosjean, Hum phreys, & Knoblich, 
2009; Grosjean, Shiffrar, & Knoblich, 2007; Kilner, Paulignan, & Blakemore, 2003) and 
influences the w ay children (Lepage & Theoret, 2006) and infants perceive others’ actions 
(van E lk et al., 2008). Our results are in accord w ith these findings as well as w ith the well- 
studied effects o f automatic behavior m atching found in healthy adults (the so-called 
chameleon effect; Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; cf. Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). Altogether, we 
suggest that automatic m otor resonance plays a crucial role in im itation in infancy as it 
enables infants to relate an action w ithin their own m otor repertoire to an action effect. W hen 
given the possibility to retrieve this effect them selves, the corresponding action is 
automatically activated (Hommel et al., 2001; W ohlschläger et al., 2003).
Our finding that infants nearly always turn on the lamp but imitate the means only 
selectively provides further support for the notion that their im itation is goal-directed 
(Bekkering et al., 2000; W ohlschläger et al., 2003). A ccording to the ideom otor principle, an 
intended action goal directly elicits the m otor program, w hich is m ost strongly associated 
w ith it. This notion can explain why all infants, even those who perform ed the head action, 
also used their hands to turn on the light as using the hands is the default mode for this kind 
o f action (e.g., pressing a button to get an effect). In the hands fre e  and the balls  condition,
99
C h a p te r  6: IMITATION IN INFANCY: RATIONAL OR MOTOR RESONANCE?
however, there w as a stronger match betw een the action of the model and the infants’ own 
m otor repertoire, which enabled the infants to build a new action-effect-association w hen 
they were observing the model as she perform ed the head actions. This m otor program was 
subsequently also activated w hen infants w ere trying to attain the desired effect themselves, 
competed w ith the activation of the hands’ m otor program  and, ultimately, led to the more 
frequent occurrence of head touches in this condition. This view  supports the idea of a 
dynamic com petition in tim e between several possible effectors to perform an action (see also 
Erlhagen & Schoner, 2002; Simmering & Spencer, 2008; Thelen & Smith, 1994). It can 
explain why even infants who had already turned on the lamp w ith their hands subsequently 
switched means and used their head. In contrast, this behavior is hard to reconcile w ithin a 
rational approach to im itation in infancy. Specifically, infants should not consider it efficient 
to turn on the lamp w ith the head w hen they had already learned that the light effect could be 
obtained w ith an easier hand action.
It should be noted that our findings replicate the original study by Gergely and 
colleagues (2002), although in our study, in contrast to Gergely et al. (2002), the model left 
the experimental booth after having m odeled the action. Furtherm ore, the communicative 
cues given by the model did not differ across our five conditions. Nevertheless, infants 
im itated the head touch to a different extent in the five conditions. These findings support the 
notion that infants’ selective imitation of the head touch cannot solely be explained by the 
presence o f the model or particular ostensive cues in pedagogical situations (e.g., Csibra & 
Gergely, 2006; Kiraly, 2009) but supports the notion that m otor resonance plays a crucial role 
in the head touch task.
However, a num ber of other studies have presented evidence for rational im itation in 
infants em ploying different tasks. For instance, Schwier, van M aanen, Carpenter, and 
Tom asello (2006) presented 12-month-old infants with an experim enter who played w ith a 
toy dog showing how the toy dog entered a toy house through the chimney instead of through 
the door. In one condition, the door was open (door open), whereas in a second condition, the 
door was closed (door closed ). W hen infants subsequently were handed the toy dog and toy 
house w ith an open door to play with, more infants put the dog into the house through the 
chimney in the door open  than the door c lo sed  condition. This finding was interpreted as 
evidence for rational im itation in infancy. However, one has to be careful w hen comparing 
actions w hich are closely connected to cultural norm s (e.g., entering a house through a door 
instead of through the chimney) to actions derived from the application of an efficiency
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principle (e.g., turning on a lamp w ith the hands or the head), as cultural norm s o f doing 
things in a particular way are not necessarily based on criteria of efficiency (cf. Keesing & 
Strathern, 1998). M ore importantly, however, it should be noted that the toy dog made two 
“forward m otions w ith its nose practically touching the door” (Schwier et al., 2006, p. 306) 
before entering the house via the chimney. The infants in the door c lo sed  condition m ight 
have perceived the toy dog’s m ovem ents as trying but failing to enter the house through the 
door. Thus w hen infants reproduced the w hole action w ith successful goal attainm ent in the 
subsequent im itation phase (cf. M eltzoff, 1995), their behavior could be interpreted as 
helping the dog to enter the house through the door, w hich had previously been closed (cf. 
W arneken & Tomasello, 2006). This was not the case in the door open  condition w here no 
physical obstacle was presented so that infants did not observe any failure in getting the dog 
into the house through the door but only the entering of the house via the chimney. Taken 
together, we suggest that infants’ behavior in Schwier and colleagues’ (2006) study m ight not 
result from an evaluation o f the actions’ efficiency, but rather from their ability to recognize 
and imitate the goals underlying failed actions (cf. M eltzoff, 1995).
Our study has im plications for the theoretical question about w hich mechanism s 
subserve infants’ im itation and understanding o f other people’s actions (e.g., Heyes, 2001; 
Jones, 2007; Paulus, in press-b). In contrast to earlier explanations o f this phenomenon, the 
present study provides evidence that m otor resonance is an im portant m echanism of im itation 
in infancy. Our findings did not indicate that infants rationally assess the efficiency of an 
observed action in the head touch paradigm  by taking into account the situational constraints, 
as adults probably do (Brass, Schmitt, Spengler, & Gergely, 2007; de Lange, Spronk, 
W illem s, Toni, & Bekkering, 2008). Our findings thus point out some lim its of the 
teleological approach and suggest that the ability to think rationally about others’ actions 
m ight not yet be fully functional in early infancy, but m ight emerge and gain im portance later 
during developm ent (see also Kuhn, 2001, 2005; Paulus et al., in press-a). O ur research, 
however, leaves open the question w hether and to w hat extent infants’ im itative behavior 
m ight also be susceptible to other m echanism s like social and ostensive cues (cf. Csibra & 
Gergely, 2006) or infants’ developing understanding about causal relations and their 
functional object knowledge (cf. Brugger, Lariviere, M um m e, & Bushnell, 2007). Further 
research is needed to closely examine the scope and limits of each of the proposed 
mechanisms.
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In sum, our findings shed light on the “complete m ystery” (Bates, 1979, p. 332; cf. 
Jones, 2007) o f the inform ation-processing m echanism s behind infants’ im itation and provide 
evidence that m otor resonance is an important, automatic m echanism  subserving im itation in 
infancy (cf. Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). The study reveals im itation as a fascinating 
m echanism  developed possibly as a secondary effect o f evolution (W ilson & Knoblich, 
2005): before infants realize that they are learning through im itation they are already doing 
so.
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Chapter 7
The role of motor resonance in 14-month-old infants’ imitation
Based on:
Paulus, M., Hunnius, S., & Bekkering, H. (submitted). The role o f  m otor resonance in 14- 
m onth-old infants ’ imitation. M anuscript submitted for publication.
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Abstract
Recently, researchers have been debating w hether infants’ im itation is based on sensorim otor 
processes (e.g., m otor resonance) only or w hether inferential processes like teleological 
reasoning (i.e., reasoning about the efficiency o f others’ actions) also affect infants’ imitation. 
The present contribution directly investigates these different theoretical notions employing 
the seminal and widely used head touch paradigm  (Gergely, Bekkering, & Kiraly, 2002). In 
four conditions, the observed action induced more or less m otor resonance depending on the 
way the action was modeled, and was either efficient or not. The results suggest that 14- 
m onth-old infants do not imitate novel actions according to their efficiency, but that m otor 
resonance plays an im portant role in infants’ imitation.
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1. Introduction
Although infants’ im itation has been a topic o f research w ithin the field o f developmental 
psychology for more than a century (e.g., Baldwin, 1906; Barresi & M oore, 1996; Piaget, 
1962; Jones, 2007), the mechanism s subserving im itation in infancy are still a topic o f vivid 
discussion (e.g., Elsner, 2007; Gergely & Csibra, 2003; Jones, 2009; M eltzoff & Moore, 
1989; Paulus, Hunnius, Vissers, & Bekkering, in press-c). The teleological stance theory 
postulates that humans norm atively evaluate actions they observe by applying the principle of 
rational action  (Gergely & Csibra, 2003). Em ploying this principle, they expect agents to act 
in a way, which they infer to be m ost efficient for achieving their aims. Follow ing these 
theoretical considerations, it has been suggested that infants (and even animals) im itate 
actions ‘rationally’, depending on the efficiency o f the dem onstrated action (e.g., Buttelmann, 
Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2007; Gergely, Bekkering, & Kiraly, 2002; Range, Viranyi, & 
Huber, 2007; Schwier, van M aanen, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2006; Zmyj, Daum, & 
Aschersleben, 2009).
In the seminal study by Gergely and colleagues (2002), 14-month-old infants 
observed an adult w ho was sitting at a table w ith a black box in front of her on which a lamp 
was mounted. She leant forward and touched the lamp w ith her forehead, w hich caused a 
light effect. In one condition, the adult had a blanket wrapped around her shoulders, which 
she held up w ith her hands (H ands occupied) while she was perform ing the head touch. In a 
second condition, her hands were free as the blanket was hanging loosely around her 
shoulders (H ands free). M ore infants in the H ands free  condition im itated the head touch than 
in the H ands occu pied  condition. The authors suggested that in the H ands occupied  condition 
infants thought that the model had to use her head as her hands were occupied. In the H ands 
free condition, however, the model appeared to use her head deliberately and infants were 
thus more likely to reproduce the head touch.
Recently, however, we have presented evidence that infants’ apparently “rational” 
im itation behavior in the head touch paradigm  m ight be caused by another, more low-level 
mechanism  (Paulus et al., in press-c). In the H ands fre e  condition, the model supported 
herself w ith her hands on the table w hen perform ing the head touch, while in the H ands 
occu pied  condition she bent over w ith her arms crossed in front of her chest. Importantly, 
w hen im itating the head touch, infants always also put their hands on the table next to the
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lamp to m aintain a stable position. The action m odeled in the H ands fre e  condition thus 
resem bled more closely the action as the infants perform ed it.
Findings have shown that a person’s own action capabilities and action experiences 
influence the way he or she perceives the actions o f others (e.g., Hauf, Aschersleben, & 
Prinz, 2007; M eltzoff, 2007; Sommerville & W oodward, 2005; van Elk, van Schie, Hunnius, 
Vesper, & Bekkering, 2008). In particular, it has been found that the observation of an action 
that is part o f one’s own m otor repertoire leads to higher activation in the m otor system (i.e. 
m otor resonance) than the observation o f an action that is not w ithin one’s m otor repertoire 
(e.g., van E lk et al., 2008; see also Calvo-M erino, Glaser, Grezes, Passingham, & Haggard,
2005). As the head action m odeled in the H ands fre e  condition was more sim ilar to how the 
infants would perform the action themselves, it is likely that this action induced m ore m otor 
resonance in the observing infant than the action w hich was dem onstrated in the H ands 
occu pied  condition.
To test the hypothesis we m anipulated the extent to w hich the observed actions could 
be m atched onto the infants’ own m otor repertoire in addition to w hether the observed 
behavior appeared to be efficient (Paulus et al., in press-c). The results suggested that motor 
resonance plays a central role in infants’ im itation, whereas no support was found for a 
rational evaluation of the others’ actions being a determ inant of im itative behavior in infancy.
However, although one m ight acknowledge that m otor resonance is an im portant 
m echanism  subserving im itation in infancy, this does not exclude the possibility that infants’ 
im itation is also affected by inferential processes like teleological reasoning (G. Gergely, 
personal communication). In other words, m otor resonance m ight be a necessary prerequisite 
for im itation, but infants m ight -  on top o f that -  still take the efficiency o f the observed 
action into account.
To examine this hypothesis, we added another factor to the original design of Gergely 
and colleagues (2002). By changing the position of the lamp, we elim inated the differences in 
m otor resonance betw een the original H ands fre e  and H ands occu pied  conditions. M ore 
concretely speaking, we attached the lamp to a rack on which it could be adjusted to be at the 
height o f the adult m odel’s as well as the infant’s head. Accordingly, infants could perform a 
head touch easily by leaning forward w ithout the need to support them selves w ith their hands 
on the table. So, w hen the model dem onstrated the head touch w ith her hands either free or
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occupied, both actions w ere part o f the infants’ m otor repertoire and w ere likely to lead to the 
same strength of m otor resonance in the observing infant.
The design o f the study consisted o f tw o factors. The first factor Lam p  described the 
position of the lamp (Lamp Table, Lam p H igh ) and the second factor H ands the situational 
constraints im posed on the hands (H ands fre e , H ands occupied). A ccording to the 
teleological stance theory we would expect that infants’ im itation should be affected by the 
action’s efficiency independent o f the position o f the lamp. Consequently, a m ain effect o f 
H ands would be expected, that is im itation perform ance should be higher if  the actor 
m odeled the action in an inefficient m anner independent of the position of the lamp. 
However, if m otor resonance is a m ain factor contributing to infants’ im itation performance, 
we expected an interaction effect between the factors Lam p  and H ands, indicating that no 
difference betw een H ands Free and H ands occupied  should be found in the Lam p H igh  
condition com pared to the original Lam p Table situation in w hich a difference between 
H ands Free and H ands occupied  should be found.
2. Method
2.1 Participants
The final sample included 71 14-month-old infants (M  = 14 months, 12 days; range 13;15 -  
14;31; 32 boys). The data o f 38 infants in the conditions Lam p Table - H ands fre e  (LT-HF) 
and Lam p Table - H ands occupied (LT-HO) were taken from the study by Paulus et al. (in 
press-c). Thirty-three infants were recruited to participate. The final sample included 19 
infants in the LT-H F  condition, 19 infants in the LT-HO  condition, 17 infants in the Lam p  
H igh -  H ands F ree (LH-HF) -  condition, 16 infants in the Lam p H igh -  H ands occupied  
(LH-HO) condition. An additional 9 infants did not complete the experim ent due to 
inattentiveness or fussiness, interference by the parent, or a procedural or technical error. The 
participants w ere healthy, full-term  infants w ithout any pre- or perinatal com plications and 
were recruited from local birth records. The infants’ parents gave inform ed consent for 
participation of their child in the study, and all participants received a book or monetary 
com pensation for their visit.
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2.2 Materials and Setting
The light box in the lamp table conditions LT-H F  and LT-HO  consisted o f a lamp (diam eter 
13 cm) which was m ounted onto a black box (27 x 19 x 5.5 cm). The box was positioned on a 
table and was filled with lead so that the infants were unable to move it. In the Lam p H igh  
conditions (i.e. LH -H F  and LH -H O ), the lamp was attached to a rack (see Figure 1). Along 
this rack, the lamp could be moved vertically to adjust its height. The rack was m ounted onto 
tw o rails w hich were extended over the edge o f the table so that the rack could be slid from 
one side o f the table to the other.
A B
Figure 1. Figure A shows the lamp with the light box used in the Lamp table condition. Figure B 
shows a schematic drawing of the lamp on the rack used in the Lamp high condition.
In the conditions LT-H F  and LT-HO, experimenter, parent and infant were sitting at a 
table, w hich had a rectangular section cut out of one side to allow the child comfortable 
access to the lamp. In the conditions LH -H F  and LH-HO, the experim enter and the parent and 
infant w ere sitting at the longer edge of a rectangular table facing each other. Cameras were 
used to record the infant’s as well as the experim enter’s behavior. The blanket used in the 
experim ent w as made o f blue fleece (130 x 158 cm).
2.3 Procedure
The experim ent took place in an experimental booth to m inim ize distraction for the child. 
L ight was dimmed to a m oderate level to m ake the light effect o f the lamp m ore salient. 
W hen parent and infant were seated properly, experim enter entered the booth w ith the
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blanket. In each o f the conditions the model assured eye-contact w ith the child and 
subsequently uttered the sentence ‘Brrr, I  f e e l  so  c o ld ! ’ while placing the blanket around her 
shoulders (cf. Gergely et al., 2002). The rest o f the procedure during the m odeling phase was 
different for each of the conditions.
Lam p Table conditions: In the tw o Lam p Table conditions, the lamp was placed on the 
table. In the LT-H F  condition, the experim enter’s hands were free. She placed the blanket 
around her shoulders and made sure that the infant noticed that her hands were free by 
rubbing her hands and m oving her chair a few  centimeters. Then she sat down and put her 
hands next to the lamp. She called the infant’s name and said ‘L ook w hat I  am go in g  to do !’ 
The model then turned on the lamp using her forehead and returned to the initial position. 
The action was m odeled four times. Betw een the head touches, the experim enter used the 
words ‘Yes!’, ‘L ook !’ or called the infant’s name in order to keep the infant focused. 
Subsequently, the experim enter said to the infant ‘W ouldyou  like to try as w e ll? , pushed the 
lamp across the table in front o f the infant, and left the experimental booth. The child was 
given 60 seconds to explore the lamp. The tw o conditions differed from each other as in the 
LT-HO  condition the experim enter held the blanket wrapped around her shoulders, using her 
hands. H er hands were thus not free. The rest of the procedure followed closely the H ands 
F ree  condition, w ith the difference that the model did not support herself w ith her hands on 
the table while perform ing the head touch.
Lam p H igh  conditions: The Lam p H igh  conditions differed from the Lam p Table 
conditions insofar as the lamp could be adjusted to the height o f the infant’s head. In the 
condition LH-HF , the model showed that her hands w ere free, sat down on the chair and laid 
her hands down in her lap. For the rest, the m odel’s behavior followed closely the condition 
LT-HF. A lso the LH-HO  condition followed closely the procedure o f the condition LT-HO. 
A fter having perform ed the action sequences in the Lam p high  conditions, the model let the 
blanket slip on the chair, moved the rack on the rails to the infants. The infant w as given 60 
seconds to act on the lamp. In all four conditions the experim enter’s use o f verbal and 
nonverbal expressions was the same.
2.4 Data analysis
The first 60 seconds after the child was given the lamp and attended to it w ere coded. An 
action was coded as a head touch w hen infants touched the lamp w ith their head. In the Lam p  
table  conditions, also bending to the lamp within 10 cm of its surface was coded as a head
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touch (cf. Gergely et al., 2002; Paulus et al., in press-c). To investigate to which extend 
infants used their hands and heads, it w as registered w hich action infants perform ed first 
w hen switching on the lamp (hand or head touch). A  log-linear analysis based on a logit- 
model (see K noke & Burke, 1980) w ith the independent variables H an d (Hands free , H ands 
occupied) and Lam p  (Lamp Table, Lam p H igh) and the dependent variable H ea d  Touch was 
carried out to examine differences in the num ber of infants perform ing a head touch between 
the conditions. An analysis o f variance (ANOVA) w ith the factors H an d (Hands free , H ands 
occupied) and Lam p  (Lamp table , Lam p high) w as calculated to analyze the latencies to the 
first head touch (for the infants who perform ed a head touch).
2.5 Results
In the condition LT-HF, 14 out o f 19 infants (74%) perform ed a head touch, while only 5 out 
o f 19 infants (32%) perform ed a head touch in the condition LT-H O  (cf. Paulus et al., in 
press-c). In the condition LH-HF, 9 out o f 16 infants (56%) perform ed a head touch, and 12 
out o f 17 infants (71% ) perform ed a head touch in the condition LH-HO  (see Figure 2). 
H ierarchical tests o f logit-m odels revealed not only a significant m ain effect o f the factor 
Lam p  (z=2.218, p<0.05), but also that the interaction o f both factors contributed significantly 
to the explanation of the data (com parison model w ith and w ithout interaction effect, 
z=2.309, p<0.05). To further examine this effect, post-hoc Chi Square tests were conducted. 
The tests revealed that the num ber of infants im itating the head touch was significantly 
different in the Lam p Table conditions, LT-H F  and LT-HO, / 2(1, 38)=6.756, p<0.01, but not 
in the Lam p H igh  conditions, LH -H F  and LH-HO, / 2(1, 32)=0.732, p=0.39. Furtherm ore, the 
num ber of infants im itating the head touch in the H ands occu pied  conditions was 
significantly larger in the LH -H O  than the LT-HO  condition, / 2(1, 35)=5.461, p<0.05, but no 
significant difference was found for the H ands fre e  conditions, LH -H F  and LT-HF, / 2(1, 
34)=1.172, p=0.28.
By far m ost of the infants first used their hands rather than their head to switch on the 
lamp (85%) (see Table 1). This pattern was not different between the conditions, 
/2(3 ,71)=3.341, p = 3 4 .
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Figure 2. Percentage of infants performing a head touch in each of the experimental conditions. The 
two bars on the left show infants’ behavior in the Lamp table condition, the two bars on the right in 
the Lamp high condition. The dark bars represent the Hands free and the light bars the Hands 
occupied conditions.
Lamp table Lamp high
Hands free Hands occupied Hands free Hands occupied
Head action 11% 11% 13% 29%
first
Table 1. Percentage of infants in each condition performing a head touch before using their hands to 
switch on the light (Head action first)
4. Discussion
The aim o f  this study was to examine w hether teleological reasoning is an independent 
m echanism  underlying 14-month-old infants’ im itation o f novel actions. M ore specifically, 
we investigated w hether infants’ imitation of novel head touch actions is affected by the 
efficiency of the dem onstrated actions w hen the level of m otor resonance they elicit is the 
same. U sing the seminal head touch paradigm  (Gergely et al., 2002), w e examined how often
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infants im itated the head touch in tw o conditions in which the m odel’s hands were either 
occupied or not by holding a blanket. To elim inate the difference in elicited m otor resonance 
betw een the efficient and the less efficient condition (cf. Paulus et al., in press-c), we 
introduced a novel factor (Lamp H igh). The results show an interaction effect of the factors 
Lam p  and T able: w hen the am ount o f m otor resonance was the same for both conditions, as it 
was the case w hen the lamp was presented at head level on a rack, no difference between the 
H ands fre e  and the H ands occupied  condition was observed. This suggests that 14-month-old 
infants did not take into consideration the situational constraints of the model and did not 
im itate the novel action according to their efficiency, but that m otor resonance was an 
im portant factor in infants’ imitation.
Importantly, the percentage of infants im itating the head touch in the LH-HO  
condition was significantly higher than in the LT-HO  condition. This is in line w ith the 
hypothesis proposed earlier that infants’ failure to im itate the head touch in the H ands 
occu pied  condition o f the Gergely et al. (2002) study m ight be due to a low  level o f m otor 
resonance (Paulus et al., in press-c). W e suggested that the m odel’s head action could be 
m atched onto the infants’ m otor repertoire to a lesser extent in the original H ands occupied  
condition than in the H ands fre e  condition, leading to less m otor activation during action 
observation (cf. van E lk et al., 2008). In the current study, we increased the overlap between 
the m odel’s and the infants’ way o f perform ing the head action by putting the lamp on a rack 
at the height of the infants’ head, and significantly more infants imitated the head touch in the 
novel H ands occupied  condition. This further corroborates the hypothesis that infants’ 
reduced tendency to imitate the head touch in the original H ands occu pied  condition of 
Gergely et al. (2002) is due to a low er level o f m otor m atching rather than their evaluation o f 
the efficiency o f the dem onstrated action.
Although touching the lamp w ith the head w as now relatively easy, 30 to 40%  o f the 
infants in our study still did not im itate the head touch at all. This is approximately the same 
percentage as in the LT-H F  condition. Though the level o f m otor resonance is an im portant 
aspect, infants’ im itation is thus affected by more than one factor. Probably it is a dynamic 
interaction o f different factors (cf. Thelen & Smith, 1994), such as infants’ previous 
experiences w ith specific learning environments (e.g., Jones & Herbert, 2008), 
interindividual differences in m em ory capacities (e.g., Kolling, Goertz, Frahsek, & Knopf, 
2009), or the m odel’s social engagem ent (e.g., N ielsen, Simcock, & Jenkins, 2008). Further 
research is needed to closely examine the interaction between these factors.
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Our findings have im plications for research about the m echanism s underlying 
im itation in infancy (e.g., Bates, 1979; Elsner, 2007; Jones, 2007; Paulus, in press-b). 
Gergely and colleagues (e.g., Gergely et al., 2002) suggested that infants’ im itation is 
affected by their ability to evaluate the efficiency o f observed actions. However, we argue 
that m otor resonance m ight be an im portant m echanism  subserving im itation in infancy and 
m ight probably determ ine infant im itation to a larger extent than rational reasoning (Paulus et 
al., in press-c). The current study provides additional evidence for the crucial role o f m otor 
resonance in im itative behavior but not for teleological reasoning. The results are in line with 
recent findings on infants’ action prediction that show the lim itations of infants’ ability to 
rationally evaluate the actions o f others (Paulus et al., in press-a) and suggest that this ability 
m ight emerge only later during developm ent (e.g., Brass, Schmitt, Spengler, & Gergely, 
2007; W illiamson, M eltzoff, & M arkman, 2009; see also Kuhn, 2005). M ore research is 
needed to investigate the developm ent of the ability to evaluate the efficiency of others’ 
actions.
113
114
Chapter 8
Bridging the gap between the other and me: The functional role of 
motor resonance and action effects in infants’ imitation
Based on:
Paulus, M., Hunnius, S., Vissers, M., & Bekkering, H. (in press). Bridging the gap between 
the other and me: The functional role o f m otor resonance and action effects in infants’ 
imitation. D evelopm ental Science.
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Abstract
This paper investigates a tw o-stage model of infants’ im itative learning from observed 
actions and their effects. According to this model, the observation o f another person’s action 
activates the corresponding m otor code in the infants’ m otor repertoire (i.e., leads to m otor 
resonance). The second process guiding im itative behavior results from the observed action 
effects. If the m odeled action is followed by a salient action effect, the representation of this 
effect will be associated w ith the activated m otor code. If the infant later aims to obtain the 
same effect, the corresponding m otor program  will be activated and the m odel’s action will 
therefore be imitated. Accordingly, the model assum es that for the im itation of novel actions 
the m odeled action needs to elicit sufficient m otor resonance and m ust be followed by a 
salient action effect. Using the head touch im itation paradigm, we tested these two 
assum ptions derived from the model. To this end, w e m anipulated w hether the actions 
dem onstrated to the infants were or were not in the m otor repertoire, i.e., elicited stronger or 
less strong m otor resonance, and w hether they w ere followed by salient action effects or not. 
The results w ere in line w ith the proposed tw o-stage model of infants’ im itative learning and 
suggest that m otor resonance is necessary, but not sufficient for infants’ im itative learning 
from others’ actions and their effects.
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1. Introduction
The role of im itation in early developm ent has been a topic of great interest w ithin the field 
o f psychology (e.g., Baldwin, 1906; Bandura, 1977; M iller & Dollard, 1941; M oore, 2006; 
Piaget, 1962). It has, for example, been claimed that im itation plays a central role in first 
language acquisition (Papousek & Papousek, 1989), in infants’ learning about tool-use 
(Tom asello et al., 2005), and the facilitation o f social relations (Nadel-Brulfert & 
Baudonniere, 1982). Taken together, it has been suggested that im itation serves cognitive as 
well as social functions (Uzgiris, 1981).
The mechanism s subserving im itation have rem ained a topic of extensive discussion 
over the last decades (e.g., Bates, 1979; Jones, 2007). Research has suggested that infants’ 
im itation is affected by a relatively automatic process of perception-action m atching (Paulus, 
Hunnius, Vissers, & Bekkering, in press-c), a natural inclination for following ostensive cues 
in pedagogical situations (Gergely & Csibra, 2006), the ability to read the intentions of others 
(Tom asello et al., 2005), or the appreciation o f salient action effects (Elsner, 2007).
Findings on infants’ learning about action-effect contingencies indicate that infants 
learn from the observation of others’ actions and subsequently tend to imitate those actions 
that were accom panied by a salient action effect (Elsner & Aschersleben, 2003; Elsner, Hauf, 
& Aschersleben, 2007; H auf & Aschersleben, 2008; Hauf, Elsner, & Aschersleben, 2004; 
Klein, Hauf, & Aschersleben, 2006). H auf and Aschersleben (2008), for example, 
dem onstrated to 7- and 9-m onth-old infants that pressing one of tw o buttons led to a salient 
action effect. Then, infants were allowed to play w ith the buttons. It could be shown that the 
infants tended to press first and for longer the button that led to the salient action effect. This 
indicates that action-effect learning is an im portant m echanism in infants’ imitative learning 
from observed action-effect contingencies. Generally, the results are explained by the Theory 
o f  E vent C oding  (TEC; Hommel, M usseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001), which suggests 
that actions are controlled by anticipation o f their sensory effects (Elsner & Hommel, 2001). 
The goal to elicit a particular effect activates the corresponding m otor program w hich has 
been associated w ith this effect and leads to the execution of the action (Hommel, 2009; 
W ohlschlager, Gattis, & Bekkering, 2003; for a current review  see also Nattkem per, Ziessler, 
& Frensch, 2010).
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However, the claim that infants are able to employ observed action-effect 
contingencies to control their own actions fails to take into account an im portant point. The 
research reported so far implicitly assum es a correspondence between the infants’ own 
actions and the actions o f another person, insofar as infants have to link their own m otor 
system to the representation o f the observed action effect. W hen perform ing a particular 
action, the action code and the perceptual code are related to each other via repeated co­
occurrence (i.e., associative learning), so that w hen infants w ant to attain the action effect the 
corresponding action code (i.e., m otor program) will be activated (cf. E lsner & Hommel, 
2001). A pplying this model to im itative learning, however, ignores the fact that there is an 
im portant gap betw een the other person and the infant. As the other’s actions are not the 
infants’ own actions, the question arises as to how infants are able to relate their own motor 
system to the representation o f the corresponding action effect (i.e., build an action-effect 
association). In other words, it begs the question o f how  infants relate the observed actions to 
their own action repertoire (the “correspondence problem ” ; Barresi & M oore, 1996; Brass & 
Heyes, 2005; Heyes & Bird, 2007). The research reported in this paper addresses this 
question and exam ines one possible m echanism  that enables infants to learn from  the 
observation o f others’ actions and their effects.
W e suggest that the m echanism  o f m otor resonance allows infants to perceive the 
actions o f others as corresponding to their own and to thus link actions o f others to their own 
m otor repertoire. Support for such a m echanism  comes from research w ith adults that shows 
that the mere perception o f another’s action automatically facilitates the execution o f the 
same m otor act w hen the observed action is w ithin one’s own m otor repertoire (Brass, 
Bekkering, W ohlschläger, & Prinz, 2000; Brass, Derrfuss, M atthes-von Cramon, & von 
Cramon, 2003; Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, & Rizzolatti, 1995; Kilner, Paulignan, & Blakemore, 
2003; Stürmer, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2000; for a sim ilar approach also see Hommel et al., 
2001). It has been proposed that a hum an m irror neuron system m ight be the neural basis o f 
the capacity to match observed actions onto one’s own m otor repertoire (e.g., Iacoboni et al., 
1999; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; W ohlschläger & Bekkering, 2002). R ecent evidence 
from developmental studies supports the notion that infants’ own action experiences and 
action capabilities alter the way they process the actions o f others (e.g., Falck-Ytter, 
Gredebäck, & von Hofsten, 2006; Hauf, 2007; Hauf, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2007; 
Sommerville, W oodward & Needham , 2005; van Elk, van Schie, Hunnius, Vesper, & 
Bekkering, 2008; cf. H auf & Prinz, 2005). W e suggest that m otor resonance m ight be the
118
Chapte r  8: MOTOR RESONANCE AND ACTION EFFECTS IN INFANTS' IMITATION
mechanism  that serves to bridge the gap betw een another person’s actions and the infant’s 
own action repertoire and enables infants to form an action-effect association via 
observational learning. Together, whereas the literature has focused on tw o separate 
m echanisms, it is the aim o f this paper to unify them  into one framework. The considerations 
outlined in the last paragraphs give raise to a tw o-stage model o f infants’ im itative learning 
from the observation o f others’ actions and their effects (cf. Paulus et al., in press-c).
W e propose that infants’ observation o f another person’s action activates the 
corresponding m otor code in infants’ m otor repertoire i f  the action is w ithin their m otor 
repertoire. I f  the other person’s action is followed by a salient action effect, the representation 
o f this effect (perceptual code) will be associated w ith the m otor code (i.e., a bidirectional 
action-effect association will be formed; for a sim ilar model on hum an action control see 
Elsner & Hommel, 2001). W hen infants later w ant to obtain the same effect, the 
corresponding m otor program  will be activated.
The current paper tested the tw o basic assum ptions o f this qualitative model. First, the 
assum ption that a m odeled action needs to resonate in the m otor system o f the infant predicts 
that dem onstrated actions that induce little m otor resonance are unlikely to be imitated, even 
if  they are followed by a salient action effect. Second, the assum ption that infants strive for 
salient effects predicts that an action that elicits strong m otor resonance but is not followed 
by a salient action effect is also unlikely to be imitated. For im itative learning o f novel 
action-effect contingencies to take place, the m odeled action needs to elicit sufficient m otor 
resonance (i.e., needs to be in the m otor repertoire o f the infant) and m ust be followed by a 
salient effect.
To investigate these hypotheses w e built on the findings o f a study by Paulus and 
colleagues (in press-c) in which infants observed how a model touched a lamp on a table in 
front o f her w ith her head to turn on the light (cf. Gergely, Bekkering, & Kiraly, 2002). It has 
been found that infants always im itated the head action supporting them selves w ith both 
hands on the table, probably to m aintain a stable posture while bending over5. Importantly, 
the frequency w ith which infants im itated the head touch was higher in conditions in which 
the model also put her hands on the table while perform ing the head touch, than in conditions
5 To provide quantitative support for this notion we recoded infants’ behavior during the test phase of 
the study of Paulus et al. (in press-c). Out of 95 participants, 43 showed at least one head touch. Of 
these 43 infants, 100% imitated the head touch supporting themselves with both hands on the table.
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in w hich she perform ed the head action in a different m anner (e.g., w ith her arms crossed on 
her chest, or w ith her arms in the air). These previous results stressed the importance o f motor 
resonance for im itation in infancy, as many infants im itated the novel action in conditions in 
which there was a greater overlap betw een infants’ way o f perform ing the action and the 
m odel’s way o f dem onstrating the action.
To address the questions o f w hether m otor resonance is necessary and sufficient for 
infants’ im itation and thus mediates action-effect learning through observation, we 
investigated the interplay o f m otor resonance and learning from observed action-effect 
contingencies in the head touch task. For this purpose, we examined infants’ im itative 
behavior in three novel conditions that we directly com pared w ith the results o f two 
conditions from our previous study (Hands fre e  and Button ; cf. Paulus et al., in press-c). In 
the original H ands fre e  condition the model dem onstrated the head action while supporting 
herself on the table w ith her hands. In the original Button  condition, the model wore a 
blanket, which w as held in place by a button. W hen dem onstrating the head touch, she 
crossed her arms in front o f her chest. Interestingly, more infants im itated the head touch in 
the H ands fre e  than in the Button  condition, which is in line w ith the notion that motor 
resonance plays a crucial role in infants’ im itation (Paulus et al., in press-c). In all three novel 
conditions we used a m odified version o f the original lamp task in which a small switch had 
been added to the lamp, w hich deactivated the lamp, so that the light effect could no longer 
be elicited.
The new H ea d  Effect condition was comparable to the Button  condition6 as the model 
turned on a lamp w ith her head while she had her arms folded in front o f her upper body 
under the blanket. In the original Button  condition, only a small num ber o f infants imitated 
the head touch, w hereas all infants repeatedly turned on the lamp w ith their hands. W e 
modified this condition in our novel H ea d  Effect condition so that the model switched the 
lamp o ff before giving it to  the child so that no effect could be elicited. As the infants 
normally first try to turn on the lamp w ith their hands (e.g., Paulus et al., in press-c), infants 
would experience that pressing the lamp w ith their hands does not lead to the effect. A t the 
same time, they had observed during the dem onstration phase that the model turned on the
6 We chose to modify the Button condition (Paulus et al., in press-c) instead of the original Hands 
occupied condition (cf. Gergely et al., 2002), as in this condition the model’s hands remained free. 
This was important for our second new condition Head Only as the model needed her hands to 
demonstrate a hand action on the lamp.
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lamp w ith her head. I f  m otor resonance is not a prerequisite for infants’ im itative learning we 
would expect that more infants -  after having experienced that they cannot switch on the 
lamp w ith their hands -  would im itate the head touch in the new  H ea d  Effect condition than 
in the original Button  condition in w hich the lamp could also be turned on w ith the hands. If  
m otor resonance, however, is a necessary prerequisite for infants’ im itative learning about 
observed action-effect contingencies we would expect that despite their failure to switch on 
the lamp w ith their hands still only a few  infants would try to switch it on w ith their head. 
Accordingly, we would expect that the num ber o f infants perform ing a head touch would be 
smaller com pared to a condition in which more m otor resonance occurs, e.g. the H ands Free 
condition, and com parable to other conditions w ith little m otor resonance, e.g. the Button  
condition.
The second new  condition, H ea d  Only, was com parable to the H ea d  Effect condition. 
For this condition, however, we additionally m anipulated another factor besides turning the 
lamp o ff before giving it to the child (as in the H ea d  Effect condition). The model not only 
dem onstrated that the lamp could be turned on w ith the head (as in the Button  and the H ead  
Effect conditions) but she also showed that pressing the lam p w ith the hand did not produce 
the light effect. As it has been argued that infants’ im itative learning is influenced by the 
pedagogical context in which the model dem onstrates the action (cf. Kiraly, 2009; Gergely & 
Csibra, 2006), one m ight argue that an explicit dem onstration o f action consequences (i.e., 
dem onstrating how the effect can and cannot be obtained) should facilitate infants’ learning 
from observed action-effect contingencies (cf. Kiraly, 2009). Accordingly, i f  m otor resonance 
is not a prerequisite for infants’ imitation, infants should be able to make use o f the explicitly 
dem onstrated action-effect contingency. In particular, more infants should im itate the head 
touch than in the Button  and the H ea d  Effect condition as it was clearly dem onstrated that 
only the head, but not the hand action led to the desired light effect. I f  m otor resonance, 
however, is a necessary prerequisite for infants’ im itative learning from others’ actions we 
expected that only a small num ber o f infants will perform the head touch in the H ea d  Only 
condition.
The third new condition, N o Effect, investigated the role o f salient action effects in 
conditions w ith high m otor resonance. In particular, we were interested in w hether infants 
would im itate the head touch i f  no light effect at all would be obtained by the model. In other 
words, is m otor resonance sufficient to induce a high rate o f im itative behavior even though 
no salient effect will be activated? The model took the same blanket and followed exactly the
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same procedure as in the H ands fre e  condition w ith the exception that the lamp remained 
deactivated during the entire experimental session. W hen the model dem onstrated the head 
action, no light effect was produced. I f  action effects play an im portant role in infants’ 
im itative learning, w e would expect that only a m inority of infants would perform the head 
touch in the No Effect condition. If, however, m otor resonance is sufficient to induce 
im itative behavior, many infants should imitate the head action (for an overview of all 
conditions see Table 1).
C o n d it i o n
Hand Action
D e m o n s t r a t io n  
Head Action Position Hands
T e s t
H ands free Head->light Hands on table Lam p on
Button Head->light Hands crossed Lam p on
H ead Effect Head->light Hands crossed Lamp off
H ead Only H and->no effect Head->light Hands crossed Lamp off
N o Effect Head->no effect Hands on table Lamp off
Table 1. Table 1 visualizes the design of the study. The first column represents the five conditions. 
The second till the fourth column shows the actions during the demonstration phase. The last column 
shows whether the lamp was turned off during the test phase or not.
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2. Method
2.1 Participants
The final sample included 96 14-month-old infants (Range 13; 15 -  14; 31; 47 boys). The 
data of 38 infants in the conditions H ands fre e  and Button  w ere taken from the study by 
Paulus et al. (in press-c) and were reanalyzed for our purposes. 58 infants were recruited to 
participate in the experiment. The final sample included 19 infants in the Hands fre e  
condition, the Button  condition, the H ead  Effect condition, the H ead  O nly  condition, and 20 
infants in the No Effect condition. An additional 11 infants did not complete the experim ent 
due to inattentiveness or fussiness, interference by the parent, or a procedural error. The 
participants were healthy, full-term  infants w ithout any pre- or prenatal com plications and 
were recruited from local birth records. The infants’ parents gave inform ed consent for 
participation of their child in the study and w ere given a baby book or monetary 
com pensation for their visit.
2.2 Materials and Setting
The light box consisted of a lamp (diam eter 13 cm), w hich w as m ounted onto a black box (27 
x 19 x 5.5 cm). The box was filled w ith lead so that the infants were unable to move it. On 
the front side of the box there was a toggle switch that could be used to turn off the lamp. The 
switch w as invisible for the infant, due to its size (1 x 1 x 3 mm), its black color, and the fact 
that the switch was on the back side of the box (see Figure 1A for a picture of the box). The 
blanket used in the H ea d  Effect and the H ea d  Only conditions w as made o f blue fleece (130 x 
158 cm) and had a clearly visible red button (diam eter 8 cm) attached to it. A  buttonhole had 
been made for the button. The blanket used in the N o Effect condition resem bled the other 
blanket, though w ithout a button or a buttonhole.
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J i
Figure 1 . Figure 1A shows a picture of the lamp. Figures 1B and 1C show the model’s position before 
performing the head touch in the different conditions (1B Button/ Head Effect/ Head Only; 1C Hands 
free/ No Effect).
The caregiver and the infant were sitting at a table which had a square spearing on the 
side at which they were seated. The infant w as seated on the caregiver’s lap in the spearing 
w ith his or her belly against the tabletop. Two cameras were used to record the infant’s and 
the experim enter’s behavior during the experiment.
2.3 Procedure
The procedure followed closely the procedure o f Paulus et al. (in press-c). Before starting the 
experiment, the experim enter took time to let the infant get used to the testing room. Parents 
were given an instruction w hich contained inform ation about the way the infant had to be 
positioned on the lap and the way the parent was supposed to behave during the experiment.
The experim ent took place in an experimental booth to m inim ize distraction for the 
child. W hen the parent and the infant were seated properly, the experim enter left the 
experimental booth for a few  moments. L ight was dimmed to a m oderate level in order to 
m ake the light o f the light box in the H ea d  Effect and the H ea d  Only conditions more salient. 
Then the experim enter re-entered the booth w ith the blanket. To make everything as 
comparable as possible to the original conditions (see for the rationale Paulus et al., in press- 
c), in each o f the conditions the model started w ith the sentence „B rrr, I  f e e l  so  cold! ’ to 
direct the infant’s attention to her behavior7, m aking sure that the infant paid attention to her
7 Please note that Paulus et al. (in press-c) were interested in a different question, namely if  infants’ 
imitation is rational or subserved by motor resonance. To that end, they introduced a cover story, in 
which the model uttered that she felt cold and subsequently placed a blanket around her shoulders. 
The blanket was either hold by the hands or not, so that the model’s hands were free or not while
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by m aking eye-contact. The further procedure in the m odeling phase was different in each 
condition.
In the condition H ea d  Effect, the model placed the blanket around her shoulders, 
which was held by a button. To make sure that the infant perceived that her hands were free, 
the model rubbed her hands and grasped the chair to move it a few  centimeters. Then she sat 
down and crossed her arms under the fleece in front o f her upper body (see Figure 1B). She 
m ade sure to have the infant’s attention by assuring eye contact and saying „L ook w hat I  am  
go in g  to d o !’ I f  eye contact was not established immediately, the experim enter called the 
infants name, followed by „Watch thisF to receive attention again. Then the model perform ed 
the head touch: she bent forward, turned on the lamp by pressing it w ith her forehead and 
returned to the initial upright position. The head touch w as m odeled four times. In between 
the head touches, the model assured eye contact w ith the infant and smiled mildly. I f  an 
infant used vocalizations during the modeling phase, the model replied w ith „Yes!’ W hen the 
model noticed that the infant did not pay attention to her w hen she was in the upright position 
during the modeling phase, she would say „L ook!’ to keep the infant focused. Additionally, 
she called the infant’s name w hen the infant did not pay attention anymore. A fter having 
perform ed the action sequence, the experim enter released the button and let the blanket slip 
on the chair. Then the model turned o ff the lamp using the small switch on the m odel’s side 
o f the light-box, while sim ultaneously asking the infant „ W ould you  like to try as w e l l? , to 
m ake sure the infant would not notice the experim enter turning o ff the lamp. Then she 
cautiously moved the lamp across the table to put it in front o f the infant. This was done in a 
way in which the small, black switch rem ained on the side o f the box that could not be seen 
by the infant. The model stood up and left the experimental booth w ithout looking at the child 
and m other again. A fter the experim enter left, the child was given 60 seconds to act on the 
lamp. W hen the 60 seconds had passed, the experim enter reentered the booth and inform ed 
the parent about the rationale behind the experiment.
The H ea d  Only condition resem bled the H ea d  Effect condition with the difference that 
the lamp had been deactivated before the experiment. A fter sitting down, the model first tried 
to turn on the lam p with her hand. To this end she pressed the top o f the lamp w ith her right 
hand while looking at it. As described above, the lamp was turned off before the experiment 
so that no light effect was produced. A fter every attem pt to turn on the lamp w ith her hand,
performing the head touch (cf. Gergely et al., 2002). Although this story was not important for our 
current study, we closely followed the procedure of Paulus et al. (in press) in our novel conditions, to 
keep our results comparable to their findings.
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she moved her hand back to her body again and frowned every time she pressed the lamp. 
The hand action was perform ed four times. In between, the model assured eye contact with 
the infant. W hen she noticed that the infant did not pay attention to her, she used the words 
„Yes!’ or „L ook !’ in order to keep the infant focused. She also called the infant’s name when 
the infant did not pay attention anymore. A fter the model perform ed the hand action four 
tim es she ensured that there was eye contact w ith the infant and said „H ave another look a t 
w hat I  am go in g  to d o ! ’ W hile saying this, the model turned on the lamp by pressing the 
switch that was on her side of the lamp. This was done sim ultaneously to prevent the infant 
from noticing the lamp being switched on. A fter the lamp had been switched on, the 
experim ent followed closely the procedure in the H ea d  Effect condition. The Button  
condition was exactly the same as the H ea d  Effect condition w ith the only exception that the 
experim enter did not turn off the lamp w hen giving it to the infant. The infants were able to 
elicit the light effect by pressing the lamp w ith their hands or heads.
The H ands fre e  condition differed from the other conditions as the model placed the 
blanket w ithout the button loosely around her shoulder and put her hands next to lamp instead 
o f crossing them  in front o f her upper body (see Figure 1C). That means w hen perform ing the 
head touch the model was supporting her upper body part by having her hands lying next to 
the lamp. In this condition the lamp was not turned off w hen given to the infant as it was in 
the Button  condition. The No Effect condition was almost the same as the H ands fre e  
condition, the only difference being that the lamp rem ained turned off during the whole 
experiment. The light effect could not be activated by either the experim enter or the infant. In 
all conditions, the experim enter’s use o f verbal and nonverbal expressions w as the same. No 
other language was used during the experim ent besides the phrases m entioned above.
2.4 Data analysis
The first 60 seconds were coded after the child was given the lamp and attended to it. A  head 
touch w as defined as a m ovem ent o f the head towards the lamp, whereby the infant’s head 
was w ithin a distance o f 10 centim eter from the lamp. W e coded i f  infants perform ed at least 
one head touch or no head touch at all. This coding procedure is identical w ith previous 
studies (cf. Gergely et al., 2002; Paulus et al., in press-c). To investigate to w hich extent 
infants relied on their hands and heads, it was registered which action infants perform ed first 
w hen acting on the lam p (hand or head action) and how often they used their hands (hand 
touch). Chi square tests were carried out to examine differences in the num ber of infants
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perform ing a head touch betw een the conditions (cf. Gergely et al., 2002). An analysis o f 
variance (ANOVA) w ith the factor condition was calculated to analyze the frequency o f hand 
touches. Furtherm ore, we com pared the latencies to the first head touch between the 
conditions by calculating an ANOVA.
3. Results
In the condition H ands free , 14 out o f 19 infants (74%) perform ed the head touch while in the 
condition Button  five out o f 19 infants perform ed the head touch (26%; cf. Paulus et al., in 
press-c). In the new condition H ea d  Effect, six out of 19 infants perform ed the head touch 
(32%; see Figure 2). Chi Square Tests revealed that the difference betw een the num ber o f 
infants im itating the head touch in the H ea d  Effect condition and the H ands fre e  condition 
was significant (x2(1, 38) =6.756; p<0.01) w hereas no statistical difference could be found 
betw een the num ber of infants im itating the head touch in the N o Effect condition (7 out of 20 
infants; 35%) and the Button  condition ( j2(1, 38) =0.128; p=0.721), 35% and 26%, 
respectively. In the condition H ea d  Only five out of 19 infants perform ed the head action 
(26%). The num ber of infants im itating the head touch in the H ea d  Only condition was 
significantly smaller than in the H ands fre e  condition (x2(1,38)=8.526; p<0.01), but not 
different from the Button  condition ( j2(1,38)=0; p=1). A  further com parison between the 
condition N o Effect and the condition H ands fre e  was conducted to investigate w hether the 
head touch was differently imitated, w hen it led to a salient action effect or not. A  significant 
difference was found betw een the H ands fre e  and the N o Effect condition ( j2(1,38)=5.867; 
p<0.05).
Button Hands Free Head Effect Head Only No Effect
Latency 22.2 (8.4) 29.9 (4.9) 23.2 (8.2) 20.6 (7.5) 24.3 (8.3)
Hand Touches 23.9 (4.7) 18.6 (2.6) 13.7 (2.5) 18.3 (2.3) 18.2 (2.2)
Table 2 . Latencies to the first head touch when a head touch was performed (Latency), and average 
number of hand actions (Hands) in each condition. Standard errors for the hand actions and latency 
scores are given in brackets.
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Figure 2. Percentage of infants performing a head touch in the five experimental conditions.
Only a small subgroup o f infants im m ediately used their heads to switch on the lamp, 
but by far m ost o f the infants first used their hands. A  F isher’s exact test showed that there 
was no significant difference in the num ber o f infants who showed the head touch as first 
action between the five conditions (Fisher’s exact test, p=0.21). An ANOVA revealed that 
there was no difference in the average num ber o f hand touches per infant betw een the 
conditions (range 13.7-23.9; F  (4, 91) =1.439, p=0.23, see Table 2). The infants w ho imitated 
the head touch in each o f the different conditions, did it w ith approximately the same latency 
(range 20.6s -  29.9s; F  (4, 32) <1, see Table 2).
4. Discussion
The aim o f this study was to test tw o assum ptions derived from our tw o-stage model o f 
infants’ im itative learning o f novel action-effect associations. In particular, we exam ined the 
contribution o f tw o distinct processes in 14-month-old infants’ im itative learning: the role o f 
m otor resonance and that o f salient action effects. The first assum ption was that a m odeled 
action that induces little m otor resonance would unlikely be imitated, even i f  followed by a 
salient action effect. The role o f m otor resonance was tested in the com parison between the 
Button  and the H ea d  Effect respectively H ea d  Only conditions. The results showed that only
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a few  infants imitated the head touch even though it was followed by a salient effect during 
the m odeling phase and even though infants experienced that they could not turn on the lamp 
w ith the prepotent hand action. The second assum ption was that infants would strive to 
im itate actions that lead to salient action effects. Therefore, a m odeled action that does not 
lead to a salient effect would be unlikely to be imitated, even though it induces sufficient 
m otor resonance. The role o f action effects was tested in the com parison betw een the H ands 
fre e  and the N o Effect conditions. The results were in line w ith our predictions. Together, 
these findings provide support for our tw o-stage model as they suggest that imitative 
behavior in infancy is subserved by the interplay o f tw o mechanisms: m otor resonance and 
action-effect learning.
An alternative explanation for infants’ failure to m ake use o f the observed action­
effect contingencies in our H ea d  Only condition is that infants could simply have assumed 
that the lamp was not working anym ore because the m odel’s hand touch did not lead to a 
light effect. However, this explanation cannot account for the findings in the H ea d  Effect 
condition in which only successful head touches were dem onstrated and nevertheless only a 
m inor num ber o f infants im itated it. Furtherm ore, no differences in the num ber o f hand 
touches were found between the different conditions. That suggests that infants w ere equally 
engaged in the task in both conditions. Finally, it should be noted that the model always first 
dem onstrated the unsuccessful hand action and subsequently perform ed the head action, 
which led to the salient action effect, m aking clear that there was no technical problem with 
the lamp.
It should be noted that in some o f the conditions the infants w ere not able to turn on 
the lamp w ith their head, as the lamp was turned off in the test phase (see Table 1). However, 
as w e w ere interested in the num ber o f infants who perform ed at least one head touch or no 
head touch at all, it was irrelevant w hether infants eventually perceived a light effect once 
they perform ed the head touch or not. D ifferences between conditions could thus not be 
explained by the different consequences o f perform ing a head touch, but rather by the 
different demonstrations in the dem onstration phase.
Recent empirical findings support our notion that m otor resonance affects infants’ 
perception o f other people’s actions. It has, for example, been suggested that infants’ 
perception o f others’ actions as object-directed (Som m erville et al., 2005; Sommerville & 
W oodward, 2005) and their ability to im itate an action (Paulus et al., in press-c) depend on
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their own capacity to perform these actions themselves. Furtherm ore, electrophysiological 
evidence has been provided for m otor activation in infants and children, w hen they observe 
actions that are in their m otor repertoire (Lepage & Theoret, 2006; van E lk et al., 2008). Our 
findings extend this knowledge insofar as they clarify the exact role of m otor resonance in 
infants’ imitation. They show that m otor resonance forms a necessary, though not sufficient 
prerequisite for infants’ im itative learning from other people’s actions and their effects.
Although research has provided evidence of several factors that influence im itation in 
infancy, suggesting that infants’ im itation may be affected and subserved by various 
m echanism s (Jones, 2009), the question o f how  infants are able to learn from observed 
actions and their effects has w idely been neglected (cf. Brass & Heyes, 2005). Implicitly, it 
has been assum ed that infants can bridge the gap betw een them selves and others by m atching 
the actions o f others onto their own m otor repertoire (Elsner & Aschersleben, 2003; H auf et 
al., 2004; H auf & Aschersleben, 2008). W e provide evidence that the m echanism that 
supplies this essential basis for im itation in infancy m ight indeed be m otor resonance.
Furtherm ore, our results provide evidence that m otor resonance is not only an 
optional factor, but is a necessary m echanism  in infants’ im itative learning from observed 
action-effect contingencies. Paulus and colleagues (in press-c) have shown that by slightly 
changing the way of dem onstrating the head touch (Hands fre e  vs. Button  condition) and thus 
the level of induced m otor resonance the num ber of infants who are im itating the head action 
can be significantly reduced. W e m anipulated the Button  condition in our novel H ea d  Effect 
and H ea d  Only conditions by giving the infants additional cues that only a head touch, but 
not a hand action can elicit the salient effect. Even though it has been shown that infants are 
able to profit from such explicit dem onstrations in pedagogical situations (Kiraly, 2009; cf. 
Csibra & Gergely, 2009), infants largely failed to perform the head touch w hen subsequently 
having the opportunity to act on the lamp. Importantly, in all three novel conditions (H ead  
Effect, H ea d  O nly , N o  Effect) the num ber of infants w ho im itated the head touch was about 
the same and was significantly smaller com pared to the H ands fre e  condition. W e therefore 
propose that m otor resonance is an obligatory m echanism  involved in infants’ im itative 
learning from other people’s actions and their effects. Only w hen infants are able to map the 
perceived actions o f others onto their own m otor repertoire (see also Hommel et al., 2001), 
can they acquire novel action-effect associations through observation.
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Our results also provide evidence for the role o f action effects in infants’ and 
children’s im itation in general (Elsner et al., 2004; H auf & Aschersleben, 2008; see also 
Bekkering, W ohlschläger, & Gattis, 2000; Gleissner, M eltzoff, & Bekkering, 2000; 
W ohlschläger et al., 2003). N ote that the action perform ed by the model in the N o Effect 
condition was exactly the same as in the H ands fre e  condition, but that the conditions differed 
insofar, as only in the H ands fre e  condition the action was followed by a salient effect. The 
withdrawal o f the salient action effect drastically reduced how many infants im itated the head 
touch. This result is in line w ith findings that em phasize the role o f action effects in infants’ 
im itation (for a review  see Elsner, 2007).
In all conditions, infants also displayed frequent hand actions in addition to the head 
touches. There m ight be tw o reasons for the occurrence o f these hand actions: On the one 
hand, infants’ hand actions could be exploratory mechanism s in the service o f manually 
exam ining the novel object. Research on infants’ actions w ith novel objects has shown that 
slapping, hitting, and tipping the surfaces o f heavy objects belong to the repertoire o f 
exploratory actions in infancy (Paulus & Hauf, in press). On the other hand, one could apply 
the ideom otor principle also to the occurrences o f hand actions in the head touch imitation 
task (Paulus et al., in press-c). A ccording to the ideom otor principle, an intended goal directly 
elicits the m otor program  that is m ost strongly associated w ith it (W ohlschläger et al., 2003). 
It is reasonable to assume that using the hands to switch on the light is the default mode for 
this kind o f action (e.g., pressing a button to get an effect). W e suggest that besides the 
already established link w ith the hand action, infants in the H ands fre e  condition perceived a 
stronger match between the head action o f the model and their own m otor repertoire, w hich 
enabled them  to build a new action-effect association in the dem onstration phase. As this 
m otor program  becam e thus linked w ith the light effect, it was subsequently also activated 
w hen the infants w ere trying to obtain the desired effect. A ccording to this model, it 
competed w ith the activation of the hands’ m otor program  and, eventually, led to the more 
frequent occurrence o f head touches in this condition (for sim ilar approaches, stressing a 
dynamic com petition betw een effectors, see also Erlhagen & Schöner, 2002; Thelen & Smith, 
1994).
Although our results provide evidence for the role o f m otor resonance and action 
effects in infants’ imitation, it is striking that even in the H ands fre e  condition only 74% of 
the infants im itated the head touch. This suggests that other factors have to be considered, 
such as infants’ previous experiences w ith certain learning environm ents (e.g., Jones &
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Herbert, 2008), m om entary m otivational states like tiredness, or memory capacity of infants 
(e.g., Kolling, Goertz, Frahsek, & Knopf, 2009).
On the other hand, 26% or more of the infants im itated the head touch in the four 
conditions in which either m otor resonance was reduced or the light effect was absent. One 
could interpret this finding as evidence that m otor resonance and salient action effects are 
important, though not necessary mechanisms. However, this proportion m ight represent 
infants’ basic inclination to act on the lamp w ith their head, maybe as a part of infants’ 
explanatory actions (e.g., m outhing an object; Paulus & Hauf, in press; see also Jones, 2009). 
This interpretation is supported by recent findings o f  Zmyj and colleagues (2009) who 
examined 1-year-old infants’ behavior in a baseline condition of the head touch imitation 
task. In this condition, infants were presented w ith the light box w ithout having seen any 
demonstration. Interestingly, approxim ately 20% o f the infants perform ed a head touch on the 
lamp. A  com parable num ber of infants perform ed the head touch w hen either motor 
resonance was reduced or the light effect was absent. This finding is in line w ith our 
hypothesis that infants’ im itation relies on the interplay of m otor resonance and salient action 
effects.
4.1 A two-stage model of imitation in infancy
Altogether, our study provides empirical support for our tw o-stage model of infants’ ability to 
learn and imitate observed action-effect contingencies (for a com parable model concerning 
action control see Elsner & Hommel, 2001). W e suggest that first a mechanism  o f m otor 
resonance is necessary to overcome the correspondence problem (cf. Brass & Heyes, 2005). 
In this first step, the perception o f an action that is part o f the infants’ m otor repertoire leads 
to the activation o f the same action (e.g., van E lk et al., 2008).
Second, i f  m apping o f others’ actions onto the infants’ m otor repertoire is possible, 
the activated m otor program can be associated w ith the cognitive representation of a 
concurrently perceived action effect. In other words, i f  a dem onstrated action is accom panied 
by a salient action effect, the activation of the infants’ own m otor response is linked to the 
representation of the action effect so that subsequently the corresponding m otor program  gets 
activated, w hen infants aim to retrieve this effect them selves (cf. Hommel et al., 2001).
Although it was not the focus of our research, the previous statements raise the question of 
how m otor resonance develops during early infancy. On the one hand, it can be argued that
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m otor resonance rests upon infants’ ability to represent their own as well as others’ bodies in 
a common, intermodal representational form at w hich they m ight posses from very early on 
(M eltzoff & M oore, 1989) or a com m on coding o f perception and action in a com m ensurable 
form at (Hommel et al., 2001; Prinz, 1997). This would enable infants to match observed 
movem ents onto their kinesthetic representation of own actions and allow im itation of even 
very young infants (e.g., M eltzoff & M oore, 1977). On the other hand, it has been suggested 
that m otor resonance is based on H ebbian learning (Ray & Heyes, in press). M ore 
specifically, it has been proposed that by observing the consequences of their own actions 
(e.g., m oving an arm) the representation o f these action effects (e.g., the visual perception o f 
the m oving arm) will be linked to the m otor code. W hen the same action (e.g., an arm 
movem ent) is subsequently perform ed by another person and perceived by the observer, the 
activation of the perceptual code will automatically activate the associated m otor code 
(Catmur, W alsh, & Heyes, 2007; Del Giudice, M anera, & Keysers, 2009; see also Barresi & 
M oore, 2008). Further research is necessary to investigate these possibilities. However, 
w hatever the precise developmental origin of m otor resonance may be, our results suggest 
that it plays a fundam ental role in infants’ ability to im itate and to learn from the actions of 
others.
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Chapter 9
Action-effect binding by observational learning
Based on:
Paulus, M., van Dam, W ., Hunnius, S., Lindem ann, O. & Bekkering, H. (submitted). Action­
effect binding by observational learning. M anuscript submitted for publication.
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Abstract
The acquisition o f bidirectional action-effect associations plays a central role in the ability to 
control actions. H um ans learn about actions not only through active experience, but also 
through observing the actions o f others. This study examined w hether action-effect 
associations can be acquired by observational learning. To this end, participants observed 
how a model repeatedly pressed tw o buttons during an observation phase. Each o f the button 
presses led to a specific tone. W hen in a subsequent test phase the tones served as stimuli, to 
which the participants had to respond w ith button presses, they perform ed faster w hen the 
stim ulus-response m apping in the test phase w as com patible w ith the action-effect m apping 
o f the observation phase. A  second experim ent controlled for the possibility that the results 
m ight be due to the association o f spatial perceptual features (i.e., left or right) w ith the 
particular tone, and shows that the observation o f a real action is necessary to acquire novel 
action-effect associations. Altogether, the study provides evidence for the claim that 
bidirectional action-effect associations can be acquired by observational learning. W e discuss 
the possibility that the acquisition o f action-effect associations through observation is an 
im portant cognitive m echanism  subserving the hum an ability for social learning.
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1. Introduction
An influential account on action control has proposed that actions are controlled through 
bidirectional action-effect associations (Elsner & Hommel, 2001; Hommel, M üsseler, 
Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001; Kühn, Elsner, Prinz, & Brass, 2009; Kunde, Hoffmann, & 
Zellm ann, 2002). A ccording to this ideom otor approach, actions are represented in term s o f 
their sensory consequences and action knowledge is acquired through the repeated experience 
o f co-occurrences o f actions and their effects (cf. Hommel, 1997). The cognitive 
representations o f intentional actions are therefore characterized by the associations o f m otor 
codes w ith the representations o f their sensory consequences (i.e., sensory codes). As the 
intention to elicit a particular sensory effect is assum ed to activate directly the m otor program 
associated w ith this effect, acquired action-effect associations can be later used for the control 
o f actions (Hommel, 2009).
Evidence for this notion has, for example, been provided by Elsner and Hommel 
(2001). Participants had to press buttons as a response to a visual stimulus and experienced 
the co-occurrence o f their button presses w ith specific tones. Importantly, these tones were 
irrelevant to the participants’ task. In a subsequent test phase, participants w ere presented 
w ith both tones again. This tim e they were asked to press the buttons in response to the tones, 
which had previously followed the button presses. It could be shown that participants’ 
responses w ere facilitated w hen the preceding tone had previously been the consequence of 
this action (i.e., were perceived as effect o f the action), indicating that the perception o f the 
tone activated the corresponding m otor program.
However, action knowledge is not only acquired through active action experiences, 
but also through the observation o f other people’s actions (e.g., Blandin, Lhuisset, & Proteau, 
1999; Cross, Kraemer, de C. Hamilton, Kelley, & Grafton, 2009; see also Bandura, 1977), 
suggesting that we use observed inform ation about other people’s actions and their effects to 
control our own actions. The claim that all actions are cognitively represented and selected in 
term s o f their effects (e.g., Hommel et al., 2001), and the findings that people acquire action 
knowledge not only through active action experiences but also through the observation o f 
other people’s actions, leads thus to the hypothesis that bidirectional action-effect 
associations can also be acquired by observational learning. Importantly, to employ observed 
action-effect contingencies for our own action control, we need to relate our own m otor codes 
to the cognitive representation o f the observed effect o f another person’s action. Previous
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research has shown that the mere perception o f another’s action facilitates the execution o f 
the same action in the observer’s m otor repertoire (i.e., m otor resonance; Brass, Bekkering, 
W ohlschläger, & Prinz, 2000; Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, & Rizzolatti, 1995). Considering these 
findings o f automatic m otor activation during action observation, we propose that novel 
action-effect associations can also be acquired through observation. In particular, we suggest 
that during the observation o f another person’s actions and the effects o f these actions, 
sensory codes (i.e., the representation o f the observed effect) and m otor codes (i.e., the 
representation o f the observed m ovem ent) can becom e associated and a new  bidirectional 
action-effect association can thus be acquired.
In the present study we integrated the ideas of observational learning and ideom otor 
action control. W e examined w hether the observation o f another person’s actions and their 
effects results in an incidental learning o f action-effect associations that m odulates 
subsequent action execution as it has been shown for the acquisition o f such associations 
through own action experiences (Elsner & Hommel, 2001). In an action observation phase, 
the participants observed another actor pressing tw o buttons that triggered tw o different 
auditory effects. In a subsequent test phase, the same tones were presented as stimuli to 
which the participants had to react as quickly as possible w ith button presses. I f  responses are 
faster in a condition in which the stim ulus-response mapping in the test phase is compatible 
w ith the action-effect m apping in the observation phase as com pared to a condition w ith the 
reversed mapping, this would provide evidence for the notion that participants are able to 
acquire action-effect associations via social learning.
2. Experiment 1
2.1 Method
2.1.1 Participants
A total o f 24 students o f the Radboud U niversity Nijm egen (18 -  31 years; 6 male) 
participated in the experim ent in return for 8 euros or course credits.
2.1.2 Set-up and stimuli
A LED device w as used to present the visual stimuli in the observation phase to the 
participant and the experimenter. The device contained tw o displays (77 x 18mm), one facing
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the participant and the other facing the experim enter (see Figure 1). The participant was not 
able to see the display o f the experimenter. Both participants w ere seated at a view ing 
distance o f approxim ately 75 cm. Visual stimuli consisted o f left- and right-pointing 
arrowheads. The device was positioned in the m iddle o f a table and oriented along the table’s 
longer edge. A t the left and right hand side o f the device were tw o buffer buttons (diam eter 5 
cm; 3.5 cm high). Initially, the buttons w ere positioned close to the experim enter’s side o f the 
table. One o f the buttons was red, the other one black. Auditory stimuli w ere 400-H z and 
800-Hz tones, presented for 200 ms sim ultaneously through tw o speakers to the left and right 
side o f the participant. The experim ent w as controlled by Presentation (Neurobehavioral 
Systems, USA).
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Figure 1. Schematic overview of the experimental setup showing actor (bottom) and observer (top). 
2.1.3 Procedure and Design
O bservation  phase. Participants were introduced to the experim enter and seated opposite to 
him. On the displays o f the LED device, arrowheads w ere presented at the beginning o f each 
trial. The experim enter perform ed left and right button press responses as instructed via the 
arrowheads on his display. Each button triggered one o f tw o different sound effects (i.e., low 
or high pitch). In about 20 % o f the trials (randomly distributed) the arrowheads on the two 
sides o f the LED device pointed in tw o different directions.
Participants were inform ed that the tones were irrelevant to the task (cf. E lsner & 
Hommel, 2001). They were instructed to closely observe the experim enter’s actions and
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count the incorrect responses. To be precise, we asked participants to count how often the 
experim enter perform ed a button-press on the side, w hich had not been indicated by the 
arrowhead on the participants’ display. Importantly, these “incorrect responses” did not affect 
the action-effect m apping betw een action and tone, as the button presses w ere always coupled 
to the same tones. Participants were provided w ith a pen and a sheet o f paper. Every time 
they registered a mistake, they had cross out one o f a row/colum n/list o f circles on the sheet.
Each observation trial started with a fixation cross o f 500 ms. A fter an inter-stim ulus 
interval o f 1000 ms, an arrowhead w as presented. It rem ained visible until the experim enter 
pressed one o f the tw o buttons. 50 ms after the experim enter’s response, the corresponding 
tone was presented. The next trial started after an inter-trial interval o f 1500 ms.
The observation phase com prised 300 trials composed o f the factorial com bination of 
two pointing directions o f the arrowheads and the accuracy o f the experim enter’s 
perform ance (i.e., 80% correct trials, 20%  “m istakes”). Trials were presented in a random ized 
order. The action-effect m apping was counterbalanced across participants. So for ha lf o f the 
participants the right button-press elicited a high tone and the left button-press a low  tone 
(M apping A), whereas the action-effect m apping was reversed for the other half o f the 
participants (M apping B).
Test phase. The procedure for the test phase followed the one o f E isner’s and H om m el’s 
study (2001). The buttons were positioned in front o f the participant, before the experim enter 
left the room. Participants were asked to discriminate between the presented tones and to 
react as quickly and correctly as possible by pressing one o f the tw o buttons. Participants 
were randomly assigned to one o f tw o stim ulus-response (S-R) m apping conditions. In the 
com patible S-R condition, the S-R-mapping was the same m apping betw een response and 
tone as the participants had experienced in the observation phase. In the incom patible 
condition, the relation betw een action-effect m apping and S-R-mapping w as reversed and 
participants had to respond to the tone with the opposite button press than the one associated 
w ith the tone in the observation phase. Responses had to be given w ithin 2,000 ms. The inter­
trial interval was 1500 ms.
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The test phase consisted o f 100 randomly ordered trials (50 high and 50 low  tone). 
H alf o f the participants in each condition had experienced action-effect m apping A  in the 
observation phase and the other half had experienced action-effect m apping B.
2.2 Results
Reaction times (RTs) were measured relative to the onset o f the tones (see Figure 2 for 
means). Trials w ith incorrect responses, no responses, and trials w ith RTs deviating more 
than tw o standard deviations o f the mean RT w ere excluded from the subsequent analyses. 
The 100 trials w ere divided into three blocks consisting o f either 33 or 34 trials each. M ean 
RTs were calculated and submitted to an analysis o f variance (ANOVA) w ith the between- 
subjects factor Compatibility (compatible, incom patible) and the w ithin-subjects factor Block 
(1, 2, 3). The RT analysis revealed a main effect o f Compatibility, F (1, 22)=7.86, p= .01, 
r |p2=0.26, showing that the response latencies in the com patible group (371 ms) were 
significantly faster than latencies in the incom patible group (427 ms). There were no other 
significant effects (all other p s  > .25).
Figure 2. Mean reaction times in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. Dark bars represent reaction times 
in the compatible, light bars in the incompatible conditions. Error bars indicate the standard errors.
2.3 Discussion
The aim o f Experim ent 1 was to investigate w hether bidirectional action-effect associations 
can be acquired by observing other people’s actions and the effects o f those actions. It was
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observed that participants pressed buttons faster w hen the stim ulus-response m apping in a 
test phase was com patible w ith the action-effect m apping o f another person’s actions (i.e. in 
an observation phase) than w hen the stim ulus-response m apping was reversed. This suggests 
that the observed action-effect contingencies affected participants’ subsequent action 
execution and that participants thus had acquired action-effect associations through 
observational learning.
Experim ent 2 was designed to investigate w hether the observation o f a real action is 
necessary to acquire novel action-effect contingencies or w hether the mere be lief that an 
observed effect w as caused by another person’s action would be sufficient (cf. Sebanz, 
Knoblich, & Prinz, 2005). To investigate this question, participants in Experim ent 2 
experienced the co-occurrences o f two visual stimuli (i.e., yellow  circles) on the right or left 
side o f a com puter screen, w hich was placed in front o f them, and tw o auditory events (i.e., a 
low  and a high tone). By means o f a cover story, participants w ere lead to believe that the 
yellow  circles on the left and right side o f the screen indicated another hum an agent’s left or 
right button presses (b e lie f instruction  condition). I f  participants indeed acquire action-effect 
associations through observational learning and i f  the mere im agination o f an action is 
sufficient, one would expect the same effects as in Experim ent 1. In other words, we would 
expect that participants associate the action w ith the subsequently presented auditory effect.
However, an alternative explanation for the faster response execution in the 
com patible condition o f Experim ent 1 could be that the participants m erely associated two 
perceptual features; a spatial perceptual feature (e.g., left) w ith the particular tone (e.g., low 
tone). W hen this tone was presented again in the test phase, participants m ight have reacted 
faster w ith the corresponding button press because the perception o f this specific tone primed 
actions on the side that had been associated w ith it. That would mean that participants’ 
facilitated response execution was the result o f a previously acquired association o f 
visuospatial feature codes w ith different sounds (i.e., perceptual associations), rather than due 
to the acquisition o f action-effect associations.
To exclude this possibility, h a lf o f the participants in Experim ent 2 follow ed the same 
protocol as the participants in the b e lie f instruction  condition with the only difference that no 
cover story was presented to them  (com puter instruction  condition). That means that the 
participants experienced the co-occurrences o f the visual stimuli (i.e., yellow  circles) and the 
auditory stimuli (i.e., tones) w ithout linking these events to an action. I f  the effect o f
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Experim ent 1 is only driven by an association o f visuospatial feature codes w ith different 
sounds the com puter instruction  condition should result in the same pattern o f effects (i.e., a 
facilitation for the com patible condition). If, however, the effect o f Experim ent 1, is due to 
the acquisition o f action-effect associations, i.e., a specific button press leads to a specific 
auditory action effect, no facilitation effects would be expected for this condition betw een a 
com patible and a reversed condition.
3. Experiment 2
3.1 Method
3.1.1 Participants
A total o f 48 students o f the Radboud University N ijm egen (1 8 - 33 years; 12 male) 
participated in the experim ent in return for 8 euros or course credits.
3.1.2 Set-up and stimuli
In contrast to Experim ent 1, participants w ere seated in front o f a com puter screen w ith no 
other person present in the room. In the screen, white left- or right-pointing arrowheads were 
displayed centrally on a black background. Additionally, a yellow  circle appeared either on 
the right or left side o f the screen. The interstim ulus-interval (ISI) betw een arrowheads and 
the yellow  circles was random, varying between 250 ms and 1250 ms (matching the 
confederate’s perform ance in Experim ent 1). Auditory effects and response buttons w ere the 
same as in Experim ent 1.
3.1.3 Procedure and Design
O bservation  p h a se . The procedure was sim ilar to Experim ent 1. Instead o f a hum an model 
pressing the right or left button as a response to the arrowheads, participants in both 
conditions o f Experim ent 2 (com puter instruction, b e lie f instruction) viewed yellow  circles 
that were presented on the left or right side o f a com puter screen. Each appearance o f a circle 
was followed by a tone. As in Experim ent 1, participants were asked to indicate mismatches 
as in 20 % o f the trials the right pointing arrowheads w ere followed by a circle on the left 
hand side and vice versa.
Importantly, the participants o f the b e lie f instruction  condition were scheduled in pairs
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o f tw o people. W hen they arrived at the lab, they w ere told that they w ere going to perform a 
task together on tw o different computers. Each o f them  was brought into a separate room and 
subsequently instructed like the first ha lf o f the participants, w ith the im portant difference 
that they were told that the tw o yellow  circles were caused by a button press o f the other 
person. In other words, before the observation phase started, the experim enter dem onstrated 
that the yellow  circles could be caused by a button press (e.g., pressing the right button 
caused a circle to appear on the right side o f the screen). Then they w ere told that in the first 
phase o f the experim ent their partner would perform a reaction tim e task, namely pressing 
buttons as a reaction to the arrowheads on the screen. Participants w ere told that their screen 
was an exact copy o f their partner’s screen so that they were able to see the arrowheads as 
well as their partner’s reactions to them as indicated by the yellow  circles.
Test phase. The test phase w as identical to Experim ent 1.
3.2 Results
M ean RTs w ere calculated and submitted to an analysis o f variance (ANOVA) w ith the 
between-subjects factors Com patibility (compatible, incom patible) and Instruction 
(computer, belief) and the w ithin-subjects factor B lock (1, 2, 3). The analysis revealed a main 
effect o f block, F (2, 43)=7.76, p < .01, r |p2=0.27, but no m ain effect o f  Compatibility, F<  1, or 
Instruction, F (1, 44)=2,47, p=. 12, riP2=0.05, and no interaction effect betw een Compatibility 
and Instruction , F<1 (see Figure 1). As post hoc t-tests revealed, response latencies in the 
first block w ere significantly slower (390 ms) than latencies in the second block (369 ms) and 
the third block (371 ms), t(47)=3.94, p <  .001 and t(47)=3.07, p <  .01 respectively. This 
indicates that participants becam e faster over time, suggesting a practice effect.
To investigate w hether the null effect in Experim ent 2 was due to a lack o f power, we 
perform ed a post-hoc power analysis (cf. Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). Given the 
conventional level o f statistical significance o f a=.05 and a sample size o f 48 participants, a 
post-hoc power analysis revealed an excellent statistical power o f (1-P) = .98 for the detection 
o f a compatibility main effect o f n 2=0.23 (i.e. that is in the same size than the effect observed 
in Experim ent 1). This suggests that the power o f Experim ent 2 w as large enough to detect 
possible differences between the conditions.
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3.3 Discussion
The results o f Experim ent 2 show that participants did not react faster in the com patible than 
in the incom patible condition -  neither in the Com puter instruction  condition nor in the B elie f  
instruction  condition. This suggests that no bidirectional action-effect-association was 
acquired.
In particular, the aim o f Experim ent 2 was two-folded. First, it was exam ined w hether 
the acquisition o f an association between tones and the spatial perceptual features o f left and 
right affected the subsequent responses to buttons on the left and right side o f the participant, 
w hen responses were produced due to signalling by the tones (Com puter instruction  
condition). Second, we tested w hether the mere be lief that these spatial perceptual features 
were the consequences o f another person’s actions allowed participants to acquire action­
effect associations through observational learning and w hether participants reacted faster in a 
com patible condition than in an incom patible condition (B elief instruction  condition).
The fact that participants did not react faster in the com patible com pared to  the 
incom patible condition allows tw o conclusions: first, a perceptual prim ing o f the spatial 
features left or right does not lead to a facilitation o f an action in the left or right action space. 
This suggests that the participant’s faster reaction in the com patible condition o f Experim ent 
1 cannot be due to simple perceptual prim ing o f a previously acquired association between a 
tone and a visuospatial feature, but is due to the acquisition o f action-effect contingencies. 
Second, only the belief that a stimulus event on the left or right hand side o f a screen and the 
subsequently presented tones are the consequences o f another person’s actions, does not lead 
to the acquisition o f action-effect associations. This finding highlights the significance o f real 
action observation and their effects.
4. General Discussion
The present study shows that bidirectional action-effect associations can also be acquired 
through the observation o f other people’s actions and their effects and thereby extends the 
ideom otor approach to the realm o f observational learning. In the following paragraphs the 
im plications o f the present findings for notions regarding the acquisition o f stim ulus-response 
(S-R) m appings and for social learning theories will be discussed.
In the past decades research has provided plenty o f evidence that humans are able to
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acquire S-R m appings (for an overview see Ormrod, 1999). Furtherm ore, recent research has 
shown that an acquired action-effect m apping affect participants’ subsequent perform ance in 
a S-R task, w hen the previous effect o f an action served as the stimulus to which participants 
had to respond w ith the same action (Elsner & Hommel, 2001; K unde et al., 2002). O ur study 
adds to these results the finding that also observed actions perform ed by others and their 
effects affect subsequent S-R tasks. Importantly, these effects are only present w hen the 
associations are experienced in an action-context. The absence o f this effect in the second 
experiment, in w hich participants merely believed or im agined that an outcome w as caused 
by another person’s action, indicates that only an observed action leads to the activation o f a 
m otor code in the observer’s cognitive system, which could subsequently be related to the 
representation o f the action’s effect. This corresponds to recent findings that suggest that a 
pure im agination o f a goal-directed action does not lead to an action representation that is 
comparable to the observation o f a goal-directed action (Caettano, Caruana, Jezzini, & 
Rizzolatti, 2009). Together, our results extend thus classical learning theories by showing that 
associations betw een actions and their sensory consequences are bidirectional and that the 
perception o f a previous action effect has an im pact on subsequent behavior.
Our finding has im portant im plications for social learning theories (e.g., Bandura, 
1977; M iller & Dollard, 1941), as it suggests a cognitive m echanism  that enables humans to 
learn through the observation o f others’ actions. W hereas previous research has shown that 
humans are able to learn through observation (e.g., Cross et al., 2009), the cognitive basis 
behind this ability has remained largely unclear. In other words, how can people learn 
through the observation o f other people’s actions and the consequences o f these actions, 
enabling them  to avoid costly learning by trial and error? Based on our current findings we 
suggest that the acquisition o f bidirectional action-effect associations m ight be a crucial 
m echanism  that allows humans to acquire novel action knowledge through the observation o f 
others’ actions.
In particular, we suggest that the perception o f an action leads to the activation o f the 
same m otor code in the observer’s own m otor repertoire. W hen the effect o f this action is 
perceived concurrently w ith the action, the representation o f the effect (perceptual code) will 
be associated w ith the activated m otor code, leading to the acquisition o f a novel action-effect 
association (cf. Paulus, Hunnius, Vissers, & Bekkering, in press-b). W hen on a later occasion 
the same effect is perceived or intended and the perceptual code is thus activated, the 
associated m otor code will also be activated, leading to or facilitating the execution o f the
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action (Hommel et al., 2001). W e propose that the acquisition o f bidirectional action-effect 
associations through observational means m ight play an im portant role in the uniquely human 
ability for social learning and im itation o f such different behaviours, such as aggressive 
behavioural tendencies in children (e.g., Bandura, Ross, & Ross, 1961) or the acquisition o f 
novel action knowledge as already seen in infancy (Elsner & Aschersleben, 2003; Paulus et 
al., in press-c). Future research is needed to examine the scope and lim itations o f this 
cognitive m echanism  as well as possibly differences betw een observationally acquired 
action-effect associations and the ones that are acquired through active action experiences.
In sum, the present study demonstrates an influence o f observed action-effect 
contingencies on own action execution. Our results suggest that bidirectional action-effect 
associations can be acquired via observation and that this cognitive m echanism might 
underlie the hum an ability for social learning.
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Chapter 10
How do infants learn through the observation of others’ actions? 
A study on the neural basis o f social learning in infancy
Based on:
Paulus, M., Hunnius, S., & Bekkering, H. (in prep.). H ow do infants learn through the 
observation o f  o th e rs ’ actions? A study on the neural basis o f  soc ia l learning in infancy. 
M anuscript in preparation.
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Abstract
Transm ission o f knowledge is one o f the reasons for hum an evolutionary success. Research 
has provided evidence that already hum an infants possess em inent social learning abilities. 
However, the neurocognitive m echanism s subserving this ability are unknown. W e propose 
that infants’ social learning is based on the acquisition o f bidirectional action-effect 
associations through observation. In line w ith this, we dem onstrate that 8-m onth-old infants 
display m otor activation w hen they perceive a sound that had previously been the effect o f 
another person’s action, but not w hen the sound w as learned outside an action-observation 
context, or was not presented before at all. This suggests that learned associations between 
cortical m otor areas and areas that are involved in the processing o f perceptual effects form 
the neural basis o f social learning in infancy.
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1. Introduction
The human ability for the intergenerational transm ission o f knowledge is considered one o f 
the reasons for hum an evolutionary success (Gould, 1979). Importantly, unlike m em bers o f 
m ost other species (e.g., Thorndike, 1911), humans already possess em inent social learning 
capabilities in infancy (M oore, 2006; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & M oll, 2005). 
Striking examples o f early social learning are provided by studies on infants’ im itation. These 
behavioral studies show that from early on in life, infants are able to learn from the 
observation o f others’ actions (e.g., E lsner & Aschersleben, 2003; M eltzoff, 1988; Piaget, 
1962). But w hich neural mechanism s enable social learning in infancy?
It has been suggested that the acquisition o f novel action representations is based on 
learned associations between m otor codes and effect codes (i.e. bidirectional action-effect 
associations; e.g., Del Giudice et al., 2008; E lsner & Hommel, 2001; Keysers & Perrett, 
2004). For example, w hen someone cracks a nut, he also perceives the sound resulting from 
this action. By means o f H ebbian learning, the m otor code and the effect code becom e 
associated. It has been suggested that such action-effect associations underlie the voluntary 
control o f actions (Hommel, M usseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001). Furtherm ore, i f  the 
typical sound associated w ith the action is perceived at a later date, this leads to an activation 
in the m otor system (i.e. m otor resonance), indicating the existence o f an action 
representation. Em pirical support for this m echanism  comes from studies on human action 
control (Elsner & Hommel, 2001) and the m irror neuron system (MNS; Rizzolatti & 
Craighero, 2004). For example, it has been shown that the prem otor cortex in macaque 
m onkeys is not only active w hen they perform a hand action, but also w hen they hear the 
typical action-related sound (e.g., cracking a peanut; K ohler et al., 2002). However, research 
has so far mainly concentrated on the acquisition o f action knowledge through first-hand 
action experiences.
Hum an infants are also already able to acquire novel action representations by 
observation. W e propose that the mechanism, which subserves this ability is the acquisition 
o f action-effect associations through the observation o f others’ actions and their 
consequences. On a neuronal level, this should be im plem ented as associations between brain 
areas that are involved in m otor control and areas that are involved in the processing o f 
perceptual effects (Elsner et al., 2002; M elcher et al., 2008). Follow ing this theoretical 
notion, we hypothesize that infants should also display cortical m otor activation w hen they
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perceive a sound that has previously been the consequence o f another person’s action. To 
investigate this hypothesis, we perform ed an EEG  study w ith 9-m onth-old infants.
2. METHOD
2.1 Participants
The final sample consisted o f 11 infants (range: 8 months, 25 days to 9 months, 24 days; 
average: 287 days; 4 boys). Seven infants w ere tested but not included in the final sample due 
to equipm ent failure (n=1), parental interference (n=2) or fussiness (n=4). Participants were 
recruited from public birth records and were healthy, full-term  infants w ithout any pre- or 
perinatal complications. Informed consent for participation was given by the infants’ parents. 
The fam ilies received a baby book or monetary compensation for their participation.
2.2 Stimuli
The experimental material o f the training phase consisted o f three identical cylindric objects 
(d= 4.5 cm; h= 6 cm; see Figure 1) as well as voice recorders (Voicetracer 600, Philips, 
Germany). The cylindric objects were made out o f red plastic. They could be used as rattles 
and produced three different sounds w hen shaken (due to their content which could be a bell, 
a couple o f metal disks or screws). Each voice recorder contained a recording o f one o f the 
three sounds, so that they could be played to the infants. The voice recorders w ere inserted 
into cylindrical plastic boxes that served as containers. This enabled parents to put the voice 
recorders on the table in a stable position.
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Figure 1. Figure 1 shows the objects used in the training phase of the study, the rattle (left) and the 
container in which the voice recorder was inserted (right).
The stimulus material o f the test phase consisted o f recordings o f the same three 
sounds. Each stimulus lasted for 2000ms. The auditory stimuli w ere recorded digitally using 
a M O TU  828ml2 audio interface on a M acPro and an A KG-3000 condenser microphone. 
Recordings were made in an acoustically isolated room at 16-bit, 44,100 KHz quality. They 
were controlled for pitch and loudness. To m aintain the child’s attention and to avoid head 
movem ents during in the test phase, geom etric shapes w ere presented randomly as 
background pictures on a com puter screen.
2.3 Procedure and Design
Training Phase. Infants and parents were visited at hom e by the experim enter and 
handed over one o f the rattles and one voice recorder. Parents were instructed about the 
training procedure verbally and by means o f a w ritten training schedule. They were asked to 
train their infant for 5 minutes each with the rattle and the voice recorder for 7 consecutive 
days. The rattle training consisted o f shaking the rattle in front o f the infant at a distance o f 
approxim ately 1 to 2 meters, w hich would be close enough to ensure the infant’s attention but 
out o f his or her reach. For the training w ith the voice recorder, the container was placed at
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approxim ately the same distance. It was switched on by a caregiver so that the sound was 
played. Parents were instructed to rem ove any other toys from the infant and to avoid any 
other sounds in the background (e.g., radio) during the training w ith the rattle and the voice 
recorder. To ensure compliance w ith the instructions, parents were asked to confirm  the exact 
training tim es every day on the printed training schedule and provide inform ation about how 
their infant reacted to the stimuli.
It was counterbalanced within participants and betw een days w ith w hich object the 
training started (i.e. rattle or voice recorder). M oreover, it was balanced between participants 
which o f the three sounds served as the action-related sound (AS; caused by shaking the 
rattle), the non-action related sound (NAS; played from the voice recorder), and the control 
sound (CS; not used during the training phase).
Test Phase. The study was set up as a w ithin-subjects design and participants were 
presented w ith all three auditory stimuli. The test session was scheduled one day after the last 
training session. During the EEG  m easurem ent session, the infant was seated in an infant seat 
that was placed in front o f a com puter monitor. The parent was sitting behind the infant. A 
loudspeaker was located behind the screen. The three auditory stimuli (i.e. AS, NAS, CS) 
were presented in a pseudo-random ized order (i.e. the same stimulus was never presented 
more than two tim es in a row) using the software Presentation 11.07 (Neurobehavioral 
Systems, USA). The abstract geom etrical figures were displayed on the screen in a random 
order that was unrelated to the auditory stimuli. The experim ent was conducted until the child 
lost attention, started crying or fell asleep. During the test phase, video recordings o f the 
infants were made.
EEG  was recorded using an infant-size cap w ith 30 active Ag/AgCl electrodes 
(EasyCap, Germany) w ith a layout following the 10/20 system using a BrainAm p AC 
am plifier w ith a band-pass filter o f 0.1-125 Hz at a sampling rate o f 500 Hz. All electrodes 
were referenced online to a central reference electrode and rereferenced offline to an average 
over all electrodes. EEG  data was analyzed using Brain V ision A nalyzer (Brain Products, 
Germany).
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2.4 Analysis
As the stimuli were presented for 2000 ms per trial, the EEG  data was segm ented into 
2000 ms tim e frames per trial for further analysis. Trials w ith artifacts were rejected by 
m eans o f the automatic artifact rejection function o f Brain Vision A nalyzer (maximum 
difference o f values in a segment 300 microvolt). On average, 14% o f all trials were excluded 
from further analysis, leaving on average 26.8 trials per infant and per condition. A  two-w ay 
repeated measures analysis o f variance (ANOVA) w ith the w ithin-subject factors Hem isphere 
(C3, C4) and Sound Condition (AS, NAS, CS) and num ber o f included trials as dependent 
variable revealed only a significant effect o f Hemisphere, F(1,10)=8.226, p< .05 (all other p s  
> .47), showing that more trials were recorded for C3 (M  = 25.9, SE = 2.4) than for C4 (M  = 
27.9, SE = 2.8). Fast Fourier transform ations (FFTs) w ere conducted over each trial and 
grand averages were calculated for all three conditions (AS, NAS, CS). For the analyses, we 
selected the C3 and C4 electrodes as they are located above the left and right hemispherical 
cortical m otor regions. M u-frequency power was averaged over the 6 to9 Hz frequency band 
(Nystrom et al., in press; Reid et al., 2011). D ata were entered into a tw o-w ay repeated 
m easures analysis o f variance (ANOVA) w ith the w ithin-subject factors H em isphere (C3, 
C4) and Sound Condition (AS, NAS, CS).
To ensure that the differences in mu desynchronization between conditions w ere not 
due to differences in active movements, we coded infants’ m ovem ents from the video 
recordings. The data w ere analyzed on a fram e-by-fram e basis. Infants’ m ovem ents o f the 
hands and other limbs were coded for each trial on a four point scale (0: no movements; 1: 
low  activity; 2: m edium activity; 3: high activity; cf. Reid et al., 2011). H and m ovements 
were included as a separate variable as during the training phase the rattle sound m ight have 
been connected to the m otor program  o f the hands so that the perception o f the rattle sound 
m ight have facilitated hand m ovem ents (e.g., Gazzola, Aziz-Zadeh, & Keysers, 2006). For 
statistical analysis, the data o f the tw o dependent m easures (hand and other limb m ovements) 
were entered into a m ultivariate analysis o f variance (M ANOVA) w ith the within-subjects 
factor condition (AS, NAS, CS).
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3. Results
The analysis revealed only a significant main effect o f Sound Condition, 
F(2,20)=6.651,/?<0.01, rjp2= A 0  (all other />s>.40; see Figure 2). For further analysis, the data 
were averaged across hem ispheres (see Figure 3). Post-hoc t-tests revealed that mu- 
desynchronization was stronger in condition AS com pared to the conditions NAS and CS, 
t(10)=3.010, p= .01 and t(10)=3.078, p= .01, respectively, w hereas no significant difference 
was found betw een the latter tw o conditions, t(10)=0.098, p= .92. This shows that infants’ 
perception o f a sound that had previously been the effect o f another person’s action led to an 
activation o f their m otor system. The M A NO V A  on infants’ m ovem ents yielded no 
significant effect (F<1).
Figure 2. Topographic maps representing the differences in the EEG power spectrum between 
perception of AS and NAS (left picture) as well as AS and CS (right picture) in the mu-frequency 
band (6-9 Hz).
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Figure 3. Figure 3 displays the grand averaged EEG power for the mu-frequency band (6-9 Hz) for 
the three auditory stimuli AS (dark grey bar on the left), NAS (light grey bar in the middle), and CS 
(grey bar on the right) over the C3 and C4 electrode sites.
4. DISCUSSION
W e interpret this finding as evidence for the claim that infants acquired a novel action-effect 
association through observing another’s action. Furtherm ore, our result suggests that the 
neural basis o f this m echanism is learned association betw een cortical m otor areas and areas 
that are involved in the processing o f perceptual effects
Importantly, our result cannot be explained by differences betw een the three auditory 
stimuli, as their use as AS, NAS, and CS was counterbalanced between participants. 
Additionally, the fact that the desynchronization was significantly stronger for the action- 
related sound com pared to both another fam iliar sound the unfam iliar sound excludes the 
possibility that the desynchronization was m erely due to a fam iliarity or a novelty effect. 
Finally, there were no differences in infants’ m ovem ents betw een the conditions. It suggests 
that the differences in m u-desynchronization cannot be explained by actual differences in 
overt behavior.
Previous studies have shown that children (e.g., Eenshuistra, W eidema, & Hommel, 
2004; Kray, Eenshuistra, Kerstner, W eidema, & Hommel, 2006) and even infants (e.g.,
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Verschoor, W eidema, Biro, & Hommel, 2010; see also Chapter 3 o f this thesis) are able to 
acquire bidirectional action-effect associations. Furtherm ore, it has been suggested that the 
acquisition o f these associations plays an im portant role in intentional action control (Elsner, 
2007; Hommel et al., 2001). W hereas previous studies have suggested that infants indeed use 
knowledge about observed action effects in their subsequent action perform ances (e.g., Elsner 
& Aschersleben, 2003; H auf & Aschersleben, 2008), it rem ained unclear i f  infants are able to 
acquire action-effect associations through observational learning (as adults likely do; cf. 
Chapter 9 o f this thesis). The present findings adds thus to  recent research by providing 
evidence that infants o f 9 months o f age acquire novel action-effect associations through 
observing the actions o f others and their effects.
In particular, we suggest that the infants, while observing another person’s rattle 
action, ‘m irrored’ the action w ithin their own m otor repertoire (i.e. activated the 
corresponding m otor code). W hen they perceived the sound effect o f the rattle action, their 
representation o f the effect becam e associated w ith the activated m otor code (i.e. they 
acquired an action-effect associations). Subsequently, upon perceiving the rattle’s sound, it 
resulted in an activation o f cortical m otor areas (cf. E lsner et al., 2002; M elcher et al., 2008) 
and thus a desynchronization in the m u-frequency band (cf. M arshall & M eltzoff, 2011).
This study is the first to examine the neural mechanism s that underlie social learning 
in infancy. It provides direct evidence that infants are able to acquire bidirectional action­
effect associations not only through their own first-hand action experiences, but also through 
the observation o f others’ actions. As such bidirectional associations between actions and 
their effects underlie voluntary action control (Elsner & Hommel, 2001; Hommel et al., 
2001), infants’ acquisition o f such associations through observation enables them  to use 
socially acquired knowledge for their own action control, e.g. w hen im itating the observed 
action (Paulus, Hunnius, Vissers, & Bekkering, in press-b). W e suggest that this m echanism 
may form the basis o f human infants’ unique ability for social learning.
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„ Those who make a  pra c tice  o f  com paring human actions are never so p erp lex ed  as when  
they try to see them as a  w hole a n d  in the sam e light; fo r  they com m only contradict each  
other so  strangely that it seem s im possible that they have come from  the sam e shop."
(M ichel de M ontaigne, 1965, p. 239)
Summary and Epilogue
H ow  do children perceive others’ actions? H ow  do they process all the different m ovem ent- 
related information? H ow  do they use this inform ation to guide their own behavior? H ow  do 
they, in the course o f development, finally come to understand the intention behind an action? 
These are by no means trivial questions and are far from being conclusively understood in 
current psychological research.
The importance o f action perception in early social-cognitive developm ent has 
frequently been stressed. For example, it has been suggested that the developm ent o f action 
perception is related to a later understanding o f humans as intentional (Barresi & Moore, 
1996) and mental beings (Aschersleben, Hofer, & Jovanovic, 2008; Henning, Daum, & 
Aschersleben, 2009). Furtherm ore, the ability to predict others’ action is a prerequisite for 
smooth interactions w ith them  (cf. Bekkering et al., 2009; Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich,
2006). Finally, a close observation o f others’ behavior allows us to learn from others by 
im itating them  and thus to acquire novel knowledge w ithout costly learning through trial and 
error (e.g., Byrne & Russon, 1998).
Importantly, developmental research has shown that already very young infants are 
attentive to others’ actions (M oore, 2006). Further insight into children’s developing action 
perception has been provided over the last decade. It has, for example, been suggested that 
infants are already sensitive to different com ponents o f intentional action such as the goals o f 
others’ actions (W oodward, 1998) and the particular way in which those goals are achieved 
(Behne, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2005; Daum, Sommerville, & Prinz, 2009). 
Furtherm ore, it has been shown that infants are able to anticipate the targets o f others’ actions 
(Falck-Ytter, Gredeback, & von Hofsten, 2006) and learn from the observation o f others’ 
actions (Elsner & Aschersleben, 2003; Hauf, Elsner, & Aschersleben, 2004). 
Notw ithstanding these insightful findings, the neurocognitive m echanism s that subserve
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infants’ processing o f others’ actions have rem ained a topic o f intense theoretical discussion 
over the past few  years (e.g., B iro & Leslie, 2007; Daum  et al., 2009; Elsner, 2007; Gergely 
& Csibra, 2003; G redeback & M elinder, in press; Hauf, 2007; M eltzoff & M oore, 1989; 
M oore, 2006; Sodian, 2011; Tomasello, 1999; W oodward, Sommerville, & Guajardo, 2004). 
The m ain aim o f this thesis was thus to examine in greater detail some o f the m ost influential 
theories at the present time w ith regard to infants’ processing o f others’ actions.
Below, I first summarize the thesis and its m ain findings, and then discuss the 
im plications o f this w ork for future research. Finally, I will present the conclusion o f this 
thesis.
1. Summary
A fter the theoretical introduction provided in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 reports on a study that 
investigated infants’ and adults’ prediction o f an agent’s behavior by m easuring their 
anticipatory eye movements. In particular, this study aimed to investigate the im pact o f two 
proposed neurocognitive m echanism s -  frequency learning and teleological reasoning -  on 
hum an action prediction. The results suggested that infants’ anticipations are based on the 
frequency o f previous events; i.e. they expected that an agent would continue w ith an action 
that he had already carried out several times, but infants would not evaluate the efficiency o f 
the possible actions. The results for the adult population also studied in this paradigm, were 
less clear. Initially, their anticipations were based on the previous actions o f the agent, but 
this pattern rapidly changed over time. W hereas this study provides evidence for the im pact 
o f frequency learning on infants’ action prediction, adults go beyond this; their gaze behavior 
m ight rely on teleological reasoning.
In Chapter 3 the im pact o f 8-m onth-old infants’ active action experiences on their 
subsequent action perception was examined in an EEG  experiment. A fter one w eek o f 
training with a novel rattle, infants displayed more m otor activation w hen they heard the 
sound o f that rattle than w hen they heard either another fam iliar sound or a novel sound, 
which were not action related. This study provides experimental evidence that active action 
experiences play a role in the processing o f others’ actions. Furtherm ore, it suggests that the 
developm ent o f m otor resonance is based on acquired associations betw een actions and 
effects.
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Chapter 4 presents a study on 14- and 20-m onth-old infants’ prediction o f the target o f 
another person’s tool-use action. It w as investigated w hether infants initiate anticipatory eye 
m ovem ents based on the inform ation about an actor’s grasp and the orientation o f the tool. 
The results show that the 20-, but not the 14-month-old infants were able to flexibly predict 
the action’s target on the basis o f these cues. As infants as young as 9 months are already able 
to learn about statistical regularities (e.g., F iser & Aslin, 2002), this finding suggests that 
frequency learning is not the m ajor m echanism  underlying infants’ behavior in this task. As 
infants’ own tool-use abilities unfold over the second year o f life, the findings are in line with 
the notion that infants’ use o f these cues can only be realized in congruency w ith their own 
tool-use abilities.
In Chapter 5, the developm ent o f children’s ability to judge others’ action capabilities 
was investigated in 2.5-, 3.5-, and 5-year-old children. Em ploying a ‘choice’ task it could be 
shown that 3.5-year-old children were able to correctly evaluate others’ action capabilities. 
Additionally, even though the 3.5- and 5-year-olds perform ed at approxim ately the same 
level in the ‘choice’ task, the 5-year-old children clearly outperform ed the younger children 
in their ability to justify  their choice. It has been argued that the perception o f others’ action 
capabilities is based on the perception o f others’ affordances for action (Ram enzoni, Riley, 
Shockley, & Davis, 2008). Following this line o f reasoning the present study suggests that 
this m echanism develops over the third year o f life. Furtherm ore, it provides evidence that 
this is initially a practical ability that only becom es theoretically reflected in the course o f 
their further developm ent .
Chapters 6 and 7 report on tw o studies that examined the im pact o f m otor resonance 
and teleological reasoning. They investigated w hether 14-month-old infants’ im itation can be 
best explained by a sensorim otor m atching process between the m odel’s actions and the 
infants’ m otor repertoire ( ‘m otor resonance’), or rather by infants’ evaluation o f the 
efficiency o f others’ actions. To this end, both factors were m anipulated in the tw o studies. 
The results suggest -  in line w ith Chapter 2 -  that rational reasoning does not have an im pact 
on infants’ im itative behavior, but instead provide evidence for the role o f m otor resonance.
Chapter 8 form alized the theoretical approach o f the previous tw o chapters by 
suggesting a model o f im itation in infancy. This model proposes that infants’ im itation is 
based on the interplay betw een tw o mechanisms: m otor resonance and action-effect-binding. 
Two hypotheses w ere derived from the model and empirically investigated. First, it was
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hypothesized that infants should not im itate an action in the absence o f a salient action effect 
even w hen it induces high m otor resonance. Second, it was hypothesized that infants should 
not im itate an action that induces little m otor resonance, even w hen followed by a salient 
action effect. The results were in line w ith the predictions derived from the model, supporting 
the view  that m otor resonance and action-effect-binding play an im portant role in infants’ 
action perception.
Chapter 9 extends the observational learning findings o f Chapters 6, 7 and 8 to adults. 
By means o f a reaction tim e task, it investigated w hether participants are able to acquire 
bidirectional action-effect associations through observational learning only. To this end, 
participants observed how a model repeatedly pressed tw o buttons, w hich led to the 
production o f a specific tone. In a subsequent test phase, participants were faster w hen they 
had to perform the same button press as a response to the sound that was previously produced 
by this effect than w hen this m apping w as reversed. This indicates that the perception o f the 
sound activated a specific m otor code and that participants were thus able to acquire a 
bidirectional action-effect association by observational learning.
In Chapter 10, the neurocognitive mechanism s underlying infants’ ability for social 
learning w ere investigated by means o f an EEG  study. Based on the results o f Chapters 6 to 9 
it was hypothesized that infants should be able to acquire novel action-effect associations by 
m eans o f observational learning. For seven consecutive days, 9-m onth-old infants observed a 
caregiver playing w ith a rattle that produced a specific sound, but did not get the opportunity 
to play with the rattle themselves. A fter this training phase, infants’ electrophysiological 
responses were recorded. The participants displayed more m otor activation w hen they were 
presented with the sound made by this rattle com pared to tw o other sounds that w ere either as 
fam iliar as the rattle sound or totally novel. This shows that infants associated the sound o f 
the rattle w ith a m otor program  through observational learning. It is suggested that this 
m echanism  m ight underlie infants’ ability for social learning.
Taken together, the studies reported in this thesis provide support for the notions that 
perceptual learning processes, particularly frequency learning (Chapter 2) and affordance 
perception (Chapter 5), play an im portant role in children’s action perception rather than the 
perceived rationality o f others’ actions (Chapter 2). Furtherm ore, it could be shown that 
infants rely on their own action experiences to process others’ actions (i.e., m otor resonance; 
Chapter 3) and that this mechanism  very likely also plays a role in children’s action
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prediction (Chapter 4). Finally, the studies on im itative and observational learning suggest 
that infants’ im itation is based on both m otor resonance and action-effect binding (Chapters 
8, 10) rather than a rational evaluation o f others’ actions (Chapters 6, 7). This m echanism 
probably also plays a role in adults’ observational learning (Chapter 9). The following section 
will discuss the contribution o f these findings for a theory o f developing action perception 
and im plications for further research.
2. Contribution to a psychology of developing action perception
The m ain aim o f this thesis was to investigate the developm ent o f action perception in infants 
and young children and, in particular, its underlying neurocognitive mechanisms. W hat 
picture o f developm ent is given by the results o f the studies that w ere reported in this thesis? 
W hat is their contribution to a theory o f developing action perception?
The findings o f this thesis coincide w ith the claim that sensorim otor processes play an 
im portant role in young children’s processing o f others’ actions. On the one hand, evidence 
was provided that the learning o f visual associations subserves infants’ ability to predict 
others’ actions. On the other hand, several studies showed an im pact o f infants’ own action 
experiences and action capabilities on their processing o f others’ actions and their im itative 
learning, stressing thus the role o f m otor processes for action perception. Additionally, it 
could be shown that perceptually salient action effects are im portant in guiding infants’ 
imitation, w hich suggests that infants like to reproduce interesting (i.e. stimulating) events. In 
contrast, no evidence could be found for the claim  that infants’ action perception is subserved 
by an ability to assess the efficiency o f others’ actions. These findings are in line with 
theoretical notions that propose that the early developm ent o f  social cognition is based on 
sensorim otor couplings and that m ore advanced social-cognitive abilities develop out o f these 
more basic processes (e.g., Barresi & M oore, 1996; Bibok, Carpendale, & Lewis, 2008; 
Piaget, 1962; Thelen, 2000; see also M üller & Overton, 1998).
Interestingly, the studies suggest that dom ain-general and dom ain-specific 
m echanism s are involved in children’s developing action perception. On the one hand, 
associative learning about the frequency o f others’ actions is based on infants’ capacity for 
statistical learning, which is a dom ain-general process that plays a role in every kind o f event 
perception. On the other hand, evidence was provided for the im pact o f dom ain-specific 
m echanism s such as m otor resonance or affordance perception. Accordingly, one theoretical
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conclusion o f this thesis is that future research should abandon the research question, if  
dom ain-general or dom ain-specific processes are underlying young children’s action 
perception. Rather, it should be investigated, w hich domain-general and w hich domain- 
specific mechanism s emerge and are im portant during different phases o f development.
The results show that these sensorim otor processes are also relevant in adults’ action 
perception, that is, throughout the entire life span. In particular, also adults m ight predict 
actions on the basis o f frequency inform ation (see also Boseovski & Lee, 2006, for a study 
w ith preschoolers). Additionally, m otor resonance and action-effect binding plays a role in 
adults’ observational learning, too. The findings o f this thesis are thus in accordance with 
embodied cognition approaches, which stress the sensorim otor basis o f hum an cognition 
(e.g., F ischer & Zwaan, 2008; Glenberg, 2010)
The studies also suggest that m ore complex forms o f action understanding such as the 
perception o f others’ action capabilities or the ability to assess the efficiency o f an observed 
action develops at a later age and are not in place during infancy (see also Daum  et al., 2011; 
Klossek, M azzotta, & Puri, 2010; Pfeifer & Elsner, 2011). W ith respect to the ability to 
assess others’ action capabilities the results o f this thesis are in accord w ith other findings 
that this ability develops around 3 years o f age (see Rochat, 1995). Furtherm ore, whereas the 
present studies suggest that infants around 1 year o f age do not reason about the efficiency o f 
others’ actions, it does not give a definitive answer about the developmental trajectory o f this 
ability. However, as an assessm ent o f the efficiency o f another person’s action rests 
conceptually upon the capacity to perceive his or her action capabilities (because to be able to 
evaluate w hether someone has acted in the for him /her m ost efficient way to attain a goal we 
need to know if  he would have been able to perform another action to reach the same goal8), 
there is reason to assum e that also this ability may not develop before 3 years o f age (but, for 
a different claim see, for example, Zmyj et al., 2009).
W hy m ight this be the case? It may be speculated that the direct perception o f an 
action activates the related perceptual and m otor processes that subserve the processing o f
8 Interestingly, within comparative psychology it has been claimed that also chimpanzees (and dogs; 
Range et al., 2007; but see Kaminski et al., 2011) imitate rationally (i.e., reason about the efficiency 
of others’ actions; e.g., Buttelmann et al., 2007), whereas they lack the ability to perceive others’ 
action capabilities (Vonk & Subiaul, 2009). It remains a puzzling question, how chimpanzees might 
be able to judge the relative efficiency of means, if  they are not able to perceive others’ action 
capabilities.
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this action. In contrast, the perception o f others’ action capabilities is not the processing o f an 
ongoing action, but a rather abstract processing o f w hat somebody may be able to do. This, 
however, is a cognitively more complex task as one has to deal with several possible events -  
instead o f ju st processing one ongoing action. In a sim ilar vein, the evaluation o f the 
efficiency o f others’ actions rests upon a num ber o f other cognitive competencies, including 
the ability to think counterfactually (e.g., w hen reasoning that somebody could have acted 
more efficiently to attain a certain goal), w hich does not develop before the preschool age (cf. 
Rafetseder, Cristi-Vargas, & Perner, 2010). These considerations suggest that the 
developm ent o f these more complex forms o f action perception (and understanding) is related 
to and probably depends on the developm ent in other psychological domains such as 
representational developm ent (cf. Barresi & M oore, 1996; M oore, 2006) and/or the 
engagem ent in narrative practices (cf. Hutto, 2008). Further research is needed to investigate 
the developmental onset o f complex forms o f action understanding and how it develops out 
o f sensorim otor based forms o f action perception.
3. Implications for further research
One o f the central questions o f this thesis concerned the ability to evaluate others’ actions in 
term s o f efficiency. It has been proposed that this is a central ability as it allows humans to 
predict others’ m ovements (when the action’s goal is known) or their action goals (when the 
m ovem ent path is known). Furtherm ore, it has been claim ed that this ability is based on a 
cognitive core principle and is already present as early as 6 months o f age (Gergely & Csibra, 
2003). Several studies presented in this thesis systematically examined this claim, but could 
not find any support for this theory. Rather, the findings suggested a num ber o f alternative 
explanations to account for the previous findings that claimed evidence for infants’ rational 
action perception. This thesis therefore questions the claim that already infants evaluate 
others’ actions in term s o f their efficiency, and lim its therefore the theoretical im pact o f the 
Theory o f  R ational A ction  (Gergely & Csibra, 2003). The precise developmental pathway o f 
this ability needs therefore further investigation. Importantly, the findings o f this study do not 
rule out the possibility that this ability is evolutionary inherited and becom es functionally 
relevant only at a later age. On the other hand, it could also be possible that this ability is the 
result o f cultural socialization processes (cf. Hutto, 2008). One way o f disentangling the 
contributions o f phylogenetic and cultural processes m ight be to conduct culturally 
com parative research. I f  hum ans’ ability and propensity to reason about others’ actions in
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term s o f efficiency is unaffected by the cultural context, one would expect that children 
should show this ability at around the same age in all cultures. However, i f  the sociocultural 
context plays an im portant role, variations between cultures should be expected.
The model o f im itative learning in infancy presented in Chapter 8 suggests that 
infants’ im itation is based on the interplay o f tw o processes: m otor resonance and action­
effect binding. Interestingly, already in the first ha lf o f the 20th century, developmental 
psychologists discussed the question o f how hum an infants w ere able to imitate others’ 
actions or, in other words, how infants relate others’ actions to their own action repertoire, 
especially w hen they are not able to visually perceive their own action. Guillaum e (1925) 
suggested that a perceived action m ight serve as a signal that induces the same action in the 
infant, as perceived and executed action have been related to each other by means o f 
associative learning w hen the infant executes an action and perceives the visual consequences 
o f his own action. Piaget (1962), however, proposed that the perceived action serves as an 
index that allows the infant to assim ilate the other’s action to their own (invisible) action. 
Continuing this discussion, M eltzoff and M oore (1989) suggested that infants are able to 
relate perceived and executed actions by means o f an intermodal m atching scheme (but see 
also Anisfeld, 1991). The presented findings are inform ative for this debate because they are 
in contrast w ith all three aforem entioned theories, w hich claimed that the perception o f an 
action leads to a direct im itation o f the perceived action. The findings stress -  in line with 
other research (e.g., Elsner, 2007; Verschoor, W eidem a, Biro, & Hommel, 2010; see also 
Bekkering, W ohlschläger, & Gattis, 2000) -  the motivational aspects o f infants’ imitation: 
infants w ant to attain a goal, typically to retrieve an interesting effect. Furtherm ore, w ith 
regard to the origins o f the ability to relate others’ actions to one’s own m otor repertoire, 
Chapter 3 o f this thesis suggests that learned associations betw een actions and effects might 
play an im portant role and is thus in line w ith the considerations put forward by Guillaume 
(1925). However, this thesis does not tackle the question o f how the presented mechanisms 
interact, during the course o f children’s development, w ith other factors like pedagogical cues 
(Csibra & Gergely, 2009) or the social context (Carpenter, 2010).
It has been proposed that the perception o f o thers’ affordances plays a central role in 
the perception o f others’ actions (e.g., M ark, 2007; Stoffregen, Gorday, Sheng, & Flynn, 
1999). In particular, convincing arguments have been provided, which suggest that the 
perception o f others’ action capabilities may be subserved by affordance perception 
m echanism s (Ramenzoni et al., 2008). In more detail, it has been proposed that humans are
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able to directly perceive the actions that objects afford for another person and that they are by 
means o f this mechanism able to perceive the other’s action capabilities. This thesis presents 
first evidence that the ability to perceive others’ action capabilities develops around 3 years 
and suggests that the perception o f others’ affordances might therefore be a developmental 
achievement o f this age. However, the present research was restricted to an identification of 
this developmental trajectory and it remains for further research to investigate why this 
ability develops at this age. One possibility could be that this development crucially depends 
on the development o f other abilities such as inhibitory control and executive functioning, 
which develop around this time (see Zelazo & Müller, 2002, for a review). More precisely, a 
judgm ent o f the actions that objects afford for others requires that the child is able to prescind 
from the affordance the objects present for him. Such an ability to suppress concurrent and 
more salient information in order to focus on another task is commonly related to executive 
functioning, which in turn is thought to rely on the development o f the prefrontal cortex. 
Further neurocognitive research is necessary to investigate this hypothesis.
In her framework theory o f cognitive evolution, Heyes (2003) differentiated between 
phylogenetic and ontogenetic processes as well as between constructive and inflective 
processes in the genesis o f novel cognitive capacities. W hereas the former distinction refers 
to the source o f the selection process, which could be based either on natural selection or on 
developmental selection, does the latter distinction refer to the locus o f change, which could 
be either a cognitive mechanism itself or the specific input to a mechanism. In light o f this 
framework, the present results stress the relevance o f ontogenetic inflective processes in 
children’s action perception. More precisely, perceptual learning and motor resonance can be 
classified as ontogenetic and inflective, as they both rely on existing cognitive mechanisms, 
which become biased to specific inputs in the course o f development. The case o f affordance 
perception is less clear, but the fact that affordance perception depends crucially on action 
experiences (e.g., Franchak, van der Zalm, & Adolph, in press) suggests that this mechanism 
is also based on ontogenetic processes. Importantly, the present thesis therefore limits the 
potential theoretical impact o f the nativist claims o f domain-specific reasoning theories that 
proposed that young children’s processing o f others’ actions is based on mechanisms that 
evolved in processes o f phylogenetic construction (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1997; Csibra & 
Gergely, in press). Clarifying whether and how phylogenetic processes or innate competences 
contribute to children’s developing action perception thus remains a topic for future research 
(but see also Mameli & Bateson, 2006).
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SUMMARY AND EPILOGUE
Finally, the chapters o f this thesis have highlighted a number o f mechanisms that 
might play a role in children’s developing action perception. The existence o f each o f these 
mechanisms was investigated in carefully designed and controlled experiments. However, in 
daily life, humans do not rely on only one o f these mechanisms, but likely on all o f them. 
That suggests that these mechanisms dynamically interact with each other to result in 
adaptive and successful behavior (cf. Thelen & Smith, 1994). Additionally, research has 
provided evidence for considerable intra-individual variability in psychological functioning 
(e.g., Molenaar & Campbell, 2009; van Dijk & van Geert, 2007). Although this thesis 
systematically examined the impact o f different mechanisms on young children’s action 
perception, it is limited, as it did not investigate the dynamic interplay between the 
mechanisms presented here nor their intra-individual variability. It leaves it to future research 
to adequately address these dimensions o f children’s developing action perception.
4. Final conclusion
In summary, the present thesis provides clear evidence for the relevance o f sensorimotor 
mechanisms in the early development o f action perception and is thus in line with embodied 
and sensorimotor approaches to human cognition. In contrast, only limited evidence was 
presented o f the impact o f the principle o f rational action on action perception. The results 
stress the role o f perceptual learning, motor resonance, action-effect binding and affordance 
perception in infants’ and children’s cognitive processing o f others’ actions and in their 
ability to predict as well as learn from others’ behavior.
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Samenvatting (Nederlands)
De ontwikkeling van handelingswaarneming: neurocognitieve mechanismen van 
informatieverwerking over de handelingen van andere mensen in de kindertijd
Ontwikkelingspsychologisch onderzoek heeft in de afgelopen jaren ons begrip van het 
handelingsbegrip bij kinderen sterk vergroot. Zo is bijvoorbeeld aangetoond dat kinderen al 
in het eerste levensjaar menselijke handelingen wellicht anders verwerken dan fysieke 
gebeurtenissen. Bovendien is gebleken dat baby’s anticiperen op de handelingen van anderen 
en door observatie kunnen leren. Dat wordt duidelijk in hun imitatie van de handelingen van 
andere mensen. Deze resultaten van deze studies zijn vruchtbaar geweest voor de 
ontwikkelingspsychologie. Ze hebben geleid tot de formulering van een aantal nieuwe 
theorieën over de ontwikkeling van het handelingsbegrip en van imitatie.
Het doel van dit proefschrift was om een aantal van de invloedrijkste theorieën over actie 
perceptie bij kinderen te toetsen. Daartoe zijn 9 experimentele studies uitgevoerd met 
kinderen tussen 8 maanden en met volwassenen, waarbij gebruik is gemaakt van 
verschillende onderzoeksmethoden zoals gedragsmetingen in imitatie- en 
reactietijdexperimenten, de registratie van kijkgedrag - met op infrarood licht gebaseerde eye- 
tracking methoden - en electrofysiologische metingen van de hersenenactiviteit.
In de eerste studie werd een eye-tracking paradigma gebruikt om te onderzoeken of 
handelingsanticipatie bij 9 maanden oude kinderen en volwassenen wordt beïnvloed door 
perceptueel leren o f het nadenken over de efficiëntie van de handelingen van anderen. De 
deelnemers aan deze studie zagen op een scherm hoe een agent een lang pad gebruikte om 
zijn doel te bereiken, omdat een korter (en efficiënter) pad niet begaanbaar was. W anneer in 
de daaropvolgende testfase het kortere pad wél begaanbaar was, verwachtten zowel de 
kinderen als de volwassenen dat de agent nog steeds het lange pad zou nemen. Als deze dan 
het kortere pad koos, pasten de volwassenen hun anticipatiegedrag aan en anticipeerden naar 
het kortere pad. De kinderen deden dit echter niet. Dit toont aan dat bij de 
handelingsanticipatie van zuigelingen perceptueel leren van frequente gebeurtenissen een 
belangrijke rol speelt, terwijl de handelingsvoorspelling op basis van een beoordeling van de 
efficiëntie later in de ontwikkeling ontstaat.
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In de tweede studie werd met behulp van elektro-encefalografie (EEG) onderzocht of 
zuigelingen al bidirectionele handelings-effect associaties kunnen verwerven. Om dit te 
onderzoeken, kregen kinderen van 8 maanden een rammelaar om gedurende een week mee te 
spelen. Op deze manier leerden ze een bepaald geluid door eigen handelen te veroorzaken. 
Daarnaast kregen ze een tweede geluid te horen dat via een voice recorder werd aangeboden, 
en dat dus niet met een handeling samenhing. Na deze trainingsfase werd met het EEG de 
hersenenactiviteit van de kinderen gemeten terwijl ze naar de twee bekende geluiden en naar 
een derde, onbekend, geluid luisterden. Een frequentie-analyse van de data liet zien dat de 
mu-frequentie band over de motorische cortex sterker gedesynchroniseerd was als de 
kinderen naar het geluid van de rammelaar luisterden dan als ze de andere twee geluiden 
hoorden. Dit resultaat ondersteunt de hypothese dat zuigelingen al handelingseffect 
associaties verwerven. Deze bevindingen corresponderen met bevindingen over audiovisuele 
spiegelneuronen bij apen.
In de derde studie werd onderzocht o f kinderen door observatie kunnen leren, dat een 
werktuig verschillende functies kan hebben en dat de manier waarop iemand het werktuig 
vastpakt, voorspelt wat hij ermee gaat doen. Veertien en 20 maanden oude kinderen keken op 
een eye-tracking monitor hoe een persoon met een werktuig twee verschillende handelingen 
op telkens twee verschillende doelobjecten uitvoerde. De manier waarop het werktuig werd 
gepakt en vastgehouden was typisch voor de gebruiksfunctie ervan. Terwijl de 20 maanden 
oude kinderen op grond van deze informatie in staat waren het goede doelobject te 
voorspellen, konden de 14 maande oude kinderen dit nog niet. Cognitieve mechanismen die 
hier mogelijk aan ten grondslag liggen, zijn statistisch leren, motorische resonantie en het 
waarnemen van affordances.
De vierde studie onderzocht de ontwikkeling van de vaardigheid om de 
handelingsmogelijkheden van andere mensen waar te nemen. Kinderen van 2,5, 3,5 en 5 jaar 
observeerden hoe een actor in verschillende situaties hulp van vrienden nodig had. In iedere 
situatie waren twee vrienden aanwezig, waarvan er telkens één in staat was hem te helpen. De 
kinderen werd gevraagd aan wie ze dachten dat de actor hulp zou vragen. De resultaten lieten 
zien dat alleen de kinderen uit de twee oudere leeftijdsgroepen in staat waren de goede keuze 
te maken. Daarnaast konden alleen de 5 jaar oude kinderen hun keuze goed beredeneren. Als 
ten grondslagliggend mechanisme wordt de vaardigheid voor de waarneming van de 
affordances van andere personen voorgesteld.
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In de vijfde en zesde studie werden twee neurocognitieve mechanismen van imitatie bij 
zuigelingen onderzocht. Het principe van de rationele handelingen stelt dat zuigelingen al de 
efficiëntie van geobserveerde handelingen kunnen beoordelen en deze handelingen, 
afhankelijk van hun efficiëntie, imiteren. Aan de andere tegenstelling wordt gesteld dat 
motorische resonantie -  dat wil zeggen de activatie van het eigen motorisch repertoire door 
observatie van de handelingen van andere personen - een belangrijke rol speelt in het 
imitatieproces. In zeven condities werd systematisch gemanipuleerd o f de gemodelleerde 
handeling efficiënt was en o f de 14 maanden oude kinderen de waargenomen handeling aan 
hun eigen motorisch repertoire konden relateren. Een analyse van de reproductie van de 
geobserveerde handelingen door de kinderen liet zien dat de kinderen de handelingen vaker 
imiteerden wanneer ze de handelingen aan hun eigen motorische repertoire konden relateren, 
onafhankelijk van de efficiëntie van het geobserveerde gedrag. Deze bevindingen 
ondersteunen de conclusie dat motorische resonantie een centrale rol speelt in de imitatie bij 
zuigelingen.
In de zevende studie werden de bevindingen van de voorafgaande studies samengevat met als 
doel een model van imitatie in de zuigelingenleeftijd te formuleren en dit model te toetsen. 
Het gepresenteerde model veronderstelt dat imitatie op de vaardigheid gebaseerd is, dat 
handelingseffect associaties door observatie te verwerven zijn, en dat zuigelingen vooral 
handelingen imiteren die tot saillante effecten leiden. Dit model leidt tot de hypothese dat de 
imitatie van een handeling minder waarschijnlijk is als het kind de handeling niet aan zijn 
eigen motorische repertoire kan relateren o f als de handeling niet tot saillante effecten leidt. 
De resultaten van de studie bevestigden het model.
De achtste studie toetste de verwerving van bidirectionele handelingseffect associaties op 
volwassen leeftijd. De deelnemers zagen hoe een ander persoon met twee handelingen 
telkens een geluid veroorzaakte. In de daaropvolgende testfase reageerden de proefpersonen 
sneller als ze dezelfde handeling in reactie op de geluiden moesten uitvoeren, wanneer deze 
eerder de geluiden had veroorzaakt dan wanneer de relatie tussen geluidje en handeling 
omgedraaid was. Dit resultaat toont aan dat de waarneming van het effect van een 
voorafgaande handeling het daarmee geassocieerde motorprogramma activeert. De 
deelnemers hadden daarmee dus een bidirectioneel handelingseffect associatie door 
observatie verworven.
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In de negende studie werden de corticale mechanismen van het leren door observatie bij 
zuigelingen met hulp van EEG onderzocht. Op basis van de eerdere bevindingen werd de 
hypothese opgesteld dat kinderen handelingseffect associaties door observatie kunnen 
verwerven. Deze zouden op corticaal niveau door associaties tussen de motorische cortex en 
een verdeeld netwerk voor de representatie van het respectievelijk handelingseffect 
gerealiseerd zijn. In analogie met de opzet van de tweede studie leerden 9 maanden oude 
kinderen in een trainingsperiode van een week dat het gebruik van een rammelaar tot een 
bepaald effect leidt, daardoor dat ze de handelingen van iemand anders observeerden. 
Gedurende dezelfde week luisterden de kinderen ook naar een andere geluid, dat door een 
voice recorder werd aangeboden. In de daaropvolgende testfase werd de hersenenactiviteit 
van de kinderen gemeten, terwijl ze naar de twee bekende geluiden en een onbekend geluid 
luisterden. Het resultaat toonde een sterkere desynchronisatie aan de mu-frequentieband over 
de motorische cortex voor het rammelaargeluidje in vergelijking met de andere twee 
geluidjes aan. Dit betekent dat de waarneming van het rammelaargeluidje tot activatie in de 
motor cortex leidde en dat het corticale motorische systeem bij het leren door observatie 
betrokken is.
Samenvattend laat dit proefschrift zien dat mechanismen van perceptueel leren een 
belangrijke rol spelen in de ontwikkeling van handelingswaarneming. Dit geldt vooral voor 
statistisch leren over de frequenties van handelingen (Hoofdstuk 2) en de affordances van 
andere personen (Hoofdstuk 5). Bovendien werd aangetoond dat zuigelingen eigen 
handelingservaringen gebruiken nij het verwerken van informatie over de handelingen van 
andere personen (Hoofdstuk 3). Dit is waarschijnlijk ook bij de handelingsvoorspelling 
belangrijk (Hoofdstuk 4). De studies over imitatie en leren door observatie laten zien dat 
imitatie op de zuigelingleeftijd toe te schrijven is aan motorische resonantie en het leren van 
handelingseffect associaties (Hoofstukken 8, 10) en niet aan rationele afwegingen 
(Hoofdstukken 6, 7). Dit mechanisme speelt waarschijnlijk ook een rol in het leren door 
observatie op volwassen leeftijd (Hoofdstuk 9). De studies in dit proefschrift tonen dus aan 
dat perceptuele en motorische processen een belangrijke rol spelen in de zich ontwikkelende 
handelingswaarneming.
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Zusammenfassung (Deutsch)
Die Entwicklung der Handlungswahrnehmung: Neurokognitive Mechanismen der 
Verarbeitung der Handlungen Anderer im Kleinkindesalter
Entwicklungpsychologische Forschung hat in den letzten Jahren unser Verständnis der 
frühkindlichen Handlungswahrnehmung massiv erweitert. So haben Befunde beispielsweise 
nahegelegt, dass bereits Kinder im ersten Lebensjahr menschliche Handlungen anders 
verarbeiten als physikalische Ereignisse. Darüber hinaus wurden Nachweise erbracht, dass 
Kleinkinder Handlungen anderer Menschen antizipieren sowie durch die Beobachtung von 
Handlungen lernen und diese imitieren können. Diese Studien waren sehr gewinnbringend für 
die entwicklungspsychologische Theoriebildung, da sie zur Formulierung einer Anzahl 
einflussreicher Theorien über die Entwicklung des Handlungsverständnisses und der 
Imitation geführt haben. Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit ist es, einige prominente 
sozialkognitive und neurokognitive Mechanismen der Handlungswahrnehmung im 
Kleinkindesalter systematisch zu überprüfen. Unter Verwendung von Verhaltensmaßen in 
Imitations- oder Reaktionszeitparadigmen, der Registrierung kindlichen Blickverhaltens mit 
Hilfe von auf Infrarotlicht basierten Eye-Trackern sowie elektrophysiologischer Korrelate der 
Gehirnaktivität wurden neun experimentelle Studien mit Kindern im Alter von 8 Monaten bis 
5 Jahren sowie Erwachsenen durchgeführt.
Die erste Studie untersuchte die Hypothese, dass bereits junge Kinder die Erwartung haben, 
dass eine andere Person effizient handelt. Alternativ wurde vorgeschlagen, dass assoziatives 
Lernen von Häufigkeiten, der zentrale Mechanismus der Handlungsantizipation im 
Säuglingsalter ist. Der Einfluss dieser Mechanismen auf die Handlungsantizipationen von 9 
Monate alten Babys und Erwachsenen wurde in einem Eye-Tracking-Paradigma erforscht. 
Die Teilnehmer dieser Studie beobachteten auf einem Bildschirm, wie ein sich ueber den 
Schirm bewegender Protagonist einen langen Weg nahm, um sein Ziel zu erreichen, da der 
kürzere (d.h., effizientere) W eg nicht begehbar war. Als in der darauf folgenden Testphase 
der kürzere Weg verfügbar war, erwarteten Kinder wie Erwachsene im ersten Testtrial, dass 
der Protagonist noch immer den längeren Weg nehmen würde. Als er jedoch den kürzeren 
Weg zum Ziel wählte, veränderten die Erwachsenen, nicht aber die 9 Monate alten Kinder, in 
den folgenden Trials ihr Antizipationsverhalten und zeigten visuelle Antizipationen zum
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kürzeren Weg. Diese Befunde legen nahe, dass im Säuglingsalter perzeptuelles Lernen die 
Handlungsvorhersage dominiert, während Handlungsvorhersagen auf Grund einer 
Beurteilung der Effizienz möglicher Handlungen ein späteres Entwicklungsprodukt sind.
In der zweiten Studie wurde mit Hilfe von Elektroenzephalographie (EEG) erforscht, ob 
bereits Säuglinge in der Lage sind, bidirektionale Handlungs-Effekt-Assoziationen zu 
erwerben. Zu diesem Zweck spielten 8 Monate alte Kinder eine W oche lang mit einer Rassel 
und lernten dabei, dass sie durch ihre eigene Handlung ein bestimmtes Geräusch 
verursachten. Gleichzeitig wurden sie mit einem zweiten Geräusch vertraut gemacht, welches 
von einem Voicerecorder dargeboten wurde (und daher nicht handlungsrelatiert war). Nach 
dem Training wurde das EEG abgeleitet, während die Kinder die zwei bekannten sowie ein 
neues Geräusch hörten. Eine Frequenzanalyse der Daten ergab, dass die Kinder eine stärkere 
Desynchronisation im mu-Frequenzband über dem motorischen Kortex zeigten (d.h., 
motorische Aktivation), wenn sie das Rasselgeräusch wahrnahmen im Vergleich zu den zwei 
anderen Geräuschen. Dieser Befund unterstützt die These, dass bereits Kinder im 
Säuglingsalter Handlungs-Effekt-Assoziationen erwerben, und korrespondiert 
Untersuchungen über audiovisuelle Spiegelneuronen bei Affen.
Ziel der dritten Studie war es zu untersuchen, ob Kinder durch Beobachung lernen können, 
dass ein Werkzeug unterschiedliche Funktionen erfüllt und dass die Weise, wie es gegriffen 
wird, prädiktiv ist für seinen weiteren Gebrauch. Vierzehn und 20 Monate alte Kinder 
verfolgten auf einem Eye-Tracking-Monitor, wie eine Person mit einem W erkzeug zwei 
unterschiedliche Handlungen an je  einem anderen Zielobjekt durchführte. Die Art, wie das 
Werkzeug gegriffen und gehalten wurde, war dabei kennzeichnend für seinen weiteren 
Gebrauch. W ährend die 20 Monate alten Kinder in der Lage waren, aufgrund dieser 
Information das richtige Zielobjekt vorherzusagen, war dies den 14 Monate alten Kindern 
nicht möglich. Mögliche zugrunde liegende kognitive Mechanismen könnten statistisches 
Lernen, die W ahrnehmung von Affordances und sein.
Die vierte Studie untersucht die Entwicklung der Fähigkeit, die Handlungsmöglichkeiten 
einer anderen Person wahrzunehmen. Dazu beobachteten Kinder im Alter von 2,5, 3,5 und 5 
Jahren, wie ein Protagonist in unterschiedlichen Situationen die Hilfe von Freunden 
benötigte. In jeder Situationen waren zwei Freunde anwesend, von denen jeweils einer 
physisch fähig war (bspw. groß genug oder stark genug), ihm zu helfen. Die Kinder wurden 
gefragt, wen der Protagonist um Hilfe fragen würde. Es zeigte sich, dass nur die Kinder in
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den zwei älteren Altersgruppen dazu imstande waren, den richtigen Freund zu wählen. 
Darüber hinaus waren nur die 5-jährigen Kinder in der Lage, ihre Wahl korrekt zu begründen. 
Diese Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Kinder ab 3 Jahren fähig sind, die Handlungsmöglichkeiten 
anderer wahrzunehmen. Dies beruht wahrscheinlich auf der Fähigkeit, die Affordances 
anderer Personen wahrzunehmen.
In der fünften und sechsten Studie wurden zwei neurokognitive Mechanismen der Imitation 
im Säuglingsalter überprüft. Das Prinzip rationaler Handlung besagt, dass Kinder die 
Effizienz beobachteter Handlungen beurteilen und Handlungen entsprechend ihrer Effizienz 
imitieren. Demgegenüber wurde vorgeschlagen, dass Motorresonanz (d.h. die Aktivation des 
eigenen motorischen Repertoires durch die Beobachtung der Handlungen anderer) eine 
zentrale Rolle im Imitationsprozess spielt. In sieben Bedingungen wurde systematisch 
manipuliert, ob die modellierte Handlung effizient war oder nicht und ob die 14 Monate alten 
Babys die wahrgenommene Handlung auf ihr eigenes Motorrepertoire beziehen konnten oder 
nicht (das bedeutet, ob sie zu Motorresonanz führte oder nicht). Eine Analyse der kindlichen 
Reproduktion der observierten Handlung zeigte, dass die Babys die Handlung dann häufiger 
imitierten, wenn sie sie auf ihr eigenes Motorrepertoire beziehen konnten, unabhängig von 
ihrer Effizienz. Diese Befunde legen nahe, dass Motorresonanze eine zentrale Rolle in der 
kindlichen Imitation spielt.
Ziel der siebten Studie war es, die Befunde der vorhergehenden Studien zusammenzufassen, 
ein Modell der Imitation im Säuglingsalter zu formulieren und die Vorhersagen dieses 
Modells zu überprüfen. Das präsentierte Modell geht davon aus, dass Imitation auf der 
Fähigkeit beruht, Handlungs-Effekt-Assoziationen durch Beobachtung zu erwerben, und dass 
Säugling vor allem Handlungen imitieren, die zu salienten Effekten führen. Dieses Modell 
führte zu den Hypothesen, dass die Imitation einer Handlung dann weniger wahrscheinlich 
ist, wenn sie durch das Kind entweder nicht auf das eigene Motorrepertoire bezogen werden 
kann oder wenn sie nicht zu einem salienten Effekt führt. Die Ergebnisse der Studie waren im 
Einklang mit diesen Vorhersagen und bestätigten das Modell.
Die achte Studie überprüfte den Erwerb von bidirektionalen Handlungs-Effekt-Assoziationen 
durch Beobachtung im Erwachsenenalter. Die Teilnehmer sahen, wie eine andere Person 
wiederholt durch zwei Handlungen je  einen auditorischen Effekt auslöste. Es zeigte sich, dass 
die Versuchspersonen in der darauf folgenden Testphase schneller reagierten, wenn sie die 
gleichen Handlungen als Reaktion auf die Töne ausführten, die zuvor durch diese Handlung
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verursacht wurden, als wenn die Zuordnung zwischen Ton und Handlung umgekehrt war. 
Dies zeigt, dass die W ahrnehmung des Effektes einer Handlung das damit assozierte 
Motorprogramm aktiviert und dass die Versuchspersonen eine bidirektionale Handlungs- 
Effekt-Assoziation durch Beobachtung erworben hatten.
In der neunten Studie wurden die neuralen Grundlagen des Beobachtungslernens im 
Säuglingsalter mit Hilfe von EEG untersucht. Aufbauend auf den vorherigen Untersuchungen 
wurde die Hypothese aufgestellt, dass Kinder durch Beobachtung Handlung-Effekt- 
Assoziationen erwerben. Diese sollten auf kortikaler Ebene durch Assoziationen zwischen 
dem motorischen Kortex und einem distribuierten Netzwerk für die Repräsentation der 
jeweiligen Handlungseffekte realisiert sein. Analog zum Design der zweiten Studie lernten 9 
Monate alte Säuglinge während einer einwöchigen Trainingsperiode, dass der Gebrauch einer 
Rassel ein bestimmtes Geräusch verursachte, indem sie die Handlung einer anderen Person 
beobachteten. Zeitgleich wurden die Kinder mit einem weiteren Geräusch vertraut gemacht, 
welches von einen Voicerecorder abgespielt wurde. In der darauf folgenden Testphase 
wurden die Hirnströme der Versuchspersonen aufgezeichnet, während ihnen die zwei 
bekannten Geräusche sowie ein neues Geräusch dargeboten wurden. Die Kinder zeigten eine 
stärkere Desynchronisation im mu-Frequenzband über dem motortischen Kortex für das 
Rasselgeräusch (im Vergleich zu den anderen zwei Geräuschen). Dies bedeutet, dass die 
W ahrnehmung des Rasselgeräusches zu einer Aktivation des motorischen Kortex führte und 
dass das kortikale Motorsystem beim Lernen durch Beobachtung eine wichtige Rolle spielt.
Zusammenfassend zeigt die vorliegende Arbeit, dass perzeptuelle Mechanismen - vor allem 
assoziatives Lernen über die Häufigkeit der Handlungen anderer (Kapitel 2) und die 
W ahrnehmung der Affordances anderer Personen (Kapitel 5) - eine wichtige Rolle in der sich 
entwickelnden Handlungswahrnehmung spielen. Darüber hinaus konnte gezeigt werden, dass 
im Säuglingsalter eigene Handlungserfahrungen die Verarbeitung der Handlungen anderer 
beeinflussen (Kapitel 3) und wahrscheinlich auch für die Handlungsvorhersage wichtig sind 
(Kapitel 4). Die Studien zur Imitation und zum Lernen durch Beobachtung legen nahe, dass 
kindliche Imitation auf Motorresonanz und den Erwerb von Handlungs-Effekt-Assoziationen 
zurückzuführen ist (Kapitel 8, 10) und weniger auf rationale Abwägungsprozesse (Kapitel 6, 
7). Dieser Mechanismus spielt wahrscheinlich auch eine Rolle im Beobachtungslernen im 
Erwachsenenalter (Kapitel 9). Diese Studien legen nahe, dass perzeptuelle und motorische 
Prozesse eine zentrale Rolle in der Verarbeitung von Informationen über die Handlungen 
anderer spielen.
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